Technology adoption and the role of government: examining the national information and communication technology policies in developing countries by Maynard, Nicholas C.
  
 
 
 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: 
Examining the National Information and Communication Technology  
Policies in Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
Nicholas C. Maynard 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy  
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by: 
Michael Luger 
Harvey Goldstein 
Sudanshu Handa 
Nichola Lowe 
Gunther Maier 
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2007 
Nicholas C. Maynard 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Nicholas C. Maynard: Technology Adoption and the Role of Government: Examining the 
National Information and Communication Technology Policies in Developing Countries 
 
(Under the direction of Michael Luger, Harvey Goldstein,  
Sudanshu Handa, Nichola Lowe, and Gunther Maier) 
 
With this dissertation, I seek to provide an in-depth understanding of the role developing 
country governments can play in accelerating ICT adoption.  By analyzing the institutional, 
technology, and market factors, this study seeks to provide a solid foundation for examining the 
design and implementation of successful ICT strategies.  This research uses a combination of 
empirical and case study evidence to highlight the key challenges of reforming ICT policies and 
institutions within developing countries.  Further, this study clarifies the role of national 
governments in sponsoring and promoting ICT access and usage. 
Currently, there is a growing disparity between those developing countries that have 
successfully integrated ICTs into their economies and those that have not.  Many developing 
countries have created national ICT policies and institutions to bolster technological deployment 
with the goal of supporting productivity gains and new business development.  However, for 
many countries, these initiatives have not translated to higher levels of ICT adoption or improved 
economic development.  This has left developing country governments with a great deal of 
uncertainty over what policies to implement and which initiatives to fund.   
The case study analysis within this study has identified several key barriers to 
accelerating ICT adoption within developing countries.  These barriers include a lack of 
 iv 
affordable services, low levels of local expertise, and poor infrastructure, which combine to 
prevent latecomer countries from developing self-sustaining demand within the sector.  This 
study’s results suggest that the critical determinant for overcoming these barriers is a high level 
of government involvement after ICT market privatization.   
Those developing countries with accelerated growth in their ICT sectors tend to have 
institutions capable of adapting their policies and institutions to the rapid pace technological and 
market evolution.  This is also confirmed by my empirical research, which showed a positive and 
significant relationship between ICT institutions and levels of ICT adoption, while controlling 
for economic and social factors.  In contrast, those developing country governments without an 
active role in regulating ICT competition or supporting ICT adoption and innovation have been 
unable to sustain rapid growth of their sector.   
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
Research Problem and Hypothesis 
The creation of an information and communications technology sector has 
become a key component of a country’s economic development process, along similar 
lines to infrastructure sectors such as transportation, power or water. However, ICTs are 
different from these other infrastructure services due to the rapidly evolving technology 
and ability to easily share assets across operators; making the sector markedly different 
from other infrastructure.  These differences allow the ICT market to become more 
competitive than these other infrastructure sectors and therefore more appropriate for 
private sector ownership rather than public sector monopoly.  Despite this shift from a 
government ownership, the state must continue to play a vital role in the diffusion of ICT 
adoption and supporting innovation within the sector.  Those developing countries 
without a strong role for the state are typically unable to leverage their latecomer 
advantages to accelerate their ICT adoption.  Instead, this emergence of private sector 
ownership should lead to a more complex relationship between the government and the 
sector that includes an active balancing market competition through ICT regulation.  This 
role of the state should also include striving to attain rates of ICT adoption and utilization 
similar to those achieved in advanced economies while coordinating public-private-
academic efforts to support R&D initiatives.  
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Many developing country governments have attempted to bolster their markets 
through a wide range of policies only to see them fail, while a large number of 
developing countries have yet to even begin the process.  Despite these risks, there are a 
number of developing countries that have successfully initiated and sustained a rapid ICT 
adoption rate.  While there is no single approach to successfully accelerating ICT 
deployments within developing countries, there are a number of commonalities across 
these successful developing countries.  These include policy and institutional reforms that 
are focused on remaking the ICT sector by opening the market to new operators, 
investment, and technologies.  These national institutional and policy reforms are vital to 
diffusing ICT adoption across a population, creating economic benefits for a larger share 
of the developing country.   
To help ensure that these ICT investments translate into diffused economic 
benefits, developing country governments have designed their ICT policies within the 
larger context of their economic development efforts.  This ensures that those 
technologies adopted by the developing countries are the most appropriate to the local 
context and economic needs of the population.  These difficult technology choices 
require a coordinated effort by the government, ICT sector, and the target population to 
determine the appropriate ICT goals and policies. 
The research approach is broken into four sections described below, with each 
focused on the proper role of the state in the development, deployment, and usage of 
ICTs.  This dissertation hopes to answer the following key questions: 
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• How does the state’s role evolve as a developing country transitions toward a 
more advanced ICT sector and overall economy? 
• What are the determinants for the successful implementation of a national ICT 
policy within developing countries? 
• What are the major impediments facing developing countries as they attempt to 
accelerate the adoption and utilization of ICTs? 
To understand the ICT policy choices of national governments, it is first 
important to note three major trends identified by the literature within the 
telecommunications sector.  The first is the development of mobile and Internet 
technologies in addition to fixed line telephony (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003).  The second 
shift is the global trend away from monopoly operators to competitive carriers across 
these fixed, mobile, and Internet technologies (Wilson, 2003).  The third shift under way 
is from governmental control to private ownership, or a mix of public and private with 
independent regulatory agencies (Levy, 1994).  Steinmuller suggests that ICTs, which 
can lower transaction costs, may be able to offer developing countries a conduit for 
avoiding stages that require high levels of capital and fixed asset concentration, as 
defined by Rostow’s “stages of development” (Rostow, 1960), and moving directly to a 
knowledge-based economy (Steinmueller, 2001).  As a result, many developing countries 
now view these technologies as an important conduit to fostering both productivity gains 
(McGuckin, 1998; Baumol, 1998) and economic development (Saunders, 1994).   
This research examines the evolving role in the ICT sector for developing country 
governments within the context of the technological, institutional, and market factors 
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described above.  Previous efforts have focused heavily on a single factor or country 
when assessing the role of the state in bolstering ICT adoption.  An approach that focuses 
on a single factor will face severe explanatory limitations due to the extensive interaction 
across these factors.  A singular focus on technology ignores the challenges of the 
developing a competitive market and the necessary institutional structure.  At the same 
time, examining only the institutional factors may miss key technological changes such 
as the introduction of wireless and the Internet, which have completely remade the 
government’s role within the market.   
Similarly, studies that focus on a single country are useful, but will miss the 
commonalities across developing countries in their advancement of ICT adoption and 
utilization.  Within the ICT sector, most developing countries must adhere to 
technological and institutional gating factors in the development of their ICT market and 
industry.  In addition, national statistics and empirical studies alone cannot discern the 
key institutional mechanisms behind a government’s successful effort to bolster ICT 
adoption and utilization within a developing country.  This dissertation will overcome 
these limitations by using a combination of methodologies, including cross-country 
empirical and case study analyses, to highlight the technological, economic, and political 
determinants of successful national ICT strategies. 
Methodology and Contribution to the Literature  
The goal of this research is to build a cohesive understanding of national ICT 
policies in developing countries, which integrates the existing literature with my own 
primary research on the role of governmental ICT institutions and policies directed at 
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supporting rapid adoption.  This study’s generalizability is strengthened by creating a 
national ICT policy framework for developing countries and using this framework as a 
foundation for both the statistical regression and the case study analysis – weaving these 
two methodologies together to examine the determinants of successful ICT strategies.  
My research uses a combination of secondary data from international sources on ICTs 
and extensive primary sources to develop a framework outlining the stages of ICT 
adoption, a global regression model, and an in-depth case study analysis of Malaysia and 
Thailand.     
The framework that describes the five stages of ICT development provides a new 
way of examining ICT adoption in developing countries.  There are few examples in the 
literature of this approach, where the goal is to highlight the commonalities and themes of 
the governmental, market, and technological stages across developing countries – 
describing in great detail the evolutionary reform process that must be completed by 
national governments (Milne, 1998).  This section offers both the quantitative and the 
qualitative metrics for understanding the evolution of ICT policies, markets, institutions, 
and infrastructure within countries.  Rather than focusing on a single metric, or gating 
factor, it is important to understand how these four factors evolve in concert – interacting 
with one another to either accelerate or hamper ICT adoption rates within a country.   
To create a strong delineation between stages, the framework employs several key 
metrics that are based on an extensive literature review with numerous country examples.  
These metrics include both quantitative and qualitative metrics to understand the 
adoption process through the institutional, market, and policy factors.  For the 
quantitative factors in particular, the five stages are delineated using the trajectories of the 
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country examples as well as the infrastructure requirements of expanding the national 
network to connect the population included within each stage of adoption.  These 
network infrastructure requirements are common across developing countries, resulting in 
similar patterns of adoption despite the wide variation of technologic, economic, and 
political factors within these countries.  These five stages also provide a framework for 
examining the outputs of the cross-national regression model and the case studies, 
offering a new context for understanding the commonalities of the ICT adoption process 
across developing countries. 
The cross-national model provides empirical support to the argument that 
institutions and policies play a vital role in accelerating ICT adoption.  It is important to 
examine both economic and policy variables in combination when assessing the variation 
in adoption rates.  Previous studies of the disparity in ICT adoption have predominately 
focused on economic factors, overstating the connection between high-income levels and 
ICT adoption rates.  This study expands on current research by including institutional 
indicators in addition to economic and infrastructure trends to understand those critical 
factors that have led to higher ICT adoption rates.  
The variables within the global model are based on the New Economic Growth 
theory and New Institutional Economics to determine the key explanatory and control 
variables.  This model expands the institutional factors included in global regression 
models to more fully capture the role of the state in ICT adoption, while also highlighting 
the limitations of national statistics, for institutional effectiveness and ICT adoption.  The 
institutional variables include privatization of the state-owned telecommunications 
monopoly and the creation of an independent regulatory agency.  The explanatory power 
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of these variables is inherently limited because there is no way to consistently and 
thoroughly quantify the effectiveness of national ICT institutions across countries.  By 
relying on national statistics, this model is a broad tool and cannot account for the design 
and implementation of ICT policy and institutional reforms, which is critical to 
successfully initiating and sustaining rapid ICT adoption.  This requires a combined 
effort of empirical research along with case study analysis to define the critical success 
factors within the stages of ICT adoption.   
The case study research is divided into two sections. The first focuses on ICT 
adoption and regulation as the foundation of all other governmental ICT efforts, while the 
second section examines government support for bolstering ICT utilization.  Both of 
these sections focus on Thailand and Malaysia. Therefore, the generalizability of these 
case studies is limited to middle-income countries because low-income countries face a 
different set of institutional and technological challenges.  For countries that have begun 
their privatization and regulatory reform process, it is not enough to simply create a new 
regulator and sell off the state-owned incumbent.  National governments must ensure that 
these market and regulatory reforms are designed and implemented based on 
international best practices that demand transparency, organizational restructuring, 
evaluation and monitoring, and proper budgeting – which are designed to ensure that the 
market power of the incumbent monopoly is well balanced in the newly competitive 
market.   
Without these efforts, the incumbent is likely to continue its dominance of the 
market, driving prices higher and hampering network infrastructure deployment.  In the 
first case study section, this continuing market power of the incumbent can be seen 
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vividly within Thailand, which has implemented both privatization and regulatory 
reforms without proper organizational or political controls.  This has left the country with 
a stagnating ICT market while its neighbors continue to experience rapid ICT adoption. 
The second case study section shifts focus to the ICT institutional reform efforts 
in Malaysia and Thailand as these countries seek to expand their levels of ICT integration 
into the economy.  The development of a domestic ICT industry within a developing 
country requires the creation of specialized institutions that carefully coordinate their 
initiatives with the private sector.  My case study research shows that this institutional 
and policy reform process is directly influenced by cross-border activities, as countries 
seek to match their regional peers for ICT development.  This effort to support ICT 
utilization requires governments to rapidly alter their policy goals and initiatives in 
response to shifts in technologies, global market demand, international investment, and 
local workforce capabilities.   
Few countries have successfully managed this reform process, particularly over 
the long term.  Malaysia has experienced significant challenges because it initiated its 
domestic efforts to bolster the ICT industry in the 1990s.  However, my case study 
research suggests that the country has benefited enormously from coordinated efforts by 
the public and private sectors to adapt international technologies to the local 
environment.  Thailand has also made significant progress over the past five years, 
adopting many of the same policies and institutional reform efforts as Malaysia according 
to case study interviewees.  Yet the country has lagged behind in its development of a 
local ICT industry.  Although the ICT utilization efforts are supported by similar 
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institutions and policies in both countries, only Malaysia has successfully funded, 
implemented, and evaluated these efforts. 
Current ICT research focuses heavily on economic and market factors behind ICT 
adoption and utilization, and its impact on economic growth.  Many of these studies have 
found significant benefits to developed countries of the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), but 
have not been able to conclusively demonstrate a correlation between ICT investment and 
economic growth in developing countries (Wilson, 2003).  Rather than working to 
quantify the impact ICTs have on macroeconomic conditions, this research focuses on the 
process through which policies to support ICT adoption are successfully implemented 
across a range of emerging economies.  This research aims to demonstrate the important 
role the state plays in improving ICT adoption rates across developing countries and the 
benefit these technologies have on the economic development process (James, 2003).  To 
accomplish this, it is necessary to understand the economic and institutional theory base 
within economic development literature prior to examining technology policy 
development and implementation.  The methodology for my dissertation is discussed 
below in conjunction with the theory base – with the goal of offering a framework for 
understanding how countries progress through stages of ICT development and how ICT 
adoption can benefit the country at each stage (North, 1992; Pierson, 2004; Ranis, 1989; 
Sengupta, 1993; Zysman, 1994). 
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Methodology 
In completing this study, I used three research methods to gain a deeper 
understanding of the ICT adoption rates and policies of developing countries.  The first 
section develops a policy framework for understanding the various categories of national 
ICT strategies.  The second section of the study, the statistical model, examines the 
relationship between government institutional and policy changes and ICT adoption 
while controlling for economic and social factors outlined in the new economic growth 
theory.  To understand the design and implementation process of these ICT policies, the 
third section of the research study includes two case study countries: Malaysia and 
Thailand.  Using primary research, these cases explore the economic and political factors 
that support or hinder national ICT policy implementation.  This section relies on the 
primary research and secondary policy sources to analyze national ICT policies of 
developing countries while assessing their potential for accelerating ICT adoption.  
Together, these four sections offer insight into national ICT adoption rates and policies – 
seeking to target an under-explored area within the current literature. 
Section 2: ICT Analytical Framework 
This section uses New Institutional Economics, which is outlined below, as the 
foundation for creating the national technology trajectories specific to ICT adoption 
within developing countries.  This is a new approach to understanding the key 
determinants of ICT adoption within technological, institutional, market, and policy 
factors.  This section offers a contribution to the literature by applying these trajectories 
 11 
to a single technology sector rather than an economy as a whole and by focusing on 
institutions and policies as the key metrics for delineating the five stages. 
Literature Review 
New Institutional Economics describes a unique institutional structure and 
technological specialization within countries that determine the national trajectory of 
development and a country’s ability to operate at the frontier of innovation.  The 
government, as the actor for innovation, supports capital investment in developing 
technologies and knowledge in a given specialization within the rules created by the 
institutional structure.  Through the sunk costs and high cost of reversal, this investment 
locks in a technological commitment for the country.  As investment, knowledge, and 
institutional rules evolve over time, these countries have a competitive advantage over 
other countries that are not choosing the same technologies and playing by the same 
rules.  While not without flaws, institutionalism in combination with endogenous growth 
theory gives a solid foundation for understanding both development and technological 
change within countries. 
Several key political and economic factors have a direct influence on ICT 
adoption, including institutional development, market liberalization, and socio-economic 
development.  Using the theory base of technological trajectories and path dependency 
created by John Zysman, Douglas North, and Paul Pierson, this research focuses on the 
institutional development of the national structures within developing countries that 
choose and support technology investments.   
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New Institutional Economics uses the economics theory of scarcity as its 
foundation, but then adds institutions and transaction costs as further limits on an actor’s 
choices (North, 1992).  Countries with weak institutions have higher transaction costs and 
therefore inefficient markets.  One of the more prominent theories has been put forth by 
John Zysman (1983), who suggests that there is no single form of capitalism that works 
for all countries.  Rather, each development success story is determined by the 
institutional frameworks responsible for choosing and supporting technological adoption 
within the market.  Zysman argues that countries need to develop a technological 
specialty and that through this specialization a country will be able to develop a global 
trade niche.  Zysman later argued that these technological, firm-level, and institutional 
factors will influence how the historical trajectories of a country’s economic and 
technological development will evolve (Zysman, 1994).  These trajectories are shaped by 
the historically rooted national institutions that channel the investment choices of 
individuals and firms. 
Building on the notion of these national trajectories, North (1994) argues that an 
analytical framework is needed to understand the changing dynamics of economic 
performance across time.  North also suggests that neoclassical economics is not suited to 
understanding economic development because it is only concerned with market operation 
and not market development and does not account for time or institutions.  He then 
suggests that when applied to developmental issues, new economic growth theory focuses 
on the technology and human capital investment but fails to include the incentive 
structure within institutions.  
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Economic and political institutions develop the incentive structure within an 
economy and as such are the determinants of that country’s economic success (North, 
1994).  These institutions include the formal and informal structures to regulate human 
interactions and become legitimized by the societal norms of a given country – as a 
result, changing only slowly over time.  Due to these institutional and cultural constraints, 
North argues that transferring formal structures of Western countries will not be 
sufficient for improving economic performance in developing countries globally. 
Within this framework of path dependence, Pierson argues that the sequencing of 
events is another key factor for institutional development (Pierson, 2004).  Similar to the 
sunk costs of technology choices, early decisions made by political actors have a larger 
influence on the institutional structure that is created.  These actors are able to 
consolidate power and resources, giving them the opportunity to set the “rules of the 
game” to increase their advantage and sustain it. 
As Pierson points out, individual reforms or institutional structures operate within 
an environment that constantly shifts over time (Pierson, 2004).  The most effective 
sequencing of policies and reforms supporting national technological efforts varies 
widely across countries, forcing governments to determine the most appropriate 
technological trajectory that can lead to accelerated economic growth.  In terms of 
Zysman’s national technology institutions, these technology structures may not be 
suitable until a country has reached a certain level of development within the national 
trajectory – low-income countries may find it more beneficial to focus on other areas of 
development, such as health and education, rather than ICT adoption.  Even when a 
country does attain a development level that requires national technology institutions, the 
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structure of those institutions will continue to change dramatically over time as the 
country develops.   
This theory base argues that institutional factors dominate technological 
development and developing countries’ ability to converge.  North rests his argument on 
the institutional ability of developed countries to build a stable enforcement environment 
that can lower transaction costs and speed development.  However, this argument fails to 
account for governmental cooperation with the private sector to bolster national 
competitiveness, as has been done by the North Atlantic and Japanese governments and 
has been emulated by successfully converged developing countries (Amsden, 1997).  The 
theory base also avoids contemplating the central role market structure plays in ICT 
deployment within a country, with competitive forces many times outweighing 
governmental controls or institutional failures.  This section works to address the 
influence of public-private coordination and market conditions on ICT strategy outcomes 
within developing countries. 
Methodological Approach 
Developing countries have accelerated their efforts to deliver affordable ICT 
access and improved utilization rates among their residents through a range of ICT policy 
initiatives (Graham, 2000).  The two goals of increased access and utilization are 
important in enhancing a developing country’s ability to compete globally for jobs and 
investment (Ford, 2005).  Although these goals are touted frequently, they are not always 
tailored for a given country (Cohen-Blankshtain, 2003).  Policymakers must ask 
themselves how they define affordable access and improved utilization within the 
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geographic, competitive, and political environment of the country (Javary, 2002).  Once 
these goals are defined, a set of policies can be implemented and a decision on the 
optimal ICT solutions can be made. 
ICT infrastructure and applications will be adopted by a developing country in 
five stages, with policymakers shifting their goals from supporting increased access, to 
developing a robust private sector, and finally to creating a globally competitive ICT 
industry (Grubesic, 2004).  Although these goals are not mutually exclusive, there is a 
progression in policy and technological complexity as countries move away from directly 
supporting access infrastructure through a state-owned enterprise, to directing market 
competition through a regulatory agency, and then to indirectly supporting access through 
a ministry of ICT.  In countries that support a domestic ICT industry, the government’s 
role shifts to becoming a coordinator and advisor to the private sector.  To overcome 
these changing priorities and governmental roles, countries are forced to reevaluate their 
goals on a regular basis, adjusting their policies and technology choices accordingly.  As 
a result, ICT goals within a developing country will not be static; in fact, they must be 
flexible enough to adapt to the changing technological and economic conditions to 
achieve an optimum outcome (Strover, 1999).   
This framework addresses the commonalities in ICT adoption across developing 
countries by constructing five stages of communications technology development.  These 
commonalities are across several factors influencing ICT adoption: regulatory 
environment, technology choices, market competition, ICT policy, and ICT institutions.  
Combined, these components create the five stages of ICT adoption within developing 
countries.  This framework also highlights the major attributes of national ICT strategies 
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implemented within those ICT development stages.  In the literature, the current 
analytical models on the stages of ICT adoption within developing countries have not 
been updated to account for the rapid changes in technology and the rise in importance of 
the Internet and mobile telephony (Milne, 1998).  Instead, they focus too heavily on fixed 
line access and miss crucial factors that should be included in an assessment of the stages 
of ICT adoption (James, 2005).  This component of the framework is based on secondary 
research of national governments to determine how these developing countries 
progressed with their technology adoption investments and policies.     
This national ICT framework also examines a range of developing countries that 
have created policies at each of the major stages of ICT adoption.  There are almost 50 
countries with national ICT strategies, 35 of which have been approved (Docktor, 2004).  
These countries represent a wide range of economic and political contexts, and the 
framework section examines the outcomes of these policies across these countries.  This 
is not an exhaustive list of all program options, but rather an overview of the various 
categories of initiatives that address the requirements outlined for the stages identified in 
the framework.  This section also examines the appropriate level of government 
involvement required to achieve success in these initiatives (OECD, 2002).  Within a 
given country, the level of public involvement differs across the various ICT services, 
such as high-speed Internet or video (Kvasny, 2006). 
In the national ICT programs that I have studied, three linked attributes determine 
the structure and scope of a country’s ICT strategy: market, technological, and 
institutional structure, in addition to stakeholders and policy mechanisms of these ICT 
strategies (Wilson, 2003).  Using secondary sources from national studies and policy 
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papers, the framework includes a range of ICT strategies that depend on the competitive 
landscape of the country.  These strategies may only target the low-income and rural 
regions in countries with robust market competition or they may encompass a national 
deployment and utilization plan.  From secondary research conducted, increases in 
market scope may also raise the complexity of organizing ICT strategies, which in turn 
can lead to problems in maintaining these efforts.  In finding the right role of the state 
within the market environment, stakeholders must include economic and political 
limitations as well as technological considerations (Frieden, 2005). 
Infrastructure development for ICT policies ranges from expanding the use of 
existing infrastructure to developing new networks, training facilities, and ICT research 
centers.  ICT access programs usually include the rollout of a fiber network and last-mile 
access equipment to fill the gaps of existing telecommunications infrastructure.  Many 
communications technology training programs simply use existing facilities at local firms 
or universities to minimize the impact on their budgets. However, ICT strategies call for 
additional facilities in rural or low-income areas (Mariscal, 2005).  Infrastructure 
improvement can also include developing national IT research capacity, which can 
involve the construction of a research park or the creation of higher education degree 
programs.  This research capacity assists developing countries in supporting technology 
development and innovation tailored for domestic use.  
Institutional structure is defined as the level of institutional, legal, and regulatory 
structures put in place to support the creation of a national ICT strategy.  Depending on 
the focus of the national policy, there can be a wide range of institutional structures 
across developing countries.  For policies focused on indirect support to the market, such 
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as financial subsidies to the private ICT sector, there are few institutional or regulatory 
hurdles for sustaining the effort.  However, to fund and operate an ICT research park and 
the requisite infrastructure, similar to Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), a 
governmental institution or other organization may need to be created that has the 
necessary authority to fund and coordinate these policies.  This institutional structure 
requires significant governance capabilities on the part of the new organization as well as 
a sustained financial commitment.  
Institutional structure is also linked to market and infrastructure requirements.  
For ICT strategies that are truly national in scope, rather than a regional effort, this may 
add a layer of bureaucracy for the ICT institution to coordinate.  As stated above, an 
increase in the complexity of the infrastructure for the strategy – for a national network, 
for example – will increase the institutional and regulatory hurdles for the ICT policy.   
This framework is used to benchmark the case study countries in Section 2, 
assessing their position within the five stages for ICT policy implementation.  This serves 
to guide the ICT policies a country should adopt, depending on where they were located 
within the ICT stages laid out by the framework.  This result could serve as a road map 
for government policy makers as well as private sector decision makers aiming to make 
an investment in the technology adoption of a given country.  This framework could also 
become useful in the long term across developing countries aside from Malaysia and 
Thailand, once it is adapted for the local environment of additional countries.  
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Section 3: Cross-national ICT Regression Model 
This section relies on New Institutional Economics to determine the key 
explanatory variables along with New Economic Growth theory, which is discussed 
below, to establish the necessary control variables.  This cross-national model offers a 
more in-depth examination of the institutional factors that influence ICT adoption rates, 
including both privatization and regulatory reform variables, while controlling for those 
economic indicators that are outlined by endogenous growth theory. 
Literature Review 
New Economic Growth theory offers a compelling structure for understanding 
economic development, suggesting that growth is driven by the creation of globally 
competitive products within the export sector, which in turn bolster human capital 
development and efficient reallocation of resources (Romer, 1992).  Within this 
framework, ICTs improve the competitiveness, enhance human capital development, and 
streamline resource allocation.  First, ICTs become a factor of production for a country’s 
export sector, increasing firm productivity and increasing the reach of export firms by 
connecting them seamlessly to global markets.  Second, ICTs offer key infrastructure for 
human capital development, creating knowledge networks that can be accessed by 
students and workers to bolster technological capabilities within the country.  Third, ICT 
infrastructure can be a conduit for efficiently reallocating capital resources while making 
governmental and firm resource tracking easier to accomplish. 
This approach to economic developed offered by New Economic Growth theory 
is supported by the economic histories of East Asia’s newly industrialized economies, 
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which are the focus of this case study research and have been used as a test for new 
growth theory (Sengupta, 1993).  Sengupta offers three components to the new economic 
growth theory.  First, non-rival inputs should generate increasing returns for the export 
sector, which is key to generating technology innovations.  Second, human capital 
investments have a strong and positive externality within the economy.  Third, the export 
sector is able to draw labor and resources from the non-export sector through a dynamic 
reallocation process supported by government policies as well as a reduction in economic 
regulations from earlier import substitution policies.  Sengupta’s research results suggest 
that the South Korean economy followed this model very closely during its development 
in the 1980s. 
Methodological Approach 
This cross-national regression model utilizes cross-sectional time-series data to 
examine the key determinants of ICT adoption across 154 countries.  This model builds 
upon the current literature, which includes a wide range of cross-sectional models that 
investigate the economic variables that influence the wide variation in cross-national ICT 
adoption.  Previous studies have tended to rely on economic data in determining the 
variables to include, failing to include the role of the state (ITU, 2003).  In contrast, this 
model utilizes variables identified by the theory base discussed above, including market 
liberalization variables, economic development variables, and institutional indicators 
(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003; Dutta, 2004).   
Many developing countries have completed a market liberalization process of 
their economies, which can include increased trade and international investment and 
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enhanced market competition (Steinmueller, 2001).  Because this process cannot be 
quantified as such, this model uses several key indicators, such as trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), to account for the relative openness of an economy (Blomstrom, 1998).  
The second set of variables includes three metrics to measure economic development, 
accounting for the strength of an economy as well as the socio-economic development 
that is necessary for robust ICT adoption (Kapur, 2002).  The final set includes variables 
that control for the institutional and regulatory evolution that takes place within 
developing countries.  This includes privatization of state-owned enterprises and creating 
national ICT policies (Frieden, 2000). 
Variables 
The model uses a dependent variable that is the combined penetration rate of 
fixed and mobile subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants within each study country.  Each 
indicator is weighted equally within the dependent variable despite the rapid rise of 
mobile utilization.  Fixed line access is still necessary for many broadband and other 
services, and it is given equal weight within the model.  This data is based on results from 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).  
The independent variables include market liberalization variables, economic 
development variables, and institutional indicators:   
• The first market liberalization variable is foreign direct investment, which is the 
total amount international firms have invested in a country’s corporations – either 
through stock ownership or joint ventures – and it is measured as a percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in the model.  As a country liberalizes its market, it 
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opens itself up to international investment in the process.  Increased FDI can also 
lead to technology transfer from international firms to domestic companies.  
These transfers speed up the telecom adoption rate and were hypothesized to have 
a positive influence on the dependent variable. 
• The market liberalization variables also include trade as a percentage of GDP, 
foreign direct investment, and privatization.  Trade is measured as the total output 
and input of goods and services as a percentage of GDP.  Countries with high 
levels of trade, controlling for those with lower levels of development, have 
higher adoption rates on average. 
• The first economic variable measured was GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity.  GDP is the total economic output for a country in a given year.  
Purchasing power parity measures that output in terms of buying power, rather 
than in dollars, to control for fluctuations in international exchange rates.   
• The countries’ population density is also included, which is measured as the 
number of people per kilometer.  Technology adoption rates face the practical 
issue of running telephone wires and connecting computers.  Telecom adoption in 
small, urban countries such as Singapore will happen at a faster pace than in large, 
more rural countries such as Thailand.  Population density acts as a proxy for this 
issue. 
• The total output of the services sector as a percentage of GDP is included to 
control for the advancement of the national economy.  As a country moves away 
from agricultural- and manufacturing-based economic activities, the demand for 
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ICTs was shown to increase.  Firms and workers in advanced services sectors are 
more likely to adopt, utilize, and customize these technologies than users in other 
sectors (Jomo, 2003).  As a national economy shifts toward services, there is a 
positive correlation with ICT adoption.    
• The first institutional variable controls for a country’s level of government 
expenditure, measured as a percentage of GDP.  As developing countries shift 
from focusing on state-owned enterprises to forming and budgeting for a welfare 
state, the size of the government begins to increase faster than GDP.  This 
variable is used to control for this shift in governmental position within the 
economy and act as a proxy for national political development.  This indicator is 
positively correlated with the dependent variable.  
• Privatization of the state-owned telecom monopoly is included as a dummy 
variable, with those years after privatization marked with a 1.  This reform is 
defined and tracked by the ITU, which completes an annual survey of all of its 
member countries. 
• Creation of an independent regulatory agency has a positive and significant 
correlation with the dependent variable (Ure, 2003) and is also included as a 
dummy variable, with those years after development of the agency marked with a 
1.  This reform is defined and tracked by the ITU, which completes an annual 
survey of all of its member countries. 
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Data and Analysis 
The data for the dependent and independent variables was collected from the ITU 
and the World Bank, from its World Development Indicators database.  The data 
collected includes 16 years within the study period, from 1990 to 2005, which was long 
enough to encompass the ICT market liberalization process that many countries 
underwent in the 1990s and early 2000s.   
These pooled time-series cross-sectional data were used in a fixed effects model 
to estimate the correlation between income, liberalization, and development, as well as 
ICT penetration rates across 154 countries.  Fixed effects are the most common models 
used with pooled time-series cross-sectional data sets, particularly in cases where a vast 
majority of the study population is observed, as is the case with my cross-national data, 
rather than a sample set of countries.  I utilized these data to analyze the variance across 
time and across countries – which, according to the theory base, is essential to 
understanding the impact of institutional factors on ICT adoption rates.     
Section 4: ICT Adoption Case Studies  
This section focuses on the large body of literature devoted to explaining the 
rapidly industrializing economies of East Asia.  This development literature is used as a 
basis for understanding the role of the state within the economy at large and the ICT 
sector in particular.  These past studies from the literature provide a foundation for 
understanding the critical role the government plays in technology development even 
after a sector has been privatized.  My research for this section adds to this literature by 
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examining the importance of institutions in the development of the ICT sector within the 
larger discussion surrounding the role of the state in economic development. 
Literature Review 
There has been a lengthy debate within economic development literature over the 
reasons behind the success of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Economies, including 
Singapore and South Korea (Ranis, 1989; Lim, 2000).  There have been significant 
hurdles and setbacks; but as Ranis points out, these countries have successfully 
transitioned from an agrarian economy, to an import substitution, and finally to a 
technologically advanced economy (Amsden, 1989).   
A key component of this success has been the creation of Zysman’s national 
institutions, discussed above, which have successfully supported technology adoption 
within these countries.  Moving beyond Zysman’s definition, these institutional structures 
consist of both governmental and non-governmental organizations that direct, support, 
and regulate national technology initiatives.  By advancing national technological 
capacity, a country’s technology institutions are an important contributor to larger 
economic development efforts (Feinson, 2003).   
One of the most important institutions to support ICT sector development is the 
national telecommunications regulator.  Levy (1994) argues that while performance of 
the telecommunications sector can be satisfactory under a wide range of regulatory 
conditions, these conditions must be stable to allow long-term investment into the sector.  
With arbitrary or volatile regulatory conditions, and without a credible commitment to 
enforce and maintain the regulatory regime, the necessary long-term investment will not 
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be available to the telecommunications industry (Weingast, 1995).  In this highly volatile 
regulatory environment, public ownership may be the only feasible option to achieve this 
credible commitment, given a country’s economic and political environment (Levy, 
1994). 
Under a more stable regime and private provisioning, Levy suggests there is a 
need for an independent regulatory agency to sustain a competitive market and ensure the 
benefits of ICTs are diffused throughout the population.  An independent institution in 
the sector increases market certainty and long-term stability, which in turn opens the 
sector to investment and increases its potential for benefiting the country’s economic 
growth.  Private telecommunications operators invest heavily in their infrastructure if the 
necessary regulatory constraints are in place; otherwise, the private investment is minimal 
(Levy, 1994).   
Policy and institutional reforms are the critical success factors for growth in ICT 
penetration rates within developing countries, whose governments currently face a 
myriad of policy options (Wilson, 2003).  These regulatory policy issues include public 
versus private initiatives, monopoly versus competitive markets, domestic versus foreign 
ownership, and centralized versus decentralized administrative controls.  Until 10 years 
ago, a vast majority of countries opted for public provisioning of telecommunications 
services. Wilson suggests that today a vast majority of governments have, to greater or 
lesser degrees, begun to shift toward more private, more international, more competitive, 
and more de-centralized management of their ICT sectors.  However, compared to 
developed countries, developing country governments are not moving at the same pace 
nor have they developed the same level of institutional support (Wilson, 2003). 
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Methodological Approach 
Several developing countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have announced 
their national policies within the last ten years (Ramasamy, 2004).  Because both were 
modeled after Singapore’s national ICT policies and institutions, the national plans and 
ICT institutions of both countries are very similar.  However, the implementation and 
success of the two countries have differed considerably.  A series of interviews were 
completed with government, private sector, and university stakeholders in Thailand and 
Malaysia during three months of in-country research in 2006 to help determine the cause 
behind these two differing experiences.  This research found that key factors for both 
countries included transparent telecom privatization and regulation, strong political 
institutions and leadership, and sustained public-private coordination.   
Both countries are at a crossroads in their development.  Neither can safely rely 
on manufacturing alone to spur economic growth.  Exhibit 1.1 summarizes key national 
indicators for the two countries plus Singapore’s indicators for comparison.  All figures 
within this dissertation are reported in US dollars.  The national ICT policies are at the 
center of the government’s attempt to create new economic opportunities while 
improving the country’s ability to compete globally. 
 28 
Exhibit 1.1: Economic and ICT Indicators by Country, for Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. 
Economic Indicators 2004 Thailand Malaysia Singapore 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 
      
$7,435  
      
$9,444        $25,804  
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)           46            40              65  
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)             1              4              15  
Urban population (% of total)           32            64            100  
Technology Indicators 2004 
   
Fixed and mobile telephone subscribers per 1,000 
inhabitants 
        537          766         1,350  
Internet users per 1,000 inhabitants         109          397            571  
Broadband subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants          0.2            10            121  
ICT expenditures (% of GDP)             4              7              10  
High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports)           30            55              59  
Source: World Development Indicators, 2005. 
Malaysia is a great example of a developing country that has focused almost 
singularly on technology development through foreign investment.  While attracting a 
great deal of FDI, the country’s economy has grown dependent on exporting 
multinational corporation (MNC) products to foreign markets (Blomstrom, 1998).  
Industry is moving slowly toward designing and innovating its own products.  However, 
many of Malaysia’s manufacturing facilities are still low-skilled components within the 
global supply chain.   
Many developing countries have shifted their focus from deploying fixed lines to 
wireless penetration.  Malaysia has managed to maintain a relatively high level of 
wireline adoption while driving wireless infrastructure, with average penetration for 
wireline doubling during the 1990s before reaching a plateau.  Despite a slowdown in 
overall economic growth during the Asian crisis, wireless access grew rapidly, 
outnumbering landlines in less than a decade.  Unfortunately, some areas within the 
country have been neglected during the rapid increase in teledensity.  This lack of 
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telecommunications infrastructure in these areas also highlights a larger problem of 
concentrated investment and governmental support to Kuala Lumpur to the detriment of 
the rest of the economy (James, 2003).  This situation also reflects Porter’s hypothesis on 
cluster development in developing countries that is warped by the political process, as 
discussed above in the cluster theory section (Porter, 1998). 
Thailand has closely studied its neighbors to benchmark its own ICT policies and 
institutional structure.  When Thailand was implementing structural reforms in 2002, 
Malaysia was undergoing a similar effort – causing Thailand to mirror its ICT 
institutional restructuring closely after Malaysia’s.  Now that Thailand is working on a 
second round of ICT reforms, it has looked to Malaysia again for guidance on evolving 
its ICT structures.  In the ICT-related industries, such as hardware and software, Thailand 
is currently competing with countries that have low-cost labor, such as China, as well as 
countries with high levels of skilled labor, such as Singapore.  Unlike Malaysia, Thailand 
does not have the high levels of governmental coordination and marketing required to 
compete against these other Asian economies.  
Fixed line telephony penetration and broadband penetration are below average for 
Thailand, given its level of economic and technological development.  This situation was 
significantly worse in 2000, when the government began working to catch up through its 
ICT Master Plan.  Although broadband rates are improving, it may not be due to 
government intervention but higher demand by more affluent customers.   
The case study section outlines and compares the policy and implementation 
trajectories of these two countries as well as the hurdles that impeded government 
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implementation.  Data sources for these country studies include international indices, 
secondary surveys, governmental reports, and third-party research on ICT industries, 
government regulations, and ICT policies.  The research also includes fieldwork in 
Thailand and Malaysia, completing 21 interviews with key officials responsible for 
design and implementation of the national ICT strategies.  Using the results of these 
interviews, I examined the commonalities between Thailand and Malaysia in their ICT 
strategies and implementations.  The common success factors across the national ICT 
policies of these two countries include the supporting institutional structure, technology 
choices, target beneficiaries, funding mechanisms, and implementation hurdles. 
My interviews for this research were completed with a wide range of stakeholders 
in the public and private sector.  These government interviewees included officials at 
ministries of communication, the technology policy agency, and the telecom regulator.  
These government interviews helped to clearly define the policy evolution that has taken 
place as well as highlight successes and failures within the implementation process.  
From the private sector, these interviews focused on local telecommunications firms to 
understand their plans for ICT investment and their support for the national strategy.  In 
addition, my interviews were completed with outside experts and additional officials, 
including those in the Ministry of Finance. 
Section 5: ICT Utilization Case Studies  
As with the case study research above, the research for this section also uses New 
Institutional Economics and East Asian development literature to determine the key 
factors for bolstering ICT utilization through specialized institutions.  This research 
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contributes to this literature by demonstrating the outcome differentials across countries 
despite similar technological, institutional, and policy inputs.  The creation of the 
specialized institutions described by New Institutional Economics is necessary but not 
sufficient to produce a sustained increase in ICT utilization.  The implementation of 
national ICT strategies is the key determinant in the success of ICT efforts by developing 
countries.  This section’s research relies on a methodology of primary and secondary 
sources similar to the case study analysis described above.   
Literature Review 
Despite the increased international competition for high-skilled workers and 
investment, several East Asian countries including Malaysia and Thailand have managed 
to build globally competitive sectors that require high levels of technology adoption and 
utilization.  This advancement has come through a combination of indigenous capacity 
building and international investment from MNCs, both of which were closely directed 
by the national technology institutions.  Due in part to this success, many East Asian 
NIEs, including Singapore, have now moved from middle-income to high-income 
countries (Hsiao, 2003) and have become the models for other Asian countries, notably 
Malaysia and Thailand.   
As countries privatize their monopolies, governments must work to open the 
market to new entrants, support infrastructure deployments to low-income and rural 
areas, and increase the utilization rates of ICT infrastructure – in short, helping to drive 
demand while supporting the development of the ICT industry (Gasmi, 2000).  However, 
the regulation and policy reforms underpinning these utilization efforts must be precisely 
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sequenced to support a thriving ICT sector within a developing country.  Gasmi suggests 
that successful governments have closely coordinated their ICT market policies with 
those of the private sector.  These governments have also managed to support regulated 
competition to increase supply while directly bolstering demand.   
This aspect of government involvement in the ICT sector includes supporting the 
increased utilization of communications technologies across a broad range of sectors 
within the economy (Schreyer, 2002).  Schreyer suggests that this would include 
increasing the availability of ICT applications to individuals and organizations within the 
public, business, and educational sectors in the economy.  National penetration rates for 
telephones and the Internet can increase steadily within a country.  However, utilization 
rates among the poor and rural areas for these technologies may not expand without 
government initiatives.  In addition, developing countries may not experience the 
productivity and economic benefits of ICT adoption (which have been measured within 
OECD countries) without public sector support (Schreyer, 2002).   
By focusing on ICT utilization in addition to access, government efforts can 
support productivity gains across economic sectors within developing countries.  This 
institutional support for increased utilization can take many forms, including 
government-supported technology training; aggregating demand and serving as an anchor 
tenant; fostering e-government, e-health, and other services; universal service funds; and 
governmental safeguards for services such as e-commerce (Frieden, 2005).  Frieden also 
argues that communications services will need to be adapted to the needs of the local 
economic, political, and cultural environment, particularly if these services are originally 
introduced by an international entity.  To meet local requirements, these national efforts 
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require public-private-academic coordination to successfully adapt ICT services imported 
internationally and to innovate those services created indigenously (Balaji and Keniston, 
2005).   
When discussing these national ICT policies, it is important to distinguish 
between countries operating on the technology frontier and those that are transferring and 
adapting technologies from other countries (Steinmueller, 2001).  The major issue with 
developing countries attempting to catch up technologically is when the skill sets of the 
workforce developing under one economic stage are not adequate to adapt to the new 
stage (Steinmueller, 2001).  ICTs can assist in the knowledge transfer and the lowering of 
required skill sets for employees.  However, adoption still requires a baseline level of 
capability (David, 1997).  In addition to a lack of local expertise, progress in technology 
adoption can also be slowed by market structures that limit innovation and competition, 
reliance on poor local infrastructure that hampers technology adoption (such as relying on 
low-quality phone lines for Internet access), and distribution challenges caused by 
geographic and market constraints. 
Supporting ICT utilization requires government intervention to ignite and support 
the innovation process within the country.  In addition to public-private cooperation, this 
effort requires governmental intervention to ensure spillovers between MNC branch sites, 
free trade zones, and entrepreneurial incubators and the rest of the economy.  This 
process is easily susceptible to concentrating investment as well as the societal benefits 
and positive externalities, as discussed above in the section on cluster development.   
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In support of this notice, Porter (1998) suggests that clusters in developing 
countries can form within the capital city due to political considerations rather than 
interconnections across firms.  This can result from governmental constraints that cause 
firms to locate near the “seat of power” as well as a lack of infrastructure in outlying 
areas.  Rather than increasing a country’s economic growth and development, these 
developing country clusters extract high costs for productivity due to their inefficiencies 
within the market.  In contrast to these developing country clusters, Porter suggests that 
countries in Western Europe and North America have created multiple clusters within 
multiple cities.  
As developing country clusters mature, they need to move beyond offering lower 
cost labor and compete on the quality of their goods and their ability to flexibly react to 
changes in market demand.  To achieve this, local firms within the cluster will have to 
increase their coordination vertically with suppliers and retailers, and horizontally across 
multiple regions and countries (Cortright, 2005).  Cortright argues that regional 
policymakers should focus on creating a sufficient environment for the formation of these 
expanded industry clusters while nurturing those that are already have high-quality 
producers within the region.   
Developing country firms must also be able to employ flexible specialization to 
meet demand while increasing productivity (Sabel, 1989).  Flexible specialization as 
defined by Sabel means mass-produced specialized goods from general-purpose inputs.  
To achieve this, firms required higher levels of worker and supplier collaboration than 
were previously required in traditional manufacturing sectors.  This requirement pushed 
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the development of networked firms that utilized ICTs to work within their own areas of 
specialization while sub-contracting non-essential activities to each other.   
Within this context, a government needs to focus on accelerating innovation, 
increasing utilization, and diffusing benefits simultaneously to receive the full economic 
impact of ICTs on a country.  So far, few developing country governments have 
demonstrated they are capable of launching an effort like this, let alone making it 
politically and economically sustainable for the long term. 
Methodological Approach 
As discussed above, a key component to the success of ICT strategies has been 
the creation of national technology institutions that have successfully supported 
technology adoption within these countries (Zysman, 1983).  These institutions exist in 
both Thailand and Malaysia.  However, Malaysia has been more successful in 
coordinating these entities to support its national ICT policy implementation.  These 
structures consist of both governmental and non-governmental organizations that direct, 
support, and fund national technology initiatives.  They include advisory boards, business 
development and training agencies, research and development (R&D) institutes, and 
commercialization programs.  Malaysia’s technology institutions, by advancing national 
technology capacity, are an important contributor to economic development (Feinson, 
2003).  
Although Thailand has an institutional structure similar to Malaysia’s, the 
country’s agencies do not have the budget, authority, or monitoring capabilities to 
implement its ICT policies transparently.  In addition, the country has volatile regulatory 
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conditions, leaving ICT operators without a credible commitment from the government to 
enforce and maintain the regulatory regime.  This commitment is essential to the long-
term investment environment, which is key for the capital-intensive telecommunications 
and IT industries (Weingast, 1995).  In contrast, an independent regulator, which is only 
now being formed, in the sector increases market certainty and long-term stability.  The 
ICT sector will invest heavily in its infrastructure only if the necessary regulatory and 
institutional structures exist (Levy, 1994).  These countries have both developed ICT 
strategies that contain three key areas: ICT infrastructure deployment, ICT industry 
development, and human capacity building.  Malaysia and Thailand have taken these 
basic ICT initiatives and adapted them to the needs of their local economic, political, and 
cultural environments.   
Malaysia and Thailand’s network infrastructure deployment plans were based on 
South Korea’s very successful government initiatives to support ICT network expansion.  
These plans focus on increasing access, deploying fiber networks, and expanding 
universal service obligations.  Some of these efforts have been successful, depending on 
the demand for ICT services that already exists within each country.   
The second key area, IT industry development, was the primary focus for the 
private sector and the two national ICT strategies.  In 2003, the government created 
Software Park Thailand and the Software Industry Promotion Agency to bolster its 
fledgling industry.  In Malaysia, the IT sector has grown rapidly through the involvement 
of foreign capital and MNCs, both of which are coordinated through the Multimedia 
Super Corridor.  Through the MSC, the government was able to attract a range of 
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software and IT MNCs.  The country is now focused on increasing the technology 
transfer and training from these global IT firms into its local ICT industries.  
The third area includes workforce skill development to assist in ICT knowledge 
transfers from MNCs while increasing local technology innovation capabilities.  Thailand 
has moved to support training and skills development through its Ministry of Education 
and Ministry of Industry.  However, Malaysia has made it a primary focus for its national 
development strategy.  With support from the prime minister, the country has identified 
several high-tech sectors that offer Malaysia a niche to compete in the global market.  
These sectors will benefit from a public-private effort to coordinate training and R&D 
efforts to bolster local capacity in these areas.  Although this policy was only recently 
announced, it is a vital step in Malaysia’s national strategy to utilize ICTs and develop a 
knowledge-based economy. 
The policy implementation hurdles faced by Thailand have included a lack of 
government coordination and leadership, conflicts of interest among key officials, no 
program monitoring, and limited policy enforcement.  From the beginning, Thailand has 
had a very top-down ICT strategy – with programs and policies driven by government 
ministers rather than by the needs of the private sector.  The goals set within the plan 
were also ambitious, particularly with a five-year time frame, and would have required 
careful coordination within the government to follow the national ICT plan.  Instead, the 
various ministries used the ICT Master Plan for initial budgeting only, failing to use the 
plan for program design or evaluation – resulting in overlapping and siloed efforts across 
the ministries. 
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Leadership issues and conflicts of interest have both been major impediments to 
policy implementation in Thailand.  The country’s National Information Technology 
Committee (NITC) is officially headed by the prime minister, but this position was 
typically delegated to a deputy minister.  As a result, the ability of the Committee to 
develop and implement ICT policies would vary widely depending on the personal 
interests of the deputy assigned.  Policy implementation would suffer a slowdown under 
deputies who were not interested.  More recently, the prime minister headed the NITC 
himself but was also found to have a conflict of interest, potentially steering the 
Committee to benefit his personal business interests. 
Another major hurdle for ICT policy implementation in Thailand is the lack of 
program evaluation.  ICT programs are developed by ministerial CIOs and evaluated only 
at the project level, and this limited monitoring is completed in a vacuum.  The 
evaluation work focuses on gathering quantitative data on hardware deployment, not on 
qualitative data on utilization and the impact of the ICT initiative on the economy.  Most 
important, there is no overall benchmarking or evaluation effort by the government 
against its own master plan, an essential component to ICT strategy success (Docktor, 
2004). 
In Malaysia, the ICT policies focus on infrastructure, ICT industry support, and 
human capacity development.  The Malaysian government needs to focus on accelerating 
innovation, increasing utilization, and diffusing benefits simultaneously to receive the full 
economic impact of ICTs on a country (Jomo, 2003).  Malaysia has taken the policy step 
of focusing on government intervention to ignite and support the innovation process 
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within the country.  This means working with universities, the private sector, MNCs, and 
non-profit organizations to bolster technology transfer, FDI, and technology training.   
Section Summaries 
This dissertation research includes four research sections.  The first section offers 
an ICT policy framework tailored for developing country governments.  This framework 
outlines the sections of ICT adoption, the gating factors between those sections, and the 
key policies governments will implement within each stage.  This research addresses 
some of the important questions that other researchers are not investigating, while using a 
combination of research techniques to explore the stages of ICT adoption and economic 
development.  These stages of ICT adoption and policy reform are then used to frame the 
results of a global regression model and a two-country case study, both discussed below.  
The second section includes a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression model 
of country-level data examining penetration rates for ICT adoption.  Within the 
regression model, I include policy and institutional factors in addition to social and 
economic factors that influence adoption rates.  A pooled time-series cross-sectional 
model of these factors is now possible due to the range of data on ICT adoption from the 
World Bank, the ITU, and other sources.  Several recent studies have put forth models for 
examining the relationship between ICT penetration and various economic, social, and 
political explanatory variables (Hawkins, 2005; Levy, 1994; Schreyer, 2002; Wilson, 
2003).  These studies have included many of the same factors, but few have incorporated 
a wide range of communications technologies or tracked ICT adoption over time.  More 
important, few of these studies examined the impact of ICT policy and institutional 
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reforms on penetration rates.  Most were simply attempting to draw a correlation between 
penetration and macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP per capita, and high-level 
political factors, such as political freedom.  Although this can be enlightening when 
comparing the relative successes across countries, it is not as helpful to developing 
countries that will need to understand the key policy factors that must be in place to 
accelerate ICT adoption. 
The case study analysis is split into the third and fourth sections, which explore 
the individual factors for ICT policy implementation across Malaysia and Thailand.  The 
case study research effort focuses on the sequencing of events and policy shifts involved 
in rapid ICT adoption across countries (Wallsten, 2002).  The hypothesis is that once ICT 
adoption is spurred by a combination of policy changes and economic factors, it must 
then be institutionalized to sustain this accelerated growth rate (Edwards, 2002).  This 
institutional process must include the creation of an independent regulatory agency and a 
ministry of ICT that both have the authority, budget, and enforcement capabilities 
necessary to sustain national ICT policies focused on ICT adoption and utilization 
(Wenders, 1992).  This process of economic development and institutional shifts spurring 
ICT adoption is repeated through several stages of technological development, with each 
stage requiring a new set of policies and institutional reform (Fink, 2003).  I hypothesized 
that growth is not sustainable for developing countries that cannot complete the 
institutional reform process within each stage.   
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Section 2: ICTs in Developing Countries – The Stages of 
Adoption  
 
Introduction 
One of the key policy goals for developing country governments is to diffuse 
ICTs across their nations through a combination of government intervention and private 
sector growth (Mariscal, 2005).  In recent years, these technologies have become a focus 
for governments hoping to accelerate their economic development through ICT-driven 
productivity gains, enhanced educational capabilities, and expanded innovation capacity 
(Brynjolfsson, 1996; McGuckin, 1999; Siegel, 1997).  Through the inherent advantages 
of being latecomers, many developing countries can begin a rapid process of expanding 
their ICT penetration rates – quickly reaching or even surpassing developed country 
adoption rates (Rouvinen, 2006).  Achieving rapid acceleration in ICT adoption requires 
a coordinated effort by the government, the private sector, and academia to reach the 
pent-up demand that exists within the developing country by harnessing the existing 
foundation of communications services and injecting new competition and technologies 
(De Boer, 1999).  Without this public-private coordination, developing countries cannot 
sustain their ICT growth paths, leaving many regions and sectors within the country 
underserved by ICTs.  
To accelerate their ICT adoption rates, developing countries undergo similar 
processes of institutional, policy, and market reforms that can be delineated into five 
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distinct stages.  To highlight the similar processes across developing countries, this 
section describes five stages marked by evolving technology options, institutional 
frameworks, national ICT policies, and market structures (Milne, 1998).  Within these 
five stages, these four factors affect the development of the ICT market, creating new 
opportunities or challenges for policymakers as they attempt to quickly adapt national 
policies and initiatives to the ever-evolving ICT environment.  These stages are based on 
common patterns of development within these four factors across developing countries, 
offering a new framework for understanding ICT sector development.  For a given 
country, its stage of adoption is determined by its level of ICT penetration as well as its 
progress across three qualitative factors: institutional, policy, and technological 
development.   
One of the most important and most difficult factors is the required reform of the 
national ICT institutional structure and policy framework (Levy, 1994).  Developing 
countries tend to reform their institutions and policies through several of the five stages, 
altering the state’s position to find its most appropriate role within the market (Bortolotti, 
2007; Mariscal, 2005).  This process can prove to be very difficult for most developing 
country governments, given political and financial disincentives for reform, including the 
sunk costs of early stage policy choices as well as regulatory capture by operators (Levy, 
1996).  As a result, only those developing countries that have successfully navigated this 
process can sustain rapid growth in their ICT adoption rates.  
I have based these five stages of ICT adoption, and the evolving role of the state, 
on Rostow’s ideas on the stages of economic development (Rostow, 1960).  These ICT 
stages use Rostow’s concept as a guide for outlining and highlighting the transition 
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countries make from a traditional communications market to a highly competitive and 
innovative ICT sector.  The chart in Exhibit 2.1 outlines the five stages of ICT adoption 
and utilization as well as the corresponding ICT policies, institutional structure, and 
competitive environment.  The boundaries for these phases do not overlap.  However, 
there are no hard lines between stages.  Rather, these are meant to be estimated transition 
points in a country’s ICT development.  For example, a country’s four ICT metrics may 
be slightly below the boundary for stage four, but the overall ICT sector within this 
country may demonstrate all the attributes of stage four due to its institutional, policy, 
and market reforms.  Although this may not be reflected in the four metrics, this 
advanced level of ICT sector development would be seen in the other, qualitative 
measures outlined in the table below in Exhibit 2.1.  In addition, countries may also have 
attributes from more than one phase at a given time.  The goal of this research is not to 
pigeonhole a country into a given stage, but to outline broad stages of ICT development, 
illustrating the adoption process while demonstrating how these four factors change with 
a country’s development. 
Ranges were set for the four ICT metrics in each stage.  The table below includes 
fixed line, mobile, Internet, and broadband penetration rates.  These are representative 
estimates based on the patterns of growth seen across developing countries as their ICT 
sectors have grown.  Depending on the metric and the underlying technology, there are 
differing ranges set for each ICT sector.  For example, because the network deployment 
costs and time frames are significantly higher for broadband versus mobile telephony, the 
penetration rate between stage one and two is much lower for broadband (Jensen, 2005).  
A similar difference in network costs is true for fixed line versus Internet access, which is 
 50 
reflected in the ranges of penetration set for those metrics as well.  These ranges for each 
of the stages represent the inflection points in penetration rate growth for many countries.  
Moving from one stage to the next will require a new level of network deployment, 
enhanced market competitiveness, and expanded end-user demand.  It is unlikely that any 
two countries will go through these stages in exactly the same manner.  Instead, many 
will have their own inflection points.  In addition, not every country will have the same 
inflection points and not all transitions between stages will cause a country to experience 
a change in the slope of their adoption rate.  However, these penetration ranges set for 
each stage broadly represent the patterns of adoption seen across developing and 
developed countries as their ICT sectors mature. 
It is important to note that in this section, I am using the World Bank’s definition 
of low-, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high-income countries; definitions and 
examples are included below.  When referring to developing countries, I am including 
low-, lower-middle, and upper-middle income countries while counting high-income 
economies as developed countries.   
• Low-income countries: These developing countries have a 2006 gross national 
income (GNI) per capita of $905 or less.  Within the 185 World Bank member 
countries, this category includes 53 economies, such as Cambodia, India, Haiti, 
and Ghana.  
• Lower middle-income countries: These developing countries have a 2006 GNI per 
capita from $906 to $3,595.  The World Bank classifies 55 countries in this 
category, including Algeria, China, Colombia, Jamaica, and Ukraine.  
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• Upper middle-income countries: Developing countries in this category have a 
2006 GNI per capita from $3,596 to $11,115.  There are 41 economies in this 
category, such as Argentina, Hungary, Oman, Russia, and Turkey. 
• High-income countries: These developed countries have a 2006 GNI per capita of 
$11,116 or more.  This category includes 60 countries, such as Australia, Finland, 
Japan, Singapore, and the United States. 
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Exhibit 2.1: Overview of the Five Stages of ICT Adoption 
 Traditional market 
Pre-conditions for 
takeoff Takeoff 
Drive to mass 
market 
Age of high 
consumption and 
innovation 
Fixed line 
penetration rate 
(per 1,000 
inhabitants) 
0 to 100  100 to 200 200 to 350 350 to 500 Over 500 
Mobile penetration 
rate (per 1,000 
inhabitants) 
0 to 100 100 to 200 200 to 600 600 to 800 Over 800 
Internet penetration 
rate (per 1,000 
inhabitants) 
0 to 100 100 to 200 200 to 350 350 to 500 Over 500 
Broadband 
penetration rate 
(per 1,000 
inhabitants) 
0 to 10 10 to 50 50 to 150 150 to 200 Over 200 
Residential and 
business ICT usage 
Limited residential 
use; business users 
in urban areas 
Urban fixed line and 
mobile growing, but 
few rural users  
Accelerated growth 
for residential and 
business users 
Internet and mobile 
phone widespread 
with residential  
Market has reached 
saturation  
Income level Low income Lower-middle 
income 
Upper-middle 
income 
High income High income 
ICT industry Importer of ICT 
technology 
Part of the global 
ICT supply chain, 
but little value 
added 
Local ICT industry 
begins to take off, in 
a few target markets 
Reliant on ICT 
imports, but a larger 
industry develops  
ICT products and 
services globally 
competitive 
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Competitive 
environment 
Monopoly Competitive mobile 
and Internet, but 
limited fixed line 
Competitive urban 
fixed line; robust 
mobile competition 
Cable, wireless, and 
fixed all compete 
against one another 
Market reaches 
saturation; heavy 
price competition  
National ICT policy 
focus 
Privatization; tech 
transfer 
liberalization; 
network deployment  
Expand 
connectivity; 
investment and tech 
transfer 
Support to local ICT 
industry; training; e-
Government 
initiatives 
Coordinate public-
private R&D; 
expand tertiary 
education 
Public-private 
coordination to 
speed ICT 
innovation 
Universal service 
policy focus 
Metro center 
networks; 
payphones and 
village phone  
Expansion beyond 
urban areas; 
universal service 
fund 
Rapid expansion of 
universal service 
fund for rural users 
Universal service 
for Internet and 
broadband services 
Universal service 
fund continues to 
subsidize rural or 
low-income users 
ICT institutional 
structure 
Regulator; 
ministerial power 
rests with state-
owned PTT 
Authority split 
across agencies; 
larger private sector 
role 
Creation of Ministry 
of ICT; implements 
national policies  
MICT shares 
authority; 
government’s role is 
reduced 
MICT broken up 
again across many 
agencies  
Major hurdles Difficult to take 
control from a PTT 
and its revenue 
source 
Reforms that will 
create takeoff 
difficult to start 
Difficult to sustain; 
requires institutional 
reforms and support 
Manage 
competition; expand 
broadband networks 
Few countries have 
been able to become 
ICT innovators 
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Theory Base 
Exhibit 2.1 uses the general framework of five stages presented by Rostow as a 
framework for understanding the economic, political, and technological changes that 
occur within a developing country.  Development economists have supplanted Rostow’s 
theory due to the lack of empirical evidence for rapid economic “takeoff” within 
developing countries (Easterly, 2006).  However, as this study will discuss, there are 
excellent examples of developing countries that have experienced rapid acceleration in 
their ICT adoption rates – making Rostow’s framework a good complement to ICT 
development theory.  Combined, Rostow and ICT sector research serve as an important 
tool for understanding the rapid changes developing countries undergo in their ICT 
sectors.  To augment the framework presented by Rostow, I have also used several 
articles with ICT-specific frameworks, including the telecommunication adoption 
framework presented by Milne (1998) that outlines five stages of policies and the 
corresponding penetration rate for fixed line access.  This was an important first step in 
developing an ICT adoption framework.  However, it leaves out new technologies, such 
as Internet access and mobile phones, and focuses predominantly on universal service 
policies.  The adoption phases discussed within this study have been expanded to include 
additional technologies and are more comprehensive in their approach to ICT markets, 
policies, and institutions.  The section below defines the four major factors that influence 
ICT adoption: institutions, policies, markets, and technologies.  
There has been a lengthy debate about the connection between economic growth 
and ICT adoption (Edwards, 2002).  Although this research does not contend directly 
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with this issue, several previous studies have shown that there is a causal link between the 
deployment of ICTs and economic growth (Roller, 2001).  Based on a study of 21 high-
income countries, Roller suggests that countries begin to see the economic benefits of 
ICTs once their adoption rates approach universal service.  This suggests that developing 
countries may not experience measurable economic growth benefits until they reach stage 
three or four.  However, there are other economic benefits from adoption at earlier stages 
that are not reflected in national statistics.   
In contrast, other studies have shown that returns on IT-related investments made 
by developing countries are not statistically significant (Dewan, 2000).  However, 
Dewan’s study simply may not have enough data points with years of high IT spending 
because it was completed in 2000.  Dewan agrees with Roller’s contention that developed 
countries have statistically significant returns on their IT investments.  Another recent 
study by Jorgenson tracks higher returns on IT investments across all regions, particularly 
in developing Asia (Jorgenson, 2005).  This may suggest that countries in stages one and 
two should focus on basic communication services, rather than investments in bolstering 
domestic IT usage.  A focus on IT usage may become more beneficial in stage three, but 
certainly in stages four and five.  
While ICT adoption follows its own path within countries, there are similarities in 
diffusion patterns between ICTs and other technologies.  A recent study of technology 
diffusion across countries examined several sectors including ICTs (Comin, 2004).  This 
study by Comin suggests that the key determinants of technology adoption include 
human capital, type of government, trade liberalization, and adoption of predecessor 
technologies.  The first three factors are all reliant on government policy for successful 
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implementation, suggesting that the role of the state is a vital component for technology 
diffusion across a wide range of sectors including ICTs.   
Comin also argues that technologies begin with high-income countries first and 
then trickle down more quickly to developing countries.  Because developed countries 
have already adopted these technologies and built successful business models around 
delivering them, developing countries can access technologies that have already been 
vetted by the market.  This adds credence to the hypothesis that developing countries are 
better suited to rapid ICT adoption than developed countries because they are latecomers 
and not operating at the technology frontier.  In another study on latecomers, Perkins 
examines several technology sectors including fixed lines to determine the latecomer 
advantages for developing countries in following the adoption curves of developed 
countries (Perkins, 2005).  Perkins argues that openness to international trade – and, in 
turn, technology transfer – will positively affect technology adoption within developing 
countries.  
These concepts of latecomer advantages in technology adoption, the benefits of 
technology transfer on adoption, and the vital role of the state are incorporated into the 
five stages.  The section below outlines the four major components influencing ICT 
adoption rates: institutional structure, national ICT policies, market competitiveness, and 
network infrastructure.  This section explains the four key concepts within the 
framework, which will be examined stage by stage and in more detail in the rest of this 
study. 
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Key Concepts within the Adoption Stage Framework 
Although countries are commonly divided into developed and developing 
categories, there are in fact many levels of ICT development within each category.  These 
different levels of ICT sector maturity are then reflected in the national ICT adoption 
goals and the key policies and public support given to ICT development (Albadvi, 2004).  
By categorizing the ICT adoption levels, ICT goals, and policies, we can more clearly 
understand the factors that strongly influence the successful acceleration of ICT adoption 
rates within developing countries.   
The chart in Exhibit 2.2 depicts the GDP per capita and the ICT adoption rate for 
174 countries across all five stages.  For the sake of simplicity, ICT penetration is 
measured only as the total fixed and mobile lines per 1,000 people and does not include 
Internet access or broadband subscribers.  The thresholds of the five stages have been 
placed to reflect the averages for the penetration rates outlined above in Exhibit 2.1.  As 
countries move from one stage to the next, there are patterns to the development and 
evolution of their ICT goals, institutions, policies, and technology platforms.  Each has 
separate gating factors that will be met by many governments as they reform their 
institutions, policies, and markets to address the challenges of the new ICT sector 
environment (Milne, 1998).  For many countries in stages one through three, the policy 
will remain focused on deploying basic network access to support telephony and data 
services.  Countries that have reached stages four and five will tend to focus more heavily 
on ICT innovation rather than simple access.  The section below outlines the key reforms 
and market changes that transpire within each of the five stages. 
 58 
Exhibit 2.2: The Relationship between GDP per Capita and ICT 
Adoption 
 
Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Institutional Organization and Regulatory Structure  
The role of the state in the development of an ICT sector is defined by the 
regulatory and institutional structure that is created by the central government.  These 
institutions include a national regulator, ministries of communications and innovation, 
and – for countries that have yet to privatize – a state-owned operator (Li, 2005).  The 
regulatory and institutional structure of a developing country is the foundation for all 
other governmental efforts to accelerate ICT adoption – from direct actions, such as 
network deployments, to indirect supports that include market subsidies.  The successful 
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creation of an independent regulator, separated from the political influence of the 
government, is the typical starting point for accelerated ICT adoption (Baudrier, 2001).   
Similarly, the creation of a ministry with a critical mass of ICT expertise, budget, 
and authority improves the likelihood of successful implementation of ICT policies 
(Hawkins, 2005).  Countries with a weak national regulator or poor ministerial 
organization will hamper any ICT policies or initiatives that are designed to achieve 
national adoption goals.  As countries develop their ICT sectors, the institutional structure 
of the regulator and ministries changes to match the evolving role of the state across the 
five stages of adoption.  Evolving from a centralized parastatal with regulatory and 
monopoly power, developing countries work to carefully construct a new set of 
institutions based on international practices that can balance the market power of 
competitors, ensure universal access, and drive ICT innovation across the public and 
private sectors (Gasmi, 2000).  Few developing countries have been able to achieve this 
balance, but those that have offer a template for other governments to customize to their 
own national environment.   
National ICT policies  
In both developed and developing countries, many central governments have 
created national ICT strategies to bolster ICT adoption (Hossain, 2003).  These strategies 
tend to include an assessment of the key challenges in terms of ICT utilization and 
innovation along with proposing a series of initiatives to address these issues.  These 
strategies are typically created by a ministry of communications or science in 
coordination with the private sector and academia.  This public-private coordination helps 
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to ensure that realistic goals are set and that the initiatives will address demand for ICT 
services.  Policies and initiatives divorced from the realities of the national market will 
become financially unsustainable and limited in their implications for accelerated ICT 
adoption rates.   
The goals and policies chosen by governments tend to change quickly to adjust to 
the new sector environment across the five stages of ICT adoption (Fink, 2003).  For 
governments in the early stages of adoption, there may be no critical mass of private 
sector operators or networks for the market to use as a foundation.  As a result, the 
policies and goals set at these stages tend to rely on direct government involvement in 
infrastructure deployment, price setting, and service creation.  As the ICT networks and 
operators can begin delivering services independently, the policy goals and programs 
shift toward more indirect supports.  These indirect initiatives can include a range of 
operator subsidies, training, and incentives as well as financial supports for end users.  
Developing countries pursuing a catch-up strategy for their ICT adoption rates must 
carefully reform their national policies, quickly altering the role of the state to fit the 
market and the technological environment as they rapidly evolve during the five stages.  
Competitive Market and Indigenous ICT Industry  
Similar to the changing role of the state, the ICT market environment will quickly 
change as the country moves through the five phases.  Under a government monopoly, 
there may be little network deployment or technological innovation within the sector.  
Once developing countries move from the first to the second stage, several sectors will 
begin to see competition, price declines, and service quality improvements.  Although 
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privatization is not sufficient to create a competitive market, a successful privatization 
process can release market forces to service pent-up market demand and accelerate the 
sector (Fink, 2003).  
The private sector can be divided into two components that include the national 
communications market and the domestic ICT industry.  The national communications 
market includes all of the service providers delivering telephony, data, video, 
applications, and other services to residents and firms within the country (Kraemer, 
1996).  This market does not evolve smoothly or uniformly.  Instead, the competitive 
landscape undergoes periods of stability followed by bouts of rapid change.  In addition, 
some market sectors become more competitive than the rest due to technological and cost 
differences.  The most notable example is the mobile services sector, which has 
drastically lower deployment costs than a fixed line network. These lower costs have 
allowed the mobile sector to accelerate rapidly within dozens of developing countries.  
The technological advantages of the mobile sector, along with Internet access, have led to 
developing countries where one or two sectors race ahead of the rest of the market in 
terms of investment, subscribers, and innovation.  This creates uneven levels of market 
competitiveness, which forces national regulators to apply policies and regulations across 
sectors that vary widely in their market challenges.   
The local ICT industry includes hardware, software, and IT firms that adapt 
international technologies or develop their own solutions.  As a country moves through 
the stages of adoption, this domestic ICT sector moves quickly toward a critical mass of 
firms capable of serving the domestic market first before moving to international export.  
These local firms help ensure that there are sufficient applications and technologies that 
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are tailored to the local ICT market and policy environment.  Developing countries that 
rely strictly on imports may find themselves without the necessary technology options to 
support a sustained growth in ICT adoption (Madanmohan, 2004).  The ICT policies and 
institutions of developing countries must focus on the creation of both a sustainable 
communications market and an innovative ICT industry to achieve its national adoption 
goals. 
Network Infrastructure 
A wide range of technological solutions is now available to developing countries 
that are seeking to accelerate their ICT adoption rates.  These technologies enable 
developing countries to leapfrog over the traditional infrastructure that took developed 
nations decades to build out and move immediately to options tailored to rapid diffusion 
of access (James, 2005).  National ICT networks can be divided into three broad 
components: access networks, national backbones, and international connectivity.  
Access networks provide fixed lines and mobile phones with last mile connectivity for 
telephony and data services.  When assessing ICT adoption rates within developing 
countries, there is a tendency to focus strictly on the number of access lines or mobile 
subscribers within a country (Chinn, 2006).  Although these metrics demonstrate the 
relative success of ICT diffusion within the country, they ignore the vital role national 
and international backbone networks play in this effort.   
National backbones provide the foundation for ICT access adoption and include 
fiber optic, satellite, and wireless connections between cities.  These networks 
interconnect calls and data transmissions across the country and can significantly lower 
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costs for delivering services and applications.  Without a strong backbone, national 
efforts to improve ICT adoption will be hindered by high costs and unreliable services 
(Jensen, 2005).  International connectivity includes submarine and terrestrial fiber optic 
cables that interconnect a country with global networks.  A developing country with 
strong international networks will have lower Internet and transnational capacity for its 
end users.  National governments, in conjunction with the private sector, should support 
each of these three components simultaneously to ensure they can rapidly progress 
through the five stages of adoption.   
Approach to Determining the Five ICT Stages 
The goal of these ICT stages of development is to provide new insight into the 
interaction across multiple factors, including technologies, policies, market environment, 
and institutions that influence national ICT trajectories.  These stages are based on 
patterns developed through the interpretation of global ICT data sets tracked by the ITU 
along with extensive use of existing literature and developing country case examples.  
The global data includes 16 years of ITU and World Bank data for over 150 countries, 
including the four main metrics of fixed lines, mobile phones, Internet users, and 
broadband lines.  The existing literature provides previous efforts to categorize the stages 
of ICT development, research on the interaction across the four key factors influencing 
ICTs, and the evolution of ICT policies and institutions across time.  The literature also 
includes a number of country examples that focus on the evolution of ICT networks, 
policies, and institutions within a developing country.  Using this combination of data, 
existing studies, and case examples enables my research to focus on the interaction and 
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coordination across the four factors that are necessary for developing countries to 
progress within their ICT trajectory.  I am not claiming statistical or formal 
generalizability for this study.  However, this section relies on a large foundation of 
global data and country examples to carefully determine the boundaries of these five 
stages. 
Stage One: Traditional Market with Limited Coverage  
Developing countries at this first stage of ICT adoption are predominately low-
income and tend to have only basic telephony services offered by a monopoly provider.  
These monopolies are typically government-owned, offering slow deployment of 
infrastructure and unaffordable services, creating low penetration rates for both fixed and 
mobile services along with limited Internet access.  This confines the availability of 
services to a small portion of the population and results in little ICT infrastructure 
deployment (Martins, 2003).  The typical exceptions for telephony and Internet access 
include government facilities, large businesses, and high-income residents.  Although 
access is limited, telecommunications parastatals typically become politically powerful 
by raising government revenues through high rates charged for international calls and 
business services.  This political power, coupled with the monopoly’s existing market 
power, severely limits the number of new entrants allowed to compete in the market.  
Developing countries at this stage tend to undergo significant market and regulatory 
reforms to transition to the next level of adoption. 
The chart in Exhibit 2.3 includes several countries that are currently at stage one 
overall for their adoption rates.  The metrics are based on the number of users per 1,000 
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inhabitants for fixed, mobile, Internet, and broadband services, which are then combined 
into an index to determine the proper stage for each country.  I have weighted the index 
evenly for all four metrics, rather than weighing one or two more heavily than the others.  
Although narrowband Internet and fixed lines will be supplanted eventually by mobile 
and broadband service, today both metrics are important components in understanding 
the evolution of a country’s ICT sector.  As discussed above, these metrics should be 
used in conjunction with the other major factors included in the framework, such as 
institutional and policy reforms.  However, it would require additional case study and 
primary research into each of these countries to determine the staging of each qualitative 
measure.  For the purposes of this study, the primary determinants for a country example 
to be included in a given stage are its four ICT metrics.   
Exhibit 2.3: Examples of Countries in Stage One of ICT Adoption 
Stage 1 Example Countries
Mainlines
Stage for 
Mainlines Mobile users
Stage for 
Mobile
Internet 
users 
Stage for 
Internet
Broadband 
users
Stage for 
Broadband
Stage 
Index
Ghana 14.5 1 128.5 2 18.1 1 0.1 1 1
India 45.5 1 82.2 1 54.8 1 1.2 1 1
Kenya 8.2 1 134.6 2 32.4 1 0.0 1 1
Nigeria 9.3 1 141.3 2 38.0 1 0.0 1 1
Tanzania 3.9 1 51.6 1 8.9 1 0.0 1 1
Turkmenistan 80.1 1 10.5 1 7.6 1 0.0 1 1
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators. 
The columns to the right of these metrics include the given stage for that sector.  
For example, Nigeria has reached stage two for its mobile phone services while 
remaining in stage one for the other three sectors.  This list is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but illustrative of the countries that are currently in stage one.  Several other 
countries, such as Ghana and Kenya, have also seen their mobile user adoption rates 
increase ahead of their other three sectors.  In addition, some of these countries, such as 
India, have begun to see regulatory and institutional reforms – a strong signal that the 
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country has begun the transition toward the second stage.  However, variations in the 
qualitative components of the stage framework are not incorporated into this chart, or the 
other charts included for the other four stages.  
ICT Adoption  
At this stage, many developing countries have not begun the process of 
integrating ICTs into their economies or governmental services.  In addition, there tends 
to be a lack of indigenous ICT industry, forcing the country to rely on imported ICTs 
from developed countries.  Developing countries at this stage focus their national 
infrastructure deployments on universal access rather than universal service.  Universal 
access is defined as creating ICT access opportunities for the entire population, although 
the nearest access point may be miles away for a potential user (Moschella, 1998).  
Universal access goals for developing countries tend to include ICT services that are 
deployed within major cities but limited to a per-village basis in rural areas.  This differs 
from the services deployed on an individual basis found in countries that have achieved 
universal services.  For each developing country, the definition of universal access varies 
widely depending on its geography, population density, and economic development 
(Navas-Savater, 2002).  For countries facing geographic challenges, the distance between 
access points will be much greater than for densely populated countries.  For many 
countries at this stage, fixed line access consists of fewer than 200 lines per 1,000 
inhabitants while broadband data services are almost non-existent.  Some stage one 
countries, as mentioned above, have been able to increase their mobile phone adoption.  
However, these users tend to be located the largest urban center, leaving other regions 
with limited service.  
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Exhibit 2.4 demonstrates the rapid growth of Ghana’s mobile phone market, 
which has recently reached stage two while the other three quantitative metrics – fixed 
line, Internet access, and broadband – are all still in stage one.  Ghana was able to begin 
the telecom liberalization process in the late 1990s.  However, the levels of competition 
have varied widely within the ICT sector. 
Exhibit 2.4: ICT Adoption Stages Applied to the Ghanaian Mobile 
Sector 
Ghana - Mobile Phone Subscribers (per 1,000)
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Competitive Landscape  
For developing countries at this stage, there is little competition for fixed, mobile, 
or Internet services aside from a monopoly provider that is either owned or controlled by 
the government (Wallsten, 1999).  The government is either providing services directly 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
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through a state-owned enterprise or has given a private sector company monopoly status 
in the market.  This private sector arrangement was common among many Caribbean 
islands, with the private company Cable & Wireless of Britain serving as the monopoly 
provider for many of the UK’s former colonies.  Without price and service competition, 
there is little incentive for the monopoly to offer reliable, affordable services, resulting in 
a flat number of fixed line deployments.  For many of these countries, mobile phone 
services are just beginning to be licensed and deployed under the monopoly (Proenza, 
2006).  Typically, countries with monopoly operators will see only limited mobile phone 
success due to unaffordable services.  For most of these countries, this lack of mobile 
service is not remedied until the monopoly is privatized and the regulator allows new 
entrants.  There may be competition within the ISP sector, either through dial-up services 
or Internet kiosks, but these providers will be at the mercy of the monopoly operator for 
both access and backhaul capacity.  
As mentioned above, the monopoly can secure sizable revenues from 
international and business services, which are used to cross-subsidize local services 
(Laffont, 2000).  Although these revenues may allow the monopoly to meet minimal 
requirements for universal access, they leave international and business services 
unaffordable for most users.  Data services in particular are made more expensive within 
these countries by the high costs of international connections, which may make the ISP 
business model unsustainable due to the lower margins (Jensen, 2005).   
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Network Infrastructure 
Developing countries at this stage often face a wide range of backbone and access 
issues that limit infrastructure deployment.  Geographic hurdles, such as mountains, or a 
dispersed population can push up the costs of laying copper or fiber-based assets, forcing 
operators to rely on satellite or fixed wireless to reach customers.  These alternative 
network solutions are not cost-effective for widespread deployment and support only 
voice and narrowband data services (Crandall, 2003).  Similarly, national backbones may 
not reach beyond a handful of large cities, limiting the capacity of the network to support 
any rapid increases in demand.  In addition to these technological and geographic 
challenges, developing countries also face capital shortages.  Without a critical mass of 
users or a steady revenue stream, many operators within these countries cannot find the 
necessary capital to build out their network infrastructure (Indjikian, 2005).  This creates 
a vicious cycle where neither the user base nor the network can expand due to market 
constraints, many times requiring government intervention and guarantees to trigger new 
rounds of investment. 
National ICT Policies 
Many national governments at this stage do not have a national ICT policy 
designed to increase adoption rates (Mbarika et al., 2005).  In addition, many of these 
countries do not have any efforts under way to liberalize the market or reform their 
regulatory structures to create a competitive environment.  For countries that do begin the 
regulatory and market reform process in this stage, the policy effort typically focuses on 
privatizing the state-owned monopoly, liberalizing the trade restrictions on imported 
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technologies, and deploying a national fiber backbone (Parker, 2005).  This backbone 
effort is particularly important to lowering costs in countries where the private sector has 
yet to build out its own national networks.  Universal access policies are also included as 
part of these initial deployments of telecom networks to population centers while 
expanding access to payphones and one-phone-per-village programs to expand 
connectivity access to rural and low-income areas. 
Institutional and Regulatory Structure  
The ICT institutional structure within the country is highly centralized, with the 
government’s role within the ICT market dominated by the ministry of communications 
(Acemoglu, 2005).  This single government entity typically operates both the national 
carrier and the regulator, giving the ministry direct control over the ICT sector with little 
input from other government ministries.  With a monopoly operator and a weak 
regulatory structure, developing countries find themselves with significant instability in 
the market due to political influences (Smith, 1999).  This instability can be caused by 
sudden changes to licensing or foreign ownership rules, which can shift due to political 
considerations and significantly increase the risk in an already high-risk market.  With a 
weak regulatory framework and high levels of risk, the market attracts only a limited 
amount of domestic and international investment – further hampering efforts to expand 
the national networks and markets.   
Challenges 
There are several challenges facing countries attempting to move out of this stage 
and into the next.  Economic, geographic, and political conditions can all conspire against 
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even the most strident efforts to accelerate ICT adoption within a low-income country 
(Selwyn, 2004).  In addition to these macroeconomic and political conditions, there are 
several ICT market-specific hurdles that prevent reform efforts.  One of the largest 
hurdles is the political and market power of the state-owned enterprise, which has little 
reason to support an ICT reform process that would reduce its role in the sector.  In 
addition, the operator’s large profit margins can develop into a steady stream of 
government revenue, limiting incentives for the central government to take action and 
making it politically and financially difficult to move into the second stage. 
Stage Two: Pre-Conditions for Takeoff  
It is important to note that many developing countries have not experienced the 
rapid growth in ICT adoption due to political or economic instability (Quinn, 2001).  
However, once the process has begun, these developing countries can grow their ICT 
markets very quickly, with some countries (such as Malaysia) moving from stage one to 
stage three in as few as five years.  Developing countries have completed several pre-
conditions prior to reaching the second stage.  For most developing countries, these pre-
conditions include regulatory reform, market liberalization, and increases in public and 
private sector investment (Briceno-Garmendia, 2004).  This section will examine the 
necessary pre-conditions for developing countries to support a takeoff in their ICT 
adoption rates.   
There are several other developing countries that have also begun the process of 
rapid ICT adoption and are currently working toward the pre-conditions for this 
acceleration.  Although governments at this stage are moving away from monopoly 
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authority, they are still the primary driver of investment within the sector.  With this 
primary role, governments should balance the larger revenue commitments to the 
country’s economic and social needs against their spending in the ICT sector (Kozma, 
2005).  As a result, developing countries should carefully assess the risks of directly 
supporting their ICT markets.  These governments should also determine which ICTs are 
most appropriate for accelerating adoption based on the current sector environment and 
the available technology options.   
The chart in Exhibit 2.5 contains several countries at stage two.  These countries 
have a wider range of adoption rates across the four sectors (i.e., mainlines, mobile, 
Internet, and broadband) than was seen in the stage one countries.  Several countries have 
reached very high levels of mobile phone usage, including South Africa, which has a 
mobile sector in stage four.  However, South Africa and many of these other countries 
have been slow to build out their fixed line infrastructure, as demonstrated by the 
mainline, Internet, and broadband penetration rates listed below.  Another example of this 
is the Philippines, which has reached stage three for its mobile sector but is mired in stage 
one for the other three sectors.  This lack of infrastructure has prevented the Philippines 
and other countries from experiencing accelerated adoption rates outside of the mobile 
sector.   
In contrast, countries such as China have already achieved penetration rates that 
are very close to the boundaries to stage three across several sectors (Tang, 2003).  China 
has already seen rapid increases in adoption in its fixed and mobile sectors as well as in 
its broadband sector, albeit from a very low base.  The country is also a good example of 
a developing country with wide disparities between rural and urban regions, with a large 
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majority of broadband users in urban areas.  National statistics hide the low rates of 
penetration in rural areas, which in turn may limit future growth as China’s urban centers 
reach saturation points. 
Exhibit 2.5: Examples of Countries in Stage Two of ICT Adoption 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators. 
ICT Adoption 
Countries at this stage tend to be low-income or lower-middle-income countries 
that have pushed their monopoly to expand services while beginning to introduce some 
policy reforms and mobile sector competition.  However, socio-economic and 
demographic conditions within low-income countries can become a significant challenge 
for accelerating ICT adoption (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003).  Potential ICT subscribers in 
these countries typically have limited income to devote to telecommunications services, 
while local businesses within the agricultural and manufacturing sectors may have little 
need for ICTs.  There are also thresholds where countries are simply too politically or 
economically unstable to see a rapid ICT adoption.  However, it is important to remember 
that income levels alone do not determine the success of an individual country.  
Developing countries that have already seen their ICT sectors take off display a wide 
Stage 2 Example Countries
Mainlines
Stage for 
Mainlines
Mobile 
users
Stage for 
Mobile
Internet 
users 
Stage for 
Internet
Broadband 
users
Stage for 
Broadband
Stage 
Index
Botswana 74.8 1 466.3 3 34.0 1 0.0 1 2
China 268.6 3 301.6 3 85.1 1 28.7 2 2
Indonesia 57.9 1 212.7 3 72.5 1 0.2 1 2
Jordan 119.2 2 303.6 3 117.7 2 1.9 1 2
Mexico 189.3 2 460.4 3 180.6 2 22.4 2 2
Philippines 40.5 1 418.7 3 53.9 1 0.7 1 2
South Africa 100.9 2 724.3 4 108.8 2 3.5 1 2
Thailand 109.5 2 429.8 3 110.3 2 0.7 1 2
Ukraine 255.9 3 365.7 3 96.9 1 0.0 1 2
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variety of socio-economic characteristics, but countries that can meet minimum 
thresholds for economic development can move quickly through the five stages.   
Additionally, there are no hard limits on how far or fast a country may see its ICT 
market progress.  Currently, South Korea has a per-capita income that is several times 
lower than the US or Western Europe, but the country has quickly moved toward the top 
globally for broadband, fiber access, and mobile services – surpassing the US in all three 
of those metrics (OECD, 2007; World Bank, 2006).  This suggests that the most 
important factors are not simply economic, but rather market-specific: strong ICT 
regulation and support, healthy competitive environment, and robust network 
infrastructure.  
Exhibit 2.6 depicts the mobile services adoption rate for Thailand, demonstrating 
that the country’s mobile telephony penetration rate began to stall almost immediately 
after reaching stage three.  At the same time, three of the four ICT metrics for Thailand 
are either in stage one or two – with an average at stage two overall for the country’s ICT 
sector.  The boundaries for the phases have been placed where the mobile penetration 
rates accelerated, pushing the country rapidly from stage one to two.  Once reaching stage 
three, Thailand’s mobile phone operators could no longer reach a steady base of urban 
customers, forcing them to either slow their subscriber growth or increase their network 
investment.  Based on interviews with the mobile operators, these private companies 
were reluctant to increase their investment due to the unstable regulatory and political 
environment.  Instead, they chose to reduce their capital investments, which in turn 
caused the country’s adoption rate to stall in stage three.    
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Exhibit 2.6: ICT Adoption Stages Applied to the Thai Mobile Sector 
Thailand - Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
The figure below in Exhibit 2.7 depicts the problems facing developing countries 
that only have two of the three components mentioned above.  Markets with a strong 
regulator and competitive market, but with geographic challenges that limit network 
reach as in the Philippines, can still have rural or low-income areas without access.  
Countries without a strong regulator, such as South Africa, face a weak investment 
environment due to the heightened risk associated with an unstable regulatory regime 
(Acemoglu, 2003).  For developing countries without a competitive market, the current 
network infrastructure may provide universal access.  However, the lack of competition 
will still result in expensive and often unreliable services, as we have seen in the Gulf 
States (Keivani, 2003).  Only countries with a strong regulator, competitive market, and 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
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robust infrastructure such as South Korea can initiate rapid acceleration within the market 
(Lee, 2004). 
Exhibit 2.7: Rapid ICT Adoption Requires Strong Regulation, Market 
Competition, and Robust Infrastructure 
 
Competitive Landscape  
Another important challenge facing latecomer countries prior to takeoff is an ICT 
market with large pent-up demand for basic voice and data services.  This demand comes 
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from both consumer and business sectors, which had previously been unable to afford 
services under the monopoly operator.  As a result, penetration rates within these markets 
have been kept artificially low by this lack of price competition, resulting in excess 
demand that can be quickly tapped by competitively priced services from new market 
entrants.   
Once new entrants introduce this competition into the market, services will be 
improved almost immediately while access will be quickly expanded – causing rapid 
growth in the size of the market (Gruber, 2001).  This market growth also creates 
opportunities for new services such as mobile services, applications, and video, adding to 
the initial wave of telephony and narrowband data services.  At this stage, fixed lines 
have become increasingly common in the urban areas, but there are still long waits for 
connections and few rural users.  Mobile phones have become more prevalent in urban 
and high-income areas.   
Even as competitive players are introduced into the market, they tend to be 
limited to mobile and Internet services while restricting their services to high-income and 
urban areas – regions where competitive operators can find a concentration of users 
capable of supporting financially sustainable margins (Proenza, 2006).  In contrast, there 
is still limited or no fixed line competition with the governmental Postal, Telegraph & 
Telephone (PTT) within the fixed line sector at this stage.  This situation of uneven 
competition can lead to mobile phone penetration accelerating early in stage two and 
quickly surpassing fixed line penetration. 
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Network Infrastructure 
At stage two, there is little existing network infrastructure and those few network 
deployments that are completed under the monopoly tend to focus on government 
facilities, large enterprises, and urban consumers (Smith, 1995).  Although this limits 
available services, it forms a baseline of access and core network infrastructure that can 
be expanded to offer new services.  National networks within these markets tend to 
support 10 to 20 percent of the population, which is a small base but large enough to 
create a backbone network to support the rapid expansion of services once the market is 
liberalized.  Developing countries without this baseline of infrastructure lack a necessary 
pre-condition for takeoff, and will have a significantly longer ramp-up period as they 
build out new infrastructure to support the rapid increase in demand.   
Exhibit 2.8 includes several developing countries that have undergone rapid 
acceleration of their markets, as demonstrated by their mobile phone sector in particular.  
The countries included below are not inclusive of all developing countries that have 
undergone this acceleration, but Exhibit 2.8 demonstrates that market takeoff is not 
limited to one region or one level of economic development.  It also demonstrates that 
countries that start the process later can still catch up and even surpass markets that 
accelerated earlier.  This is demonstrated by the growth in the Russian market, which did 
not begin until 2002 but has now quickly outpaced countries such as Turkey that saw 
their markets accelerate in the 1990s. 
 79 
Exhibit 2.8: Mobile Sector Growth across Developing Countries 
Mobile Phone Adoption Rates - Emerging Markets
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Regulatory Structure  
The traditional regulatory structure within developing countries included both 
their national regulator and monopoly operator within the Ministry of Communications, 
which in many cases resulted in a heavy bias of competitive regulation in favor of the 
incumbent.  This has made balanced regulatory oversight and the introduction of new 
competitive operators within a country’s market very difficult.  With the privatization of 
the operator and the creation of an independent regulatory agency, a developing country 
can become a market that supports competition across the range of technology platforms 
and services.  
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The institutional reform process begins slowly in this stage with the creation of an 
independent regulatory agency (Melody, 1997).  This agency is separate from the rest of 
the government ministries, with commissioners confirmed by the legislature and often not 
directly reporting to the Ministry of Communications.  This national regulatory agency 
becomes responsible for setting tariff prices, determining the universal service 
obligations of carriers as well as the proper mechanism for disbursing these funds, 
spectrum and service licensing, and other regulatory functions that were previously 
housed in the parastatal.   
National ICT Policies 
At this stage, universal access efforts are the highest priority among the national 
ICT policies.  This will continue through the takeoff stage and then become a secondary 
concern during market maturity in the fourth and fifth stages.  Universal access efforts 
are focused on expanding services beyond major urban areas and adding data to existing 
telephony services.  This also includes government-financed efforts to ensure 
connectivity to ministerial offices, schools, hospitals, and other socially important 
facilities.  Although not common, several countries at this stage have introduced a 
universal service fund (USF) (Garcia-Murillo, 2005).  More often, countries will wait 
until the next stage, where there is a critical mass of competitive operators and users, to 
introduce a USF.  These funds use a percentage of operator revenues to build out network 
access infrastructure while placing obligations on operators to serve rural and low-
income areas.  These obligations are typically part of spectrum and service licensing 
arrangements between operators and the regulator.   
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Another key component of the ICT policies at this stage are governmental 
initiatives that seek to bolster the adaptation of imported ICTs by local technology firms 
for use domestically (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006).  As these lower-middle-income 
countries become more integrated into global supply chains, they are seeing 
corresponding increases in trade, international investment, and technology transfer.  
Although increased integration into global business and ICT networks can accelerate this 
technology transfer, these countries still tend to have limited ability to customize 
imported ICTs to meet local market requirements (Archibugi, 2003).  Governments can 
work with their private sectors to bolster their ICT innovation capabilities and increase 
their necessary skill sets to innovate international technologies for local consumption 
(Hoekman, 2004).   
Institutional and Regulatory Structure  
Governmental authority for supporting ICT access and industry development is 
also shifted from the Ministry of Communication and is split among several agencies 
including communications, science and technology, industry, finance, and this new 
regulator (Makhaya and Roberts, 2003).  With this liberalized telecommunications sector, 
the government can avoid the heavy responsibilities of directly commanding the market.  
Instead, the government can then focus policy efforts toward expanding both supply and 
demand across the country through indirect initiatives, such as universal service funds 
and targeted access programs. 
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Benefits and Challenges 
Lower transaction costs are one of the largest benefits for developing countries as 
they begin the process of diffusing ICTs.  Firms with little or no access to market supply 
and demand information have significantly higher transaction costs (Furman, 2004).  This 
lowers firm productivity and reduces responsiveness to the market, which in turn can 
hamper economic growth within the country.  By deploying telephony and narrowband 
data services, countries can begin the process of improving firm-level productivity.  
Expanded access for firms and residents can also help create a critical mass of local users 
that can launch local content and innovation (Bar, 2000).  By moving to this second 
stage, countries may begin to see individuals and firms expanding the range and depth of 
available local content.  Prior to this stage, Internet users would have to rely on 
international sources, which may not be in the correct language or be tailored for local 
consumption.   
Other areas that benefit from expanded access and lower prices are the healthcare 
and education sectors (Akinsola et al., 2005).  Both require access to online resources, 
either from domestic or international facilities, to improve their services to local 
residents.  Within the healthcare sector, these efforts can include connections for rural 
clinics to consult with urban hospitals.  In the education sector, facilities can gain access 
to materials and trainers domestically and internationally to expand course offerings.  
These are just two examples of many public sectors that can benefit from affordable 
access to voice and data services. 
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This transition in regulatory and institutional structure creates an opportunity for 
the private sector to take on a larger role in the ICT industry and begin to exert greater 
influence on government policy reforms (Bortolotti, 2002).  Countries that move on to 
stage two can harness this private sector participation to collaborate on reforming 
national ICT policies and goals.  This public-private coordination will be vital for 
successful acceleration of ICT adoption within the third stage as well.  However, few 
developing countries can successfully manage this process (Bortolotti, 2007).  Other 
major hurdles at this stage include successfully executing the privatization of the 
monopoly, which can be hampered by political and financial considerations.  
Governments should also ensure that the regulatory agency has the necessary 
independence and authority to counter-balance the market power of operators so that it 
can successfully monitor and adjust the competitive landscape.  
Stage Three: Takeoff with Expansive Growth  
Developing countries within stage three are typically middle-income and are 
undergoing a rapid acceleration of ICT adoption.  This stage is predominately kicked off 
by governmental efforts to create a liberalized ICT service market with competitive 
providers that both expand services and lower prices.  These developing countries also 
have a solid foundation of fixed, mobile, and Internet utilization across the population.  
Developing countries at this stage can utilize their existing base of backbone networks 
and mobile infrastructure to rapidly expand their adoption rates in the mobile phone and 
Internet access sectors.  It is important to note that upper-middle-income countries are 
also included in this stage due to their relatively poor ICT infrastructure, policies, and 
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regulation.  In both upper- and lower-middle-income developing countries, these newly 
competitive ICT sectors can finally meet the pent-up demand of consumers and firms, 
propelling many of these countries to market saturation levels in as few as five years.  
The countries listed in the chart below in Exhibit 2.9 have reached stage three, 
although the levels of variation across the four sectors are similar to those in the second 
stage.  Several countries have dissimilar ICT metrics, including the Czech Republic, 
which has reached stage five in its mobile sectors but has only reached stage two in 
broadband adoption.  This disparity in penetration rates is due primarily to the low 
marginal costs of adding new mobile subscribers versus the costs and deployment times 
of broadband networks.  It is also important to note that when determining a country’s 
stage and trajectory, quantitative ICT metrics should be considered within the larger 
context of institutional, policy, regulatory, and market reforms that a developing country 
may have undergone.  Others, such as Costa Rica, have reached stage three for three of 
the sectors, but have also been slow to adopt broadband services.  Still others, such as 
Malaysia, have reached stage four for mobile and Internet usage, but only stage two for 
fixed and broadband services.   
Variations in penetration rates like these are caused by a number of factors, 
including regulatory and market competition, but the underlying costs of the technology 
for these four different sectors also play a key role (Cava-Ferreruela, 2006).  The cost for 
fixed and broadband networks is dramatically higher than mobile and Internet networks.  
This drives operator costs higher, which in turn can limit new entrants in the market.  In 
addition, these higher costs also make end-user prices unaffordable, which can limit 
adoption rates within developing countries for that sector. 
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Exhibit 2.9: Examples of Countries in Stage Three of ICT Adoption 
Stage 3 Example Countries
Mainlines
Stage for 
Mainlines Mobile users
Stage for 
Mobile
Internet 
users 
Stage for 
Internet
Broadband 
users
Stage for 
Broadband
Stage 
Index
Argentina 227.1 3 570.4 3 177.1 2 21.7 2 3
Brazil 230.4 3 462.5 3 195.0 2 17.7 2 3
Chile 210.9 3 648.6 4 171.8 2 43.5 2 3
Costa Rica 320.9 3 254.4 3 254.2 3 6.6 1 3
Czech Republic 314.4 3 1150.7 5 269.5 3 43.7 2 3
Malaysia 172.2 2 771.1 4 434.6 4 19.4 2 3
Poland 309.3 3 764.2 4 262.0 3 32.6 2 3
Russian Federation 280.2 3 838.5 5 152.3 2 11.1 2 3
Turkey 263.3 3 605.1 4 222.0 3 22.1 2 3
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators.Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators. 
ICT Adoption  
During this stage, there is rapid expansion of both residential and business users, 
particularly in dense urban areas.  Fixed line voice and data services are available to a 
majority of firms while mobile phone service becomes commonplace among residential 
users.  Typically, countries in this stage see their narrowband and broadband Internet 
access services lag behind a surge of mobile users.  This is due to the limited deployment 
of fixed line services to households, which are required for most narrowband or 
broadband residential services. 
The mobile penetration rate for many of these countries quickly outpaces the 
fixed line services of the incumbent, moving from less than 10 percent penetration to 
over 50 percent.  The graph in Exhibit 2.10 shows the fixed, mobile, Internet, and 
broadband adoption rates of Malaysia, which transitioned to a developed country 
penetration rate for mobile services in five years.  Although broadband Internet access is 
still small at the household level, and limited to the village level in rural areas, Internet 
access through dial-up is still growing quickly, especially in areas with competitive 
providers.  Fixed line services have still been slow to change, with little investment in 
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this infrastructure.  As broadband begins to take off within Malaysia and other countries 
during this stage, these countries may experience an increase in fixed line capital 
spending.  Exhibit 2.10 below presents Malaysian adoption rates across the four key areas 
within the ICT sector.  The mobile phone and Internet access sectors both have seen rapid 
growth due to market liberalization in the 1990s that resulted in the privatization of the 
monopoly and the creation of an independent regulatory agency.  As a result of this 
liberalization process, these two sectors also saw increased levels of competition, lower 
prices, and a rapid rise in demand.  In contrast, the fixed line telephony and broadband 
sectors were slow to reform, resulting in limited competition and lower levels of demand.   
As demonstrated below, Malaysia’s mobile phone adoption rate has reached 
almost 80 percent, surpassing mature markets such as Japan in 2005, while its fixed lines 
have actually declined from 20 percent down to 17 percent.  In response to saturated 
mobile markets like Malaysia’s, several developing country operators have begun to 
invest internationally to grow revenues and maintain margins – a strategy similar to that 
of the mobile carriers in the saturated European markets.  Examples include Telekom 
Malaysia and Singapore Telecom, which have both grown into regional powerhouses by 
expanding from their saturated home markets (which reached over 100 percent 
penetration in Singapore by 2005) into neighboring countries such as India and 
Indonesia.   
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Exhibit 2.10: Malaysian ICT Adoption Rates 
Malaysia ICT Adoption
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Exhibit 2.11 depicts the growth of the Malaysian mobile phone market, which has 
seen tremendous growth since entering stage two in the late 1990s and has now surpassed 
Japan in its penetration rate.  The market liberalization process and the introduction of 
competition into the sector created the necessary environment for accelerated adoption of 
the technology.  In addition, a transparent institutional and regulatory reform process has 
allowed for a more stable political and macroeconomic context, which has increased 
domestic and international investment into the sector.  This has given Malaysia’s mobile 
sector the capacity to quickly cycle through stages two, three, and four, and it is 
forecasted to enter stage five based on 2006 estimates.  Similarly, Internet access has 
grown quickly within the country, as seen in the country table in Exhibit 2.9.  In contrast, 
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fixed lines and broadband penetration have lagged behind in stage two, with little growth 
in either market. 
Exhibit 2.11: ICT Adoption Stages Applied to the Malaysian Mobile 
Sector 
 
Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Competitive Landscape  
The competitive levels across the four sectors within these countries are very 
uneven.  Countries are currently experiencing limited or no competition in some sectors, 
such as broadband, and heavy competition in others, such as mobile.  Developing 
countries with heavy competition and strong regulation in the mobile phone and Internet 
sectors will see price competition between these operators beginning to emerge as service 
adoption rates take off and carriers scramble for new customers (Nunn, 2004).  This 
higher level of competition for customers also drives carriers to quickly expand their 
Stage 1 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 4 
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networks, offering coverage for 70 to 90 percent of the population, while also enhancing 
the range of service offerings.   
With a majority of fixed line options still limited to the former monopoly, ISPs 
still have difficulty finding a sustainable business model at this stage.  ISPs are forced to 
use wholesale services from the incumbent operator to reach their customers.  Without a 
strong regulatory structure around these wholesale tariffs, it is easy for the incumbent to 
leverage its market power to price out competitive providers.  Despite these hurdles, 
countries in this stage can begin to experience expanding Internet and broadband services 
(Osterwalder, 2004).  Narrowband competition is much stronger among ISPs because 
only a local telephone line is required, whereas broadband competition is typically only 
in urban areas due to limitations in access networks.     
Network Infrastructure 
With this rapid service expansion, operators move quickly to transform their 
backbone and access networks to support a range of voice and data services, along with 
planning for upgrades to allow for new capabilities, such as video applications.  To 
address these network requirements, developing country operators have moved toward 
next-generation solutions that lower capital costs and operational complexity – 
leapfrogging the legacy infrastructure that has hampered network transformation by 
incumbents within developed countries.  Providers that deploy these next-generation 
solutions include fiber-based platforms and mobile broadband solutions in the access 
network and next-generation protocols in the backbone.   
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National ICT Policies 
For many countries in this stage, there is a transition from universal access to 
universal service as the focus for national ICT policies (Gasmi, 2000).  While universal 
access focuses network deployment at the village level, universal service aims to deliver 
mainline services at the household level and mobile services at the individual level.  This 
shift toward universal service requires a significant increase in infrastructure deployment 
to ensure that the network has the necessary capillarity to reach individual users.  In turn, 
this requires a rapid expansion in the universal service effort, including additional 
funding, an expanded number of target regions, and additional services beyond 
telephony.  The USF continues its traditional role of targeting rural users with voice 
services, but the fund also increases its support for Internet services as well as low-
income urban regions (Garcia-Murillo, 2005).   
Looking to increase demand for ICT services, governments will increase their 
training programs to expand ICT utilization in these target areas (Rahman et al., 2005).  
These training programs also increase the supply of skilled workers for local and global 
technology firms.  e-Government initiatives are also prevalent as governments seek ways 
to streamline their inefficiencies as well as expand citizens’ access to government 
programs and information (Lehr, 1998).  The policies also support increases in voice and 
data services coverage for business users as well as expanded competition and lower 
prices for international capacity, which becomes increasingly important with expanded 
trade and international investment in ICT sectors. 
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National ICT policies also focus on supporting the local ICT industry, which can 
begin to reach a critical mass at this stage (Kraemer, 2001).  Although most of these local 
businesses are not globally competitive, they are beginning to take a share of the local 
ICT market for hardware, software, and communications services.  This is particularly 
true of technologies that need to be tailored to meet the demands of the local market.  
Advanced ICT sectors in some countries may begin to focus on a few niche industries 
where they have a global competitive advantage, seeking to expand their ICT exports 
with a coordinated effort by public, private, and university resources.  One example of 
this is the creation of a software industry in Brazil that has begun to expand beyond the 
domestic market and that has been supported by both public and private sector efforts 
(Arora and Gamnardella, 2004). 
Institutional and Regulatory Structure  
Countries that have not transitioned their market regulation from a government 
ministry to an independent regulatory agency tend to begin this process at this stage.  
This formalized structure makes the regulatory environment more stable, opening the 
market to additional domestic and international investment.  In addition, once the 
monopoly provider has been privatized, the former incumbent will see its market power 
and political clout reduced, helping to rebalance the competitive environment.  This new 
regulatory environment creates more favorable conditions for new entrants, including 
easier access to capital, government support through universal service funds, and 
affordable wholesale access.  As mentioned above, wholesale access is a key component 
to opening up the ICT sector to competition, especially for competitive providers without 
the network reach to offer widespread services.  In response, many governments have 
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moved to open up the former monopoly’s backbone with favorable wholesale rates.  
However, wholesale regulation remains a contentious issue in many markets, including 
developed countries such as the United States, where regulators struggle to find effective 
regimes and rate reductions to support competitive players.  
Developing country governments also begin to alter their role as adoption 
accelerates during this stage and the private sector begins to take the lead in investment 
and technology choices (Bortolotti, 2007).  At this stage, the ICT institutional structure 
will often be combined into one ministry, such as the Ministry of ICT (MICT) in 
Malaysia, which has the ministerial authority to lead national ICT policy design and 
implementation.  Although the MICT does not have the centralized power of the former 
parastatal, it does offer middle-income countries the critical mass of expertise and budget 
to design and execute national ICT policies.  In many instances, a middle-income country 
may have its ICT experts spread among four or more ministries, limiting their 
coordination and effectiveness.  The creation of the MICT can be an important step to 
initiating and sustaining the accelerated ICT adoption process.     
Benefits and Challenges 
During this third stage, infrastructure will begin to be more widely deployed in 
rural areas and adoption rates for basic services will take off.  Although there tend to be 
wide disparities between urban and rural adoption rates, access levels will reach a point 
where rural services finally have gained traction.  The main difference between stages 
two and three is the scale of deployment.  In stage two, rural users must rely on village-
level connections and may have no access to the Internet.  In the third stage, a larger 
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number of rural users finally can gain access to telephony and the Internet at the 
household level, helping to reduce the high transaction costs common in these areas.  As 
discussed in the previous section, this can be a large benefit for rural users and firms that 
have previously been without affordable access.   
Another important benefit of reaching this stage is the appearance of a local ICT 
industry.  Prior to this stage, most countries have few ICT clusters and instead rely on 
foreign imports for equipment and expertise (Thompson, 2002).  This limits the economic 
benefit of adopted technologies because they are not tailored to the local environment nor 
are they integrated into the economy beyond those firms that are MNC suppliers.  With 
the advent of a local ICT industry, information technologies can be customized for local 
use, which in turn can accelerate the development of local expertise. 
Another benefit to countries at this stage is their expanded e-governance 
programs, which can streamline government operations while increasing citizen access to 
government services.  To improve government operations, many countries begin internal 
programs to interconnect government facilities with networks while standardizing 
software and database application to improve efficiencies (Banerjee, 2004).  e-
Governance efforts focused on expanding citizen access to government services include 
kiosks and online portals for government forms, records, and taxes.  For countries that 
had previously required in-person visits to the capital, these efforts can save citizens in 
rural areas several days of travel to complete required paperwork (Kyem and LeMaire, 
2006).  
 94 
This acceleration requires a quick evolution of national ICT policies and 
institutions to support the continued development of a competitive market and local ICT 
industry.  This stage is very difficult to sustain, particularly with the political 
considerations that may slow the pace of reform and hinder the development of the 
sector.  Many developing countries that could not sustain the reform process have seen 
their adoption rates plateau prematurely, leaving many segments of the country without 
affordable access.   
Another challenge for countries in this stage is the higher cost of deploying 
infrastructure in sparsely populated areas, which cannot be easily overcome even with 
these new ICT network solutions.  This sizable cost difference results in a significant split 
between the network infrastructure deployed to urban versus rural regions, leaving rural 
areas with limited network access.  This is due to the higher rural costs, which drive 
operators to use alternative solutions, such as satellite and fixed wireless, to reach their 
customer base.  This disparity in technology options and network costs between urban 
and rural areas will continue to exacerbate gaps in ICT access across developing 
countries. 
Stage Four: Drive to Mass Market  
Countries that have reached the mass-market stage typically include upper-
middle-income and high-income countries that have substantial ICT markets servicing a 
majority of their populations covered by fixed, mobile, and Internet services.  Once 
developing countries have reached this stage, they have markets, regulatory structures, 
and technologies that are relatively similar to those of developed country ICT sectors.  
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This enables them to quickly move past some mature markets in the adoption of new 
technologies, such as mobile services, opening up new opportunities for the domestic ICT 
industry.  For some middle-income countries that have reached this stage, there still may 
be a lag in fixed line penetration rates.  In fact, this fixed line sector may never reach 
market saturation levels due to the substitution of fixed line services with mobile 
services.  This relative dearth of fixed line infrastructure may impact countries in this 
stage as they move to expand broadband and fiber access networks.  However, it does not 
hamper the countries’ ability to increase ICT utilization or to develop a local ICT 
industry. 
The chart below in Exhibit 2.12 contains several of the countries at stage four of 
ICT adoption.  At this stage, there is less variation between countries in their adoption 
rates across the four sectors.  Several developed countries, such as Japan and Ireland, are 
near the cusp between stages four and five.  Japan is very close to the threshold for stage 
five in its mainline, mobile, and broadband usage, and it is a global ICT exporter with a 
strong institutional and regulatory structure.  Overall, this would place Japan in stage five 
despite the slightly lagging adoption within some of its ICT sectors.  Countries such as 
Japan highlight the blurring between stages four and five as well as the importance of 
using these four metrics only as guidelines.  
Exhibit 2.12: Examples of Countries in Stage Four of ICT Adoption 
Stage 4 Example Countries
Mainlines
Stage for 
Mainlines Mobile users
Stage for 
Mobile
Internet 
users 
Stage for 
Internet
Broadband 
users
Stage for 
Broadband
Stage 
Index
Hungary 332.7 3 924.0 5 297.4 3 64.6 3 4
Ireland 488.8 4 1012.2 5 275.7 3 65.1 3 4
Japan 460.0 4 741.5 4 667.5 5 175.0 4 4
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators. 
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ICT Adoption  
For countries that have reached this stage, ICT adoption rates are very similar to 
those of mature markets.  Internet access becomes widespread in this stage, with 
narrowband and mobile phone coverage reaching over 90 percent of the population and 
usage rates exceeding 50 percent.  Businesses, even small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), have widespread adoption of voice and data across the country.  However, rural 
or low-income regions and low-skilled industry verticals will continue to lag behind the 
national average.  Countries such as South Korea have already surpassed most Western 
European and North American markets in terms of mobile, fiber, and broadband metrics 
(OECD, 2007).  Other developing countries at this stage may not match South Korea’s 
success across three sectors, but instead have a single sector, such as mobile phones, 
where it has surpassed mature markets and reached market saturation.   
Exhibit 2.13 depicts the almost perfect s-curve slope to the growth of the 
Hungarian mobile market.  The market was able to move from the early adopters of stage 
one in 1997 to the market saturation of stage three by 2003.  This growth was initiated by 
a telecommunications reform process in the mid-1990s and a maturation of mobile 
infrastructure that lowered costs and enhanced service quality.  The mobile market has 
seen tremendous growth, outpacing the fixed line, Internet access, and broadband 
markets, which are all still within stage three. 
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Exhibit 2.13: ICT Adoption Stages Applied to the Hungarian Mobile 
Sector 
Hungary - Mobile Phone Subscribers (per 1,000)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Competitive Landscape  
Despite reaching ICT market saturation in some sectors, developing countries at 
this stage will still face uneven ICT competition across their various regions and service 
sectors (Gasmi, 2000).  Rural areas and fixed line services will continue to see few 
investments made by competitive operators, resulting in higher prices and fewer services.  
In contrast, urban areas and mobile services will experience the highest levels of 
competition and will receive pricing and service benefits.  The mobile sector in particular 
will see several competitive players competing heavily on price, quality, and new 
services.  In addition, as mobile broadband services are deployed, these mobile operators 
will begin to compete directly with the fixed line incumbent.  As a result, wireless and 
Stage 1 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 4 Stage 5 
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fixed line carriers compete with one another for the same customers with similar service 
portfolios (Proenza, 2006).  Although adoption of mobile broadband technology is still 
nascent, it has the potential to remake the competitive landscape, creating new avenues 
for broadband adoption in developing countries.  In addition to the mobile sector, the ISP 
sector will also become intensely competitive as Internet access services begin to reach a 
majority of households.   
In contrast, broadband networks and services in many countries still have very 
limited deployments, covering only a small portion of the population.  However, areas 
with service have begun to see significant competition on service and price between the 
former monopoly and new market entrants (Baer, 1995).  Competitive broadband 
providers in these markets use a combination of wholesale arrangements to offer services 
as well as their own next-generation networks in select areas.  Several developing 
countries, including Singapore, have developed national network deployment plans to 
support greater broadband access and competition while accelerating the supply of fiber 
access infrastructure. 
Network Infrastructure 
As discussed above, the reliance on mobile telephony at the expense of fixed line 
infrastructure can leave many developing countries without adequate broadband access.  
This limited fixed line infrastructure leaves carriers without the necessary last mile access 
to deliver widespread broadband services (Crandall, 2003).  As a result, mobile 
broadband, such as third generation (3G) wireless, and alternative wireless solutions, 
such as WiBro in South Korea, have become much more attractive to developing country 
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operators to deliver broadband services.  These wireless solutions reduce capital and 
operational expenses and are becoming more reliable for delivering high-capacity 
services (Proenza, 2006).  Without extensive copper assets to maintain, fiber deployments 
can also be cost effective, with their reduced operational costs and expanded set of data 
and video services to drive operator profits. 
National ICT Policies 
For countries at this stage, universal service undergoes a second transformation 
after shifting from universal access in the third stage.  Although rural telephony access 
will always remain a policy goal, the majority of the government’s initiatives will now 
focus on expanded broadband access and boosting utilization (Lee, 2004).  Expanding 
end-user utilization will require public-private coordination to develop content and 
applications that are customized for the local market and high-capacity connections.  
These policies can include a national deployment strategy, like Singapore’s, along with 
budget for subsidizing broadband network rollout through operator and end-user 
universal service fees.  
Another key policy goal for countries within this stage includes bolstering 
national capacity and innovating ICTs while increasing the competitiveness of local 
businesses through higher utilization rates.  To achieve this goal, governments require a 
tightly coordinated public-private-academic ICT R&D effort that seeks to commercialize 
ICT research for domestic consumption (Amsden, 1997).  This is a difficult process that 
few developing countries have successfully implemented and sustained.  In addition, this 
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also requires an expansion of tertiary ICT education to increase the number of highly 
skilled workers available to local business and R&D facilities for this effort. 
Institutional and Regulatory Structure 
Once the accelerated adoption rate begins to flatten due to saturation in the 
market, the institutional structure begins to reform again.  During this stage, the MICT 
may begin to share more of its authority with the other ministries, such as the ministries 
of education or health.  This diffusion in turn reduces the government’s direct role in the 
industry while expanding the government’s focus across a wider set of support efforts in 
public, private, and academic activities. 
Within this stage, the focus of the national regulator shifts from introducing 
market competition to enforcing the competitive balance.  Regulators work to ensure 
carriers offer affordable and reliable services without amassing excessive market power 
that could hamper competition.  As mentioned above, these universal service efforts have 
evolved from simple telephony services to include broadband as well.  In response, the 
government moves to support expanded broadband access in rural and low-income areas. 
Developing country governments, such as those in Singapore and South Korea, are also 
launching fiber initiatives while supporting growth of traditional broadband 
infrastructure. 
Benefits and Challenges 
One of the largest economic benefits of ICT adoption at this stage is increased 
productivity and faster economic growth.  The level of impact on developing countries at 
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lower stages of adoption is still debated.  However, the economic benefits of ICT 
investments at this mature stage have been more widely accepted for both developing and 
industrialized countries (Indjikian, 2005).  As a developing country begins to reach this 
stage of adoption, it begins to experience clear economic benefits that are measurable in 
national statistics (Kenny, 2003).   
These saturation levels are needed so that a majority of the country is connected 
and has integrated ICT usage into their daily lives (Senteni, 2006).  Although this 
integration is more common in developed countries, it requires a significant transition 
process for many developing countries – requiring them to reach stage four prior to 
experiencing the mass integration of the technology.  These saturation levels also create a 
virtuous circle within the ICT services, where prices continue to decline due to heavy 
competition within the sector.  Once the country reaches saturation, operators must price 
competitively to attract new subscribers.  This lowers costs for residents and firms, 
increasing each year the range of services they receive for the same price or less.  
Countries that have reached stage four typically have begun the process of 
developing a domestic ICT sector.  This local ICT industry can produce tailored products 
and services for the domestic market, expanding the opportunities for further integrating 
ICTs into the economy.  This means many developing countries are no longer reliant on 
international vendors or MNCs for their technology options.  However, this is not to 
suggest that these developing countries will not import ICTs; but that many countries at 
this stage are no longer beholden to global equipment companies for their technology 
choices.  This shift to a combination of domestic and international ICTs will lower a 
country’s reliance on MNCs for technology transfer, resulting in fewer ICT choices based 
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solely on their appropriateness for a global supply chain.  In turn, this will lower 
developing countries’ risk of using imported technologies only to see them no longer 
supported by their global firms.  This may result in flattened ICT adoption if the sunk 
costs are too high for the developing country to switch to another technology option.    
Many developing countries within this stage face a difficult task of managing the 
competitive balance coupled with the expense of rolling out broadband networks.  The 
market power of the operators can be large, easily distorting the ICT sector and requiring 
the regulator to make an immediate response.  Finding the right role for the regulator to 
ensure continued growth in the market is difficult for both developed and developing 
country governments.  In addition, the expansion of universal service to include 
broadband access brings its own set of challenges.  The budgets required for broadband 
network deployment are so large that few countries can successfully implement the 
policy.   
Another challenge is the creation of R&D capabilities and ICT innovative 
capacity, which few middle-income countries, or even high-income countries, have been 
able to achieve despite years of government support.  Middle-income countries at this 
stage are still reliant on technology transfer and ICT imports, but some have seen a larger 
industry beginning to develop within the local market (Baldwin, 2005).  Countries in this 
mass-market phase have begun to tailor foreign technology to local requirements and 
increase support for ICT R&D efforts.  However, these countries still can compete only 
in a few global niches with their indigenous technologies.  A national, coordinated effort 
between the public and private sectors is required to transition to a global ICT competitor 
– particularly a successful competitor across multiple industry segments.  Only a select 
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number of developing countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have been able to gain 
entry into this exclusive club (Amsden, 1989; Wang, 1995). 
Stage Five: Age of High Consumption and Innovation  
Countries that have reached this stage are marked by their high levels of ICT 
adoption along with an extensive and innovative ICT industry that is globally 
competitive.  Few countries have reached this stage, with key examples including several 
European and North American countries as well as Japan (as discussed in stage four) – all 
of which have a strong domestic market and exporting ICT industry (Steinmueller, 2001).  
Although very few developing countries have reached this stage, almost all of them have 
a GDP per capita high enough for OECD membership in addition to their high levels of 
ICT adoption, such as South Korea.  It should be noted that while ICT penetration tends 
to develop before an exporting ICT industry is created, it is not a hard requirement.  Even 
the US, with its low population density, has not reached all of the ICT penetration 
benchmarks to qualify for stage five.  However, the country is the dominant player across 
several ICT industries internationally.  The chart below in Exhibit 2.14 outlines the four 
metrics for a selection of countries that have reached stage five. 
Exhibit 2.14: Examples of Countries in Stage Five of ICT Adoption 
Stage 5 Example Countries
Mainlines
Stage for 
Mainlines Mobile users
Stage for 
Mobile
Internet 
users 
Stage for 
Internet
Broadband 
users
Stage for 
Broadband
Stage 
Index
Canada 565.8 5 513.9 3 520.1 5 207.6 5 5
Korea, Rep. 491.7 4 793.9 4 683.5 5 252.4 5 5
Singapore 424.8 4 1009.9 5 571.1 5 153.3 4 5
Sweden 717.0 5 934.9 5 763.5 5 214.0 5 5
United States 606.0 5 680.3 4 630.0 5 166.6 4 5
Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  Number of users in thousands for all four indicators. 
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ICT Adoption  
For countries within this stage, at least two of the four ICT sectors have reached a 
saturation point.  This saturated sector, such as mobile phones, potentially reaches over 
100 percent penetration, with many individuals owning multiple phones.  In addition, 
both fixed and broadband services are available to a vast majority of residential and 
business users, even if usage is still well below 100 percent of households (Burkart, 
2007).  It should be noted that these four metrics are merely a snapshot of current 
technologies and that communications platforms will continue to evolve, potentially 
including new forms of access such as fiber-based or mobile broadband data services.  As 
these technologies mature and are deployed across developed and developing countries, 
the primary metrics for the stages of ICT development will have to be expanded beyond 
these original four.  The list of countries in Exhibit 2.14 includes those that have reached 
market saturation, according to the ITU’s figures.  Many of these countries have seen 
their mobile adoption rates spike, overtaking their landlines and pushing their mobile 
markets beyond 100 percent penetration, as in Singapore.  At this level of ICT diffusion, 
strong competition exists between several providers, pushing prices to affordable levels 
for a broad majority of the population.  
Exhibit 2.15 presents the growth rate for the Singaporean mobile market.  
Although Singapore is no longer a developing country, the mobile market was still forced 
to catch up to Western Europe during the 1990s.  Once Singapore attained the same level 
of mobile adoption as countries such as Sweden in 2000, the country’s growth rate 
changed as it shifted from adapting international mobile technologies to operating on the 
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technology frontier.  The national mobile growth rate also slowed as the market began to 
near saturation.  
Exhibit 2.15: ICT Adoption Stages Applied to the Singaporean Mobile 
Sector 
Singapore - Mobile Phone Subscribers (per 1,000)
0
200
400
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
A country’s inclusion in this stage suggests that it has developed an 
internationally exporting ICT industry.  Countries such as South Korea (home of global 
equipment manufacturers Samsung, LG, and others) have become hotbeds for software, 
IT, and communications innovations.  Other countries, including Singapore, have 
increased their roles in MNC global supply chains, creating export centers while 
leveraging their telecommunications capacity and English capabilities to initiate an 
increased role in the global ICT industry (Koh, 2006). 
Stage 1 Stage 3 Stage 2 Stage 4 Stage 5 
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Competitive Landscape  
Both developed and developing countries at this stage have extensive competition 
within their markets across all major sectors.  Providers compete heavily on price, service 
quality, and network reach for their residential and business end users.  However, uneven 
levels of competition will continue due to the high capital costs of fixed line 
infrastructure.  These higher costs will still limit competitive operators versus the relative 
ease of entering the mobile sector for a new operator.  This sector competition also exists 
across infrastructure modes, also called multimodal competition, with providers using 
fixed line, fiber/coax cable, mobile wireless, alternative wireless, and other network 
technologies to compete head-to-head (Proenza, 2006).  This multimodal competition is 
vital to preventing a monopoly or oligopoly from leveraging its market power in one 
sector to dominate the ICT market. 
Network Infrastructure 
As mentioned above, the network infrastructure within these markets includes a 
wide range of access technologies, including mobile wireless, fixed line, fixed wireless, 
and cable.  This range of options enables operators to flexibly choose more cost-effective 
platforms for delivering high-capacity services to end-user locations.  This can lower 
overall capital and operational costs while speeding delivery of new services and 
applications over the broadband connections.  Countries at this stage are also beginning 
to deploy fiber access networks, which can connect users at high speeds while 
additionally lowering operational costs.  These fiber networks are also highly scalable, 
reaching 1 Gbps or more, which helps operators future-proof their networks as end-user 
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capacity requirements continue to grow.  To make these increases in access capacity, 
backbone infrastructure and international connections are also expanded.  These networks 
are a key component to the national infrastructure and must be scaled along with the 
access networks to meet growing demand.  
National ICT Policies 
Another key feature of the developing countries listed above is that they are 
densely populated upper-middle-income or high-income markets.  To reach saturation 
levels of ICT adoption, there are significant advantages to being a small, fairly wealthy 
developing country.  These demographic advantages and the level of economic 
development have combined to enable many countries to reach market saturation quickly, 
outpacing some developed countries, and to attain some of the highest levels of ICT 
adoption.  Network deployment costs are lower because there are fewer rural areas to 
build out to and fewer low-income regions that require government intervention to bolster 
adoption.  However, these countries also require governmental initiatives to sustain ICT 
adoption, such as universal service funds.  Even though these markets have reached 
saturation, USF programs continue to subsidize access for rural or low-income users.   
Institutional and Regulatory Structure 
Ministerial authority within countries at this stage continues the trend of 
decentralizing authority and budget across many agencies as government takes a 
secondary support role within the sector.  Despite this decentralization, there is extensive 
coordination across government agencies, the private sector, and universities to speed 
ICT innovation (Lee, 2005).  As part of this effort, there is a significant increase in ICT 
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R&D funding from ministries of science as well as programs to speed commercialization 
and entrepreneurship within the sector from ministries of industry.  National policies also 
continue to increase support for training and tertiary education within the sector from the 
ministry of education, among others. 
Benefits and Challenges 
The economic benefit for countries that move to this final stage in ICT adoption is 
the shift from domestic ICT producer to global ICT exporter.  As a global ICT R&D 
leader, ICT products and services are globally competitive across a range of industry 
sectors.  As discussed above, this capability is supported through extensive funding of 
research and commercialization efforts by government, industry, and academic facilities.  
These countries are also key components of the ICT global supply chain, providing 
value-added product development and innovation capabilities to high-technology 
products.   
To compete globally on quality and price, a country requires significant capital 
and expertise as well as strong clusters of local ICT firms.  This shift to ICT exporter also 
requires expanded R&D cooperation among public-private facilities to develop, innovate, 
and commercialize technologies.  This cooperation can also lead to additional sectors, 
such as biotechnology, benefiting from the establishment of public-private partnerships.  
This stage can also result in expanded productivity gains as ICTs become more integrated 
into a wide range of sectors in the market (Gust, 2004).  This stronger integration has 
been seen in the financial, logistical, retail, professional services, and other sectors in 
developed economies.  Similar experiences can be expected in developing countries, such 
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as South Korea, that are still maturing economically but that have reached the final stage 
of ICT adoption. 
Globally competitive ICT sectors can support a significant expansion in a 
country’s global competitive niche.  However, it is highly difficult to remain competitive 
(Archibugi, 1992).  Archibugi and Pietrobelli (2003) suggest that few developing 
countries have been able to reach this level of globally competitive ICT innovation and it 
is difficult to maintain once reaching this stage.  There are even recent concerns within 
the US and in other developed countries over their global ICT leadership position and 
their ability to maintain their innovative capacity.  This demonstrates how precarious ICT 
global leadership can be.  For developing countries that have attained global leadership 
within the ICT industry but are still developing economically, the risk of slipping back to 
stage four is even greater. 
Conclusions and Implications for Policymakers 
There are many moving parts to the five stages outlined above that require a 
coordinated response by developing country governments – with the most vital 
component of this process encompassing the evolving role of the state.  This 
governmental evolution across the five stages alters the state from monopoly operator, to 
direct supporter of the sector (through network deployments and subsidies), and then 
finally to indirect contributor (through training and ICT innovation efforts).  Although the 
government’s role in ICT sector development is significantly altered by the end of this 
process, the government still plays a vital role in providing nuanced responses to complex 
policy and market challenges as the ICT sector develops toward maturity.   
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Most developing countries tend to overcome several gating factors before moving 
from one stage to the next, including regulatory, policy, and institutional reforms as well 
as expansions in network infrastructure and market competitiveness (Bortolotti, 2002).  
In addition, a country’s progress on the gating factors in one area, such as institutional 
reforms, may be hampered severely by failure to reform other areas, such as national 
regulation.  For example, Malaysia was able to create an effective Ministry of ICT to 
design and implement ICT policies.  However, limitations in the regulatory regime have 
hampered competition in the fixed line sector, which has now led to shortages in network 
infrastructure suitable for expanding broadband services.  This uneven reform may be 
serious enough to hamper a country’s ability to increase its ICT adoption or utilization.  
One of the most important pre-conditions is the privatization of the monopoly and 
liberalization of the ICT market, a lengthy process that typically takes place during stages 
one and two.  Although some countries are able to grow their markets without 
undergoing these reforms, including several oil-rich Gulf States, these countries are not 
representative of the process most developing countries experience as they implement 
their national ICT policies.   
The goal of the section is to outline the five stages of ICT adoption and reinforce 
the idea that even as policymakers carefully gauge and refine the role of the state, the 
government continues to have a prominent role across all five stages of the ICT adoption 
process.  It is important to note that although there are commonalities in ICT 
development across these countries, the experiences of individual countries have varied 
widely across these five stages.  As a result, developing country policymakers must use 
this framework as only a starting point when determining the most appropriate policies 
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for their ICT sector.  Despite this limitation, this framework does offer a more holistic 
approach than the current literature to understanding the key factors determining ICT 
sector development.  When discussing the benefits ICTs can offer to developing 
countries, there is a tendency to focus heavily on the technological capabilities of ICTs 
rather than the governmental policies or market conditions required to support them.  
Rapidly evolving technologies can offer new options for access and services, but they 
will achieve little on their own.  Developing countries must carefully balance both the 
market regulation and competitiveness to move to the next stage.   
Developing country governments must examine their current network, 
institutional, and market structure to determine their stage in ICT adoption across the four 
major sectors: fixed line, wireless, Internet, and broadband.  Once the country’s stage has 
been determined, the government should develop short-term goals focused on improving 
access and utilization of ICTs within the current environment.  In addition, longer-term 
goals should be developed that focus on reaching the next stage of adoption.  These 
government goals can include supporting the deployment of ICT networks, expanding 
utilization, and developing local ICT sectors.  The basic aim of these goals will be similar 
across developing countries.  However, to be successfully implemented, they must be 
carefully defined to fit the local ICT sector.  To help ensure that this process is based on 
realistic assumptions concerning the national environment, the government should rely 
on input from public, private, and academic leaders to customize its goals.   
As a country moves through the five stages of adoption, the government shifts its 
role and focus dramatically.  In turn, these changing priorities shift policies, programs, 
and technologies to those most appropriate for the country.  Successful governmental 
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intervention requires the state to undergo rapid assessment and refinement of its goals, to 
adjust its policy and technology choices.  As a result, national ICT goals and policies 
cannot remain static.  Instead, these goals and policies must be adaptable to the changing 
technological and market conditions to ensure an optimum policy outcome.  Developing 
countries that can rapidly assess and refine ICT goals and policies will be able to find a 
clear path to the next stage of adoption.  Developing country governments must use 
policy interventions to jump-start the process and to correct imbalances while seeking 
ways to determine the most appropriate level of governmental involvement in the sector 
as the country advances through the five stages.  To achieve this, governments must 
carefully manage the policy process, balancing the needs of end users with those of the 
operators within their regulatory and market structure.   
The final step is to determine the most suitable technology option available to the 
country and find a financially sustainable business model to deliver this technology.  
Developing countries must use the goals and policies set by the government as a starting 
point to determine the correct technology options.  Next, developing country 
governments should utilize their national ICT assessment to determine the influence 
market, economic, and institutional factors will have on the deployment of a given 
technology.  Countries considering the various technology options available to them 
should also weigh the cost constraints and local geographic challenges that will influence 
infrastructure deployment.  Fortunately, developing countries now have several 
technology options available to them that can cost-effectively deliver services.  These 
new ICTs were key to making national networks and services affordable to and 
sustainable for developing countries. 
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Section 3: The Determinants of ICT Adoption – Market 
Privatization and Regulation in Developing Countries 
 
Introduction 
Adoption of ICTs is a key factor in a country’s economic development, as argued 
in the theory base discussion above.  An individual country’s economic performance can 
be linked to how well it obtains and utilizes telecommunication technologies. (Malecki, 
1997).  Currently, a growing disparity exists in the levels of ICT adoption between 
countries that have successfully integrated ICTs into their economies and those that have 
not.  Previous studies of this adoption disparity have predominately focused on 
macroeconomic factors, overstating the connection between telecommunications 
adoption rates and economic growth.  This study will expand on current research by 
including privatization and institutional interventions, in addition to economic indicators, 
as treatment variables that trigger higher ICT adoption rates.   
My hypothesis is that ICT adoption, as measured by the number of landline and 
mobile phones per 1,000 people, is spurred by policy changes, rather than solely by 
economic factors.  Current ICT literature supports the hypothesis that countries 
experience rapid growth in ICT adoption through policy reforms and institutional 
development, such as a new national regulatory agency (Edwards, 2002).  I use a 
regression model discussed below to test the relationship between these policy and 
institutional treatments and a country’s ICT adoption rate. 
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These policy treatments include both large-scale privatization as well as partial 
privatization of the state-owned monopoly, where a domestic or international investor 
owns a minority stake in the carrier.  For the purposes of this model, institutional shifts 
include the creation of an independent regulatory body.  These policy treatments are 
defined and tracked by the International Telecommunication Union and have been 
included as key explanatory variables to account for the shift in adoption rates within 
countries (ITU, 2003).  
This model tracks the relationship of monopoly privatization and reform of 
government regulation with the ICT adoption rates within a country.  The results are 
expected to support Levy’s argument that the government has an essential role to play in 
supporting and spurring investment in the ICT sectors (Levy, 1994).  Through the use of 
economic liberalization indicators as control variables, this model is also intended to 
support Dollar’s contention that an open economy is necessary for technology transfer as 
well as economic and productivity gains (1992).  The model provides a framework for 
benchmarking case studies of individual countries and understanding the relationship 
between ICT policies and ICT adoption within a given country. 
Conceptual Framework and Variables 
This section highlights previous cross-country studies of the determinants of ICT 
adoption as well as the impact of higher penetration rates on economic development.  
Next, this section outlines the dependent and explanatory variables, the supports within 
the literature for inclusion within the study, and recent global trends for those individual 
indicators. 
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Previous ICT and Development Studies  
From the 1960s through the 1980s, ICT penetration within developing countries 
grew slowly, with little change year-over-year (ITU, 2003).  Since then, several 
developing countries have managed rapid increases in their ICT adoption rates, more than 
doubling their penetration rates on average within the last three years.  This revolution 
within the ICT sector has dramatically shifted the number of fixed lines and mobile 
subscribers on a global basis, although these two technologies may accelerate at different 
times within the same country.   
One example of a developing country with a rapidly expanding ICT market is 
Chile, which has been considered an economic and technological success story due to its 
relatively steady economic growth and creation of a globally competitive IT sector 
(Hawkins, 2005).  Chile was able to rapidly accelerate its ICT adoption rates, increasing 
Internet penetration from 2 to 24 users per 100 people in four years (World Bank, 2006).  
Hawkins’ study suggests that policy measures introduced by the government, and widely 
supported by the population, were instrumental in achieving similar success within the 
mobile sector.  Policies mentioned within the study include lower telephone rates, 
interconnection across national networks, public access centers, and e-commerce support.  
Although this growth rate for mobile and Internet access was impressive, there was not a 
corresponding growth in fixed line penetration.  The authors suggest that the fixed line 
market did not experience a similar growth curve because these policies were not 
implemented for those services. 
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As seen in the results of the above study, countries that have experienced 
accelerated ICT adoption do not require significant institutional changes to spur it (Levy, 
1994).  Less complex policy changes such as reduced market entry barriers, openness to 
domestic and foreign investment, incentives to ICT entrepreneurs, and subsidies to 
increase demand can begin the process.  However, Levy suggests once this acceleration 
begins, the country will need to undergo significant institutional reform to sustain this 
rapidly growing market.  This will include creating an independent regulatory agency, 
judicial reform, finalizing privatization efforts, and creating multiple, overlapping 
oversight bodies to reduce arbitrary governmental action.  
Another recent study of regional ICT penetration differences focused on 
institutional reform across sub-Saharan Africa as the primary determinant in adoption 
rates (Wilson, 2003).  The study found that although economic development and 
technological environment are important factors influencing penetration, the authors 
suggest that policy and institutional issues are the critical success factors for these 
countries.  Unfortunately for the study, the spike in ICT penetration and institutional 
reforms largely took place within a two-year period in the late 1990s.  This does not give 
the model enough data within the study period to adequately examine the relationship 
between these regulatory and institutional reforms and ICT penetration rates.   
A model offered by Gutierrez and Sanford (2000) comes closer to incorporating 
the importance of tracking the impact of institutional factors on ICT adoption across time.  
The authors examine the determinants of telephone line density within Latin American 
countries across 10 years, including economic, political, and institutional factors.  Their 
model also includes mobile telephones as an explanatory variable, acknowledging the 
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substitutability of wireless telephones for fixed line services.  The results suggest that 
institutional factors, including an independent regulatory agency, and political freedom 
indices have a significant impact on teledensity.  This study’s underlying theory base and 
attempt to address the full range of institutional variables for this study are much 
improved over the many other available studies. 
Anselmo de Castro (2003) and Hall (2004) suggest that ICTs can have both a 
divergent and a convergent effect on economic development, depending on the 
governmental policies used to support diffusion of these technologies.  Anselmo de 
Castro argues that developing countries with smartly regulated private 
telecommunications sectors will experience faster ICT adoption as well as reap the 
development benefits.  Countries that are unregulated will see slower uptake of ICTs and 
will accelerate the digital divide within the country.   
OECD countries have all moved to a private or mixed policy structure over the 
past 15 years and all of them rapidly increased their investment in ICT infrastructure 
(Schreyer, 2002).  This ICT investment contributed to economic growth within these 
countries throughout the 1990s that only accelerated toward the end of the decade.  
Despite this relationship between ICT adoption and economic performance in the OECD 
countries, ICT adoption across countries does not strictly follow economic strength 
(Frieden, 2005).  Other key determinants include geographical and demographic factors.  
One notable example includes small countries with urban populations, which have an 
easier task of deploying ICT infrastructure than large, rural countries.  Although this 
model does not include developing countries within its study population, it does suggest 
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that the relationship between ICT adoption and urbanization or population density 
deserves further investigation.  
By focusing on institutional factors, this model builds on the solid foundation 
created by these previous studies.  This model improves on the approach of these other 
models by expanding the time frame to include 1990 to 2005.  Studies completed with 
data only from the 1990s are limited in their ability to determine the relationship between 
regulatory agencies and ICT adoption.  This is a result of so many countries waiting until 
the late 1990s to create their agency.  In addition, this model adds telecom monopoly 
privatization data gathered from the ITU rather than the political freedom indices, which 
have not been shown to have a significant relationship with ICT penetration.  Finally, this 
model uses a full range of developed and developing countries, instead of limiting the 
scope to OECD countries, to determine the relationship between these institutional 
factors and ICT adoption rates.  
Model Variables 
Using these previous studies as a foundation, the study below examines the 
relationship between ICT penetration and market privatization and regulation in 
developing and developed countries.  Several other political and economic factors that 
have a direct influence on adoption are also included in this model: market liberalization, 
economic development, and market regulation (Dutta, 2004).  The section below 
discusses each of these variables. 
 
 126 
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable (DV) combines the penetration rates for fixed line and 
mobile subscribers, based on per-capita figures available from the ITU.  I argue that these 
two indicators are equally important to ICT development and are to be weighted evenly 
when combined into a single DV.  The trend in many countries has been for mobile 
services to quickly outstrip fixed lines.  However, this is balanced by the need for fixed 
line infrastructure to support broadband and narrowband Internet access adoption.  
Therefore, growth in both technologies is required to successfully expand ICT access.  
This data, along with the explanatory variables, has been collected for 154 countries 
across 15 years, from 1990 to 2005.  This time frame should capture most of the policy 
changes as well as starting points for accelerated ICT penetration within these targeted 
countries. 
Fixed and mobile penetration has accelerated during the past five years, growing 
11 percent annually, reaching almost 500 subscribers per 1,000 people on a global 
average (see Exhibit 3.1).  High-income countries, including those in North America and 
Western Europe, lead the world with over 1,200 combined fixed and mobile subscribers 
per 1,000 inhabitants.  With some of these markets approaching saturation, penetration 
rates have begun to slow.  In contrast, high-growth regions such as East Asia have 
quadrupled their penetration rate during the last five years.  The region saw rates exceed 
400 subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants in 2004.  Even sub-Saharan Africa has increased 
from 31 subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants to almost 150 in just five years.  This rapid 
growth is fueled primarily by mobile phone adoption in most developing countries, 
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resulting in mobile subscribers now outnumbering fixed line users within many of these 
regions.  
Exhibit 3.1: Global Growth in Fixed Line and Mobile Services, by 
Region 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)
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Independent Variables 
The independent variables include per-capita income, a set of market 
liberalization variables, economic development variables, and institutional indicators.   
Liberalization Variables 
Market liberalization is the process that countries undergo as they move toward a 
market economy, including opening a country to international investment and trade as 
well as privatizing state-owned companies.  Market liberalization specific to the ICT 
sector cannot be easily measured across countries, so national variables that measure this 
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process in aggregate are used in the regression model as a proxy to demonstrate a 
country’s stage of openness.  This liberalization process can offer several significant 
benefits for the ICT adoption rates of developing countries.  As a market opens to 
international investment, including foreign direct investment, there is an increased 
likelihood of technology transfer for a developing country (Addison, 2002).  Increases in 
international trade can also expand the requirement for ICT adoption among local firms, 
as they become more integrated into the global supply chain (Ciruelos, 2005).  In 
addition, a privatized telecom monopoly, when coupled with strong governmental ICT 
support policies, will open the country to increased domestic and international 
competition within the ICT sector.  As a result, a larger share of the population should be 
able to access and afford the technology (Parker, 2007).  Countries that have not 
liberalized their investment, trade, and telecommunications regimes should show a lower 
than expected adoption rate than their GDP per capita levels would suggest.   
The model includes the following market liberalization variables: a dummy 
variable accounting for monopoly telecom operator privatization, foreign direct 
investment as a percentage of GDP, and trade as a percentage of GDP.   
Privatization 
A privatized market variable tracks whether the monopoly fixed line operator has 
been sold by the government, including incumbent carriers that have only been partially 
privatized.  This reform is defined and tracked by the International Telecommunication 
Union, which completes an annual survey of all 189 of its member countries.  For some 
countries, such as the United Kingdom, this is a point in time before the start of the study; 
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while for most developing countries, this is a more recent change.  According to the ITU 
data, 98 developed and developing countries privatized their telecommunications 
monopolies during the 1990s or early 2000s, placing this transition within the range of 
the 1990 to 2005 study period.  This privatization process is tracked as a dummy variable, 
with those years after privatization marked with a 1, and was expected to have a positive 
correlation with the DV.  An interaction term with the privatization variable and 
regulatory agency variable, which will be described below, was included within the 
model.  This was used to determine the joint relationship between these variables and the 
dependent variable. 
A lagged privatization variable was considered and tested due to the long-term 
nature of the privatization process.  It is possible that a country’s monopoly would 
undergo privatization, yet it would take a year before the market adoption rates would 
react.  However, this variable ultimately was left out of the model due to the long-term 
process before the official privatization of the monopoly; a process that take several years 
and would allow other market competitors to plan for its completion.  For example, 
Thailand saw an eight-year privatization process during which both the monopoly and 
competitive operators were able to prepare their networks and services ahead of time.  
This allowed for a rapid growth to occur within the country almost immediately after the 
privatization (Jirachaipravit, 2007). 
Privatization of the monopoly fixed line operator is a necessary but insufficient 
step in accelerating the ICT adoption within a developing country (Bortolotti, 2007).  
Bortolotti suggests that developing countries must have a strong institutional structure 
that can support and regulate the newly privatized operator.  Countries that have a weak 
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institutional structure may experience ICT market development hampered by regulatory 
capture, creating a market scenario where a privatized operator can use its market and 
political power to limit competition within the sector (Levy & Spiller, 1996).  This is 
directly related to the creation of an independent regulator, discussed in the section 
below, but also other government institutions.  These other institutions can include the 
ministries of science, innovation, and ICT, which have been created across many 
developing countries such as Malaysia, which has successfully accelerated its ICT sectors 
(Lee, 2002).  These successful institutional structures develop politically independent 
ministries with the necessary budget and authority to design and implement national 
policy (Painter, 2004).   
In addition to institutional reforms, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005) suggest that 
privatization is simply one component of a larger telecommunications market reform 
process that must include the creation of sustainable competition and organizational 
reforms within the operator to be successful.  This construction of a competition market, 
with streamlined carrier operations, may in fact be more difficult for developing countries 
to initiate and sustain than their institutional reforms.  Taking this argument one step 
further, Singh suggests that in addition to privatization, regulatory reforms, and market 
competition, developing countries with strong property rights will experience rapid 
expansion of network infrastructure (Singh, 2000).  Although the development of 
property rights is not tracked within this model, Singh’s study does support the 
contention that the creation of an accelerated telecommunications market requires a 
sustained market, policy, and institutional reform process within a developing country – a 
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difficult prospect and one that suggests why so few developing countries are successful in 
this endeavor.  
Foreign Direct Investment  
Gross foreign direct investment is defined by the World Bank to include the 
absolute values of the capital inflows and outflows and is included in the model as a 
percentage of total GDP (WDI, 2006).  As a country liberalizes its market, opening itself 
up to international trade and investment in the process, foreign investment begins to rise 
(Campos, 2002).  Foreign investment can also lead to technology transfer from 
international firms to domestic companies.  These transfers may speed the telecom 
adoption rate and should have a positive influence on the dependent variable. 
Exhibit 3.2 depicts global FDI inflows as a percentage of the global economy, 
which peaked in 2000 at 4.9 percent and then declined to only 1.6 percent in 2004 (World 
Bank, 2006).  This decline occurred in both developed and developing regions, 
particularly in North America and East Asia.  FDI inflows are only now beginning to 
recover in some areas.  Notably, the United States and Europe are now starting to see 
their FDI return to pre-2000 levels, according to the World Development Indicators.  In 
addition, Latin America has seen increases in its FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, 
rising from just over 2 percent in 2003 to 3 percent in 2004.  This investment growth was 
driven by expanded ties across global supply chains and improved governance structure 
for supporting FDI, particularly in Latin America, East Asia, and other emerging regions 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2002).  
 132 
Exhibit 3.2: Global Inflows of FDI, by Region 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
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Source: World Bank, 2006. 
Although international investment may assist with increasing ICT demand, in 
many developing countries this investment can also have a negative effect on ICT 
adoption. Countries with high rates of gross FDI as a percentage of GDP may not 
experience the knowledge spillovers necessary to derive significant economic benefits 
(Saggi, 2002).  Without knowledge spillovers, these countries will not have the necessary 
levels of expertise to innovate and adapt technology to their local environment.  As a 
result, the market supply for ICTs may be limited to local sectors tied directly to MNC 
supply chains.  Without economically viable technology options that can meet the 
requirements of the local environment, a developing country may experience lower levels 
of ICT penetration, holding all other variables constant.   
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In addition, results from the draft version of the model suggest that there is a 
nonlinear relationship between gross FDI and the dependent variable.  As a result, both 
gross FDI and gross FDI squared are included within the model to determine the nature 
of this relationship.  An interaction term for gross FDI and GDP per capita was also 
included. 
Trade  
During the past 5 years, global trade has grown faster than the global economy, as 
demonstrated in Exhibit 3.3.  Trade reached almost 50 percent of global GDP in 2004, 
increasing steadily from 38 percent in 1990 (World Bank, 2006).  During this time, East 
Asia became a world leader in trade, but major increases were also seen in Europe – 
particularly after the creation of the EU in 1992.  This global increase during the past 15 
years was driven largely by changes in political environments, as well as a rapid 
expansion of the global supply chain (Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  Another major driver is 
the steep cuts in international tariffs within developing countries, which declined from 
more than 15 percent of trade revenue in 1990 to only 5 percent in 2003 in both East Asia 
and Latin America, according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2006).  
While still well above the global average, South Asia also saw a significant tariff decline, 
from 27 percent to 17 percent, during the same period.  
 134 
Exhibit 3.3: Growth of Trade as a Share of GDP, by Region 
Trade (% of GDP)
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Source: World Bank, 2006. 
Trade measures the total input and output of goods and services for international 
trade as a percentage of GDP.  This variable was included to control for the level of 
economic strength across countries, which can influence the adoption of ICTs.  Countries 
with high trade levels are expected to have higher ICT penetration rates on average.  
Baldwin et al. (2001) also argue that trade is the conduit for developing country income 
convergence with developed countries.  A convergence in global incomes, based on the 
benefits of increased incomes in developing countries, would positively influence the ICT 
adoption rate.     
Other options considered to account for economic health across the study 
countries included gross domestic investment and current account balance.  Gross 
domestic investment is defined as the outlays for fixed plant, equipment, construction of 
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national infrastructure, and net changes in the level of inventories.  The gross domestic 
investment variable would have been used as a proxy for the amount of capital available 
within the country for investment within the telecommunications sector.  However, this 
indicator did not have enough observations during the study period to be included.  The 
current account balance includes net exports, income, and current transfers, which would 
include a national deficit or trade deficit that a nation may be experiencing.  This would 
certainly impact capital available for ICT investment.  However, similar to gross 
domestic investment, there were not enough observations.  
As discussion above in the FDI section, trade can increase the level of technology 
transfer experienced by a developing country (Saggi, 2002).  This technology transfer can 
increase the utilization of ICTs by local firms as they work to integrate with the IT and 
back-office systems of the MNCs that they supply (Urata, 2006).  This ICT usage can 
also increase the number of experts capable of deploying and maintaining a network 
while workers exposed to the technologies are more likely to be able to use ICTs off the 
job (Baldwin, Braconier, and Forslid, 2005).  Last, Verikios and Zhang (2004) argue that 
a reduction in trade barriers for the telecommunications sector would benefit global 
productivity rates.  Although there has been continued debate over the evidence of 
enhanced economic growth in developing countries that liberalize their trade regimes, 
recent studies seem to support the case for liberalization (Edwards, 1993; Greenaway, 
2002).   
Although a developing country can receive benefits from increased international 
trade and investment, such as technology transfer, there can be a tipping point where this 
increased trade can hamper ICT adoption (Zhu and Trefler, 2005).  This results in little 
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local demand for ICTs, despite levels of trade and investment that exceed those seen in 
developed countries – creating a small ICT market that is highly concentrated among 
wealthy residents and has little prospect for accelerated growth.  Based on this, I would 
expect a curvilinear relationship, which I explicitly test below by including trade squared 
as a variable.  
Economic Development Variables  
ICT adoption within developing countries is also influenced by the level of 
economic development the country has attained.  Without increasing levels of 
development, there can be reduced levels of demand for ICTs, which will be reflected in 
a lower than expected penetration rate.  Countries experiencing economic development 
will see their ICT sectors benefit directly – such as when the population shifts from rural 
to urban centers, lowering the costs for network deployments (Kenny, 2002).  There are 
also indirect benefits, including shifts in economic activities that require higher utilization 
rates of ICTs, such as finance or software development, in comparison to low-skill 
manufacturing (Heeks, 2006).  To account for these direct and indirect benefits, the study 
included several different approaches to accounting for economic development, such as 
measuring economic growth, rates of urbanization, and shifts toward advanced industrial 
sectors.  Economic growth is accounted for in the model by GDP per capita while 
urbanization is included through a proxy indicator: population density.  Although 
population density is not an ideal substitute for urbanization, the widespread availability 
of time-series data makes it more appropriate for this study.  Last, shifts away from 
agriculture and manufacturing, toward advanced service sectors, are included as a 
variable measuring the share of GDP represented by the services.   
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GDP per Capita  
The GDP per capita indicator is included to control for the relative advancement 
of a country’s economy (Bassanini, 2002).  Countries with low GDP levels are likely to 
have high levels of low-skilled manufacturing and agriculture within their economies, 
requiring slower adoption rates for ICTs.  It is expected that the relative size of GDP per 
capita should have a positive correlation with the dependent variable.  Although 
developing countries, such as China, have posted annual growth rates above 10 percent, 
this is not the norm among developing countries.  Few of these countries see rapid 
economic growth that would cause them to change their relative economic status within 
the study period.  Instead, the goal of the GDP per capita indicator is to stratify the 
relative level of economic attainment achieved by these countries; addressing the 
relationship between being a low-income or high-income country and ICT adoption 
rather than the annual variation in GDP per capita (Wong, 2002).   
Per-capita GDP has grown globally and has seen historic increases in developing 
countries.  These global gains were mainly pushed by the East Asian Tigers – China and 
India – as well as strong growth in the US.  According to the World Development 
Indicators, the global average for per-capita GDP has increased from just over $5,000 
PPP in 1990 to almost $9,000 PPP today (World Bank, 2006).  East Asia posted gains of 
9 percent annually, far higher than the world average of 4 percent, while South Asia also 
had above-average increases of 5 percent per year.  Europe experienced only 2 percent 
annual growth, while the United States had twice that rate.  
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This global growth in GDP per capita has helped foster growth in ICT adoption 
across developing countries.  Expanding GDP per capita can lead to rising incomes, 
increasing the disposable income available to residents to use toward ICT services 
(Bassanini, 2002).  This rise in per-capita GDP does not necessarily translate into higher 
incomes.  A developing country may have high levels of income inequality, resulting in 
few benefits for the ICT sector (Dasgupta, 2001).  This is why additional indicators, such 
as institutional and regulatory reform, are included to account for the dispersal of 
economic benefits within a country. 
No study has shown conclusively that ICT adoption in developing countries leads 
to GDP growth (Edwards, 2002).  Several previous studies, including Roller’s (2001), 
showed a causal link between the deployment of ICTs and economic growth.  However, 
Roller’s study only included 21 high-income countries; and the studies that did focus on 
developing countries showed no causal link, suggesting that developing countries may 
not have economic benefits from ICT adoption that are reflected in national statistics 
(Dewan, 2000).  This is not to suggest that no economic benefits are derived from 
adopting ICTs in developing countries – just that they are not measured in the national 
statistics currently and may be limited to firm- or household-level benefits. 
This GDP per capita variable is based on purchasing power parity.  GDP is the 
total economic output for a country in a given year.  Purchasing power parity measures 
that output in terms of buying power, rather than in dollars, to control for differences in 
international exchange rates.  Due to the non-linear relationship between adoption and 
GDP per capita, per-capita GDP squared was also included. 
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A lagged variable for GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared was included to 
account for the potential simultaneity bias that exists by including GDP per capita as an 
explanatory variable (Beck, 2001).  Using a granger causality test with GDP per capita 
and the dependent variable, I found significant F-tests for one, two, and four lags.  In this 
case, we reject the null hypothesis of non-causality, suggesting that there is an 
endogeneity problem and that the dependent variable and GDP per capita are 
simultaneously determined (Chong, 2000).  I then substituted a lagged GDP per capita as 
an instrumental variable because it is highly correlated with GDP in time t but is not 
affected by the dependent variable in time t.  Although the lagged variable does affect the 
dependent variable indirectly through GDP per capita, lagged GDP per capita is more 
appropriate than GDP per capita because it is not simultaneously determined (Hansen, 
2006). 
Services 
The services sector indicator measures the contribution of a sector to a country’s 
total economic output (GDP).  This indicator allows the model to account for countries 
that have made the shift toward service sectors and are more likely to utilize ICTs than 
countries with an agricultural or manufacturing-based economy.  As a developed or 
developing country shifts toward a services economy, it is more likely to adopt ICTs to 
increase productivity within those sectors (Furman, 2004).  This is an indicator that 
assists in separating out countries that are still struggling to make the shift to an economy 
based on advanced services.  The indicator measures the share of services output as the 
percent of GDP and should have a strong positive correlation with the dependent 
variable.  
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The service sectors in high-income countries now represent almost 75 percent of 
their economies, according to the World Development Indicators.  The global average 
grew from 65 percent in 1994 to almost 70 percent today (see Exhibit 3.4).  This shift has 
been led by the US economy, which now has more than 76 percent of its GDP generated 
by services (World Bank, 2006).  With 71 percent, the EU is slightly behind but is 
beginning to converge with the US level.  Developing countries, especially those that are 
middle-income rather than low-income, are beginning to undergo the same transition 
experienced in North America and Western Europe.  This process will be slow, taking 
much longer than the study period.  However, developing countries that have already 
begun the shift toward advanced services have already seen increases in ICT demand 
(Freeman, 1995). 
Exhibit 3.4: Services as a Share of GDP, by Region 
Services, value added (% of GDP)
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Source: World Bank, 2006. 
 141 
The service sectors variable is included to indicate the advancement of an 
economy, representing a difficult shift for most developing countries to achieve.  Many 
developing countries with relative high incomes, such as Malaysia, have been presented 
as development success stories.  However, they are still working to expand their 
advanced services sectors (Jomo, 2003).  Despite these difficulties, developing countries 
in East Asia have seen significant increases in service sector output as a share of GDP 
even as the region has experienced massive shifts of manufacturing capacity (Urata, 
2006).  The region is now generating more than 42 percent of its economy from services, 
which is up from 35 percent just a decade ago (World Bank, 2006).  East Asian 
employment in services lags far behind, with more than 20 percent of workers in services.  
This suggests that the service sectors in these Asian economies are significantly more 
productive than their traditional sectors.  A portion of this productivity variation across 
sectors can be attributed to higher ICT adoption rates in these service sectors (Hsiao, 
2006).   
Population Density  
A population density variable is included, which measures the number of people 
per kilometer and serves as a proxy for the level of urbanization within a country.  
Technology adoption rates face the practical issue of deploying national networks and 
last mile infrastructure (Galperin, 2005).  This deployment process in small, urban 
countries such as Singapore is more likely to occur at a faster pace and at a lower cost 
than in larger countries such as Thailand, with their rural populations.  Geography also 
plays an important role, with mountainous countries facing significantly higher 
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infrastructure costs than low-lying areas.  Because rural, mountainous countries have a 
lower population concentration, population density acts as a proxy for this issue as well. 
Although urbanization rates are not included within this model, population 
density can act as a partial proxy for this measure.  Similar to population density, 
increases in urbanization lower the network infrastructure costs versus the costs of a rural 
network.  In addition, urban customers may be more likely to demand higher levels of 
services and price competition than their rural counterparts.  In his 2005 empirical study 
of 50 developing countries, Li argues that a large urban customer base within a 
democratic political system is more likely to drive the reform process by creating a strong 
interest group.  These urban customers are more likely to push for privatization, 
competition, and an end to cross-subsidization because they will directly benefit from 
these reforms within the sector (Li, 2005). 
Institutional Reform Variables 
The last set of factors is market regulation and institutional reform, including the 
creation of an independent regulatory agency for the market.  For many countries, the 
regulatory agency and state-owned monopoly are within the same ministry of 
communications, creating a conflict of interest that can lead to corruption and a slow 
telecom adoption rate for the country (Kirkpatrick, 2006).  By creating an independent 
regulatory agency, along with a privatized monopoly, countries can develop a 
competitive environment for telecom adoption to rapidly grow.  As mentioned above for 
the privatization variable, the regulatory reform process must be completed as part of a 
larger institutional reform process, which can include the creation of ministries of ICT, 
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innovation, and science to drive the ICT policy process.  Although there is no readily 
accessible data that tracks the structural changes of these ICT and innovation institutions, 
a variable that tracks the size of the government as a share of GDP has been included as a 
proxy.  This government spending variable expands in conjunction with the expanding 
role of the state, particularly as developing countries shift from government ownership to 
actively supporting economic development, including fostering ICT adoption (Bortolotti, 
2007).  In addition, the level of government spending also acts as a proxy for political 
development within a developing country as it moves toward becoming a more expansive 
welfare state (Dreher, 2006).   
Two independent variables are included to capture within the model the 
institutional and political development of individual countries.  These indicators include 
both ICT-specific policy solutions, such as the creation of an independent regulatory 
agency, and high-level political development variables, such as government spending as a 
percentage of GDP.  
Regulatory Agencies  
Regulatory structure in a country should include explicit, unified regulations on 
both governance and incentives to avoid developing an inadequate governing structure.  
Regulatory governance includes the mechanisms designed to restrain arbitrary 
regulations.  Incentives can include price supports, cross- and direct subsidies to 
operators, market entry support, and assistance for carrier interconnection (Cook, 2004).  
ICT regulation is integral to understanding global technology trends and is a key 
determinant in inducing private investment in the ICT sector.  To be successful, a 
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developing country’s regulatory structure must be strong enough to withstand corruption 
and arbitrary governmental actions.  
Although most countries have shifted from state-run monopolies toward regulated 
competition (see Exhibit 3.5), many developing countries still have state-run monopoly 
telecom operators that are also their own regulators.  The creation of an independent body 
that helps to enforce a competitive market has a major impact on the ICT adoption rate 
(Baudrier, 2001).  Countries with independent regulatory agencies also typically have 
strong government involvement within the ICT sector – adding support to the hypothesis 
that adoption may be closely tied to governance issues, rather than simply economic 
growth.  Developing countries with good governance should be able to pull ahead of 
other countries with the same income levels.  
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Exhibit 3.5: Expansion of Regulatory Agencies within ITU Member 
States 
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Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2006. 
Although this model cannot account for all of the various regulations listed above, 
the creation of an independent regulatory agency should have a positive effect on the rate 
of ICT growth within the country.  An independent body that is dedicated to designing 
and enforcing a competitive market structure will have a major impact on the adoption 
rate within a country (Ure, 2003).  The creation of an independent regulatory agency is 
included as a dummy variable, with those years after development of the agency marked 
with a 1.  Similar to the privatization variable, a lagged agency variable was also 
considered and ultimately unused.  Again, this was due to the long time frames for 
designing and creating an independent regulatory agency, giving the market ample time 
to prepare and respond. 
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Government Expenditures  
Government expenditures include all public sector spending as a percentage of 
GDP.  This variable is a proxy for political development within a country.  Countries 
with high levels of government spending will be well developed politically, such as 
Western Europe; while nations with little government spending are less likely to support 
ICT market development or adoption, such as several markets across Africa (Dreher, 
2006).  Political freedom indicators, such as the one tracked by the Freedom House, were 
also considered but dropped due to a lack of annual data available for all the countries 
covered by the study (Freedom House, 2007). 
Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is expected to have a positive 
correlation with ICT penetration.  As a country’s political infrastructure develops, a 
government is more likely to be able to support a strong business environment, regulate a 
competitive telecom market, and effectively manage a universal service mandate (Garcia-
Murillo, 2005).  This relationship between government expenditures and ICT market 
development also holds for higher country income levels.  For example, several high-
income countries in Europe with some of the highest levels of governmental spending 
outstrip the United States in spending while also having a higher ICT penetration rate.  
Data Sources, Types, and Forms 
Data for all dependent and independent variables has been gathered from 
secondary sources.  The combined fixed and mobile indicators used as the dependent 
variable have been compiled using data from the World Development Indicators, which 
are collected annually by the World Bank.  In addition, indicators have been gathered 
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from the International Telecommunication Union, which has collected data on ICT and 
other factors from all of its 189 member countries.  Data for the other independent 
variables has been collected from the ITU and WDI as well as the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which was used as a source for 
development and economic indicators.  The dummy variables for policy and institutional 
shifts came from sources at the ITU, which tracks telecommunications policy from its 
members.  Data also includes the quadratic forms for trade, FDI, and GDP per capita.  All 
three of these indicators have a non-linear relationship with the dependent variable.   
Selection of Data Sources 
Considering the range of independent and dependent variables, and with some of 
the study countries missing data for one or more of the variables, the model still has 154 
countries.  The ITU gathered data for 178 countries and the World Bank has information 
for 226 countries.  However, of those 226, only approximately 180 have a significant 
amount of available data.     
There is a pattern to a number of countries that were not included in the data 
collected by either the ITU or the World Bank.  Many of those countries are currently 
experiencing armed conflict, such as Iraq, or are dependent areas, such as Greenland, 
with no separate data collection.  Unfortunately, indicators for these countries were not 
available through any other source.  There should be no pattern for the additional 
countries that have been removed from the model due to missing data for a few 
indicators.     
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Data Collection and Timing 
Data used in this pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis includes observations 
from 1990 to 2005.  This data allows for analysis of variance across time and across 
countries, which is essential to understanding the impact of institutional factors on ICT 
adoption rates.  Data for 2006 was not readily available for all of the independent 
variables, but the existing study period should capture the recent growth of ICT 
utilization in developing countries along with increases in ICT institutional reforms.  By 
including 15 years of data, the study captures the technological and policy changes that 
began to emerge in the early 1990s in a handful of countries and expanded during the late 
1990s across a large subset of the study countries.  Exhibit 3.6 contains descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
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Exhibit 3.6: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Fixed and 
mobile 
subscribers 
2791 271.95 358.98 0.32 1998.12 
Lagged GDP 
per capita 
2523 8456.939 8850.785 466.1686 64298.52 
Lagged GDP 
per capita 
squared 
2523 1.50e+08 2.94e+08 217313.2 4.13e+09 
Gross FDI (% 
GDP) 
2076 7.071171 37.25057 0 1121.338 
Gross FDI 
squared 
2076 1436.938 31087.68 0 1257400 
Trade (% of 
GDP) 
2590 83.79 46.01 1.53 376.22 
Trade squared 2590 9136.01 11346.39 2.34 141543.2 
Privatization 2996 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Population 
density 
2849 152.99 444.11 -1951.97 6328.81 
Services (% of 
GDP) 
2578 52.70 14.20 4.14 88.48 
Government 
expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
2470 16.52 7.27 2.9 76.22 
Regulatory 
agency 
2635 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Privatization * 
agency 
2618 0.2247549 .41739 0 1 
FDI * GDP per 
capita  
1898 186929.2 2131387 0 6.38e+07 
  
Methods 
The data described above is used to estimate the effects of institutional factors on 
telecom adoption while controlling for economic and social factors.  The model below 
was used to estimate the influence of privatization on the state-owned 
telecommunications monopoly, and the influence of the creation of an independent 
regulatory agency on the adoption of fixed and mobile services, while controlling both 
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market liberalization and economic development across the study countries.  This 
research attempts to control for time-variant omitted variables with pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regression and used a number of models, starting with pooled OLS, which 
is described below.  
y = α + β1(GDP per capita)it-1 + β12(GDP per capita2)it-1 + β2(foreign direct 
investment)it + β22(foreign direct investment2)it + β3(trade)it + β32(trade2)it + 
β4(privatization)it + β5(population density)it + β6(services)it + β7(government 
expenditures)it + β8(regulatory)it + β48(privatization * regulatory)it + β12(GDP per 
capita * foreign direct investment)it + ε 
However, this model is inefficient compared with a random effects (RE) model 
and is likely to have an omitted variable bias that can skew variable coefficients.  These 
omitted variables can be time-variant such as a telecom subsidy, which is likely to rise 
and fall over time and be correlated with privatization.  Once a country privatizes its 
monopoly, it can no longer maintain a cross-subsidization across the various sectors of 
the market, causing many countries to shift to subsidies aimed at indirectly supporting 
competitive operators or directly subsidizing subscribers.  Other omitted variables are 
time-invariant, such as country-specific cultural issues, which may delay adoption and 
integration of new technologies into the society.  These cultural issues are likely to also 
affect the society’s openness to international trade and investment, controlled for within 
the model by trade and FDI as a share of GDP, and are unlikely to change during the 15-
year time frame of this study.  
To address time-variant omitted variables, an RE model was tested.  This model 
allows cluster correlations and is also efficient compared with both pooled OLS and fixed 
effects (FE).    
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yit = α + β1(GDP per capita)it-1 + β12(GDP per capita2)it-1 + β2(foreign direct 
investment)it + β22(foreign direct investment2)it + β3(trade)it + β32(trade2)it + 
β4(privatization)it + β5(population density)it + β6(services)it + β7(government 
expenditures)it + β8(regulatory)it + β48(privatization * regulatory)it + β12(GDP per 
capita * foreign direct investment)it + uit + vit 
However, if these omitted variables happen to be correlated to the model’s 
explanatory variables, a random effects model would not be appropriate, giving us 
inconsistent estimators.  Based on the existing literature, this could include educational 
expenditures and literacy, which are correlated to GDP per capita.  Development metrics, 
such as infant mortality, are correlated with government expenditures and GDP per 
capita.  Also not included are R&D expenditures, which are correlated with services as a 
percentage of GDP.   
In addition to these variables that do not have enough observations to be included 
in the model, there are metrics that are not currently tracked but may be country-specific 
and correlated with this model’s variables.  These could include national or regional 
cultural variations that slow technology adoption.  There are also ICT policy and larger 
governance issues that are correlated with privatization and regulation that are country-
specific, but cannot be tracked by international databases.  This can include the ability of 
governments to execute and enforce ICT regulations, fund and implement ICT support 
policies, and support technology innovation efforts to tailor ICTs for the national market.  
A fixed effects approach controls for these unobserved country-specific factors, such as 
the subsidies and cultural issues discussed above, and allows for more accurate 
determination of the effect of privatization and regulation on the dependent variable.   
The fixed effects model below was used to estimate the influence income, 
liberalization, and development have on telecom levels across countries.  Fixed effects 
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models may exacerbate measure error and are less efficient due to a loss in degrees of 
freedom.  However, with 2,124 observations, this should not be a major concern.  In 
addition, while this FE model may still bias the estimator, it does allow for time-variant 
omitted variables within the model that are correlated with explanatory variables. 
yit = α + β1(GDP per capita)it-1 + β12(GDP per capita2)it-1 + β2(foreign direct 
investment)it + β22(foreign direct investment2)it + β3(trade)it + β32(trade2)it + 
β4(privatization)it + β5(population density)it + β6(services)it + β7(government 
expenditures)it + β8(regulatory)it + β48(privatization * regulatory)it + β12(GDP per 
capita * foreign direct investment)it + εit 
Fixed effects are the most common models used with pooled time-series cross-
sectional data sets, where a vast majority of the study population is observed, which is the 
case with my cross-national data.  Because this is a cross-national study, multicollinearity 
could be a problem and several checks were completed after removing FDI, trade, and 
GDP per capita squared.  A pairwise correlation of the data was completed as well as a 
pairwise correlation of the coefficients.  In addition, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
for each variable and the model average were checked.  
To compare the constant coefficients (CC) model with the random effects models, 
a Breusch and Pagan (B-P) test was used.  This test determines if the error terms are 
independent with the country unit, with a null hypothesis that random effects are not 
needed.  If the null is rejected, this does not guarantee that RE should be used – just that 
CC may not be the most appropriate. 
The Hausman test was used to compare the random effects and fixed effects 
models.  This test determines whether there is a significant difference between the two 
models, with a null hypothesis that there is no difference between the RE and FE models.  
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If we fail to reject the null, then the RE is preferred given its greater efficiency versus the 
FE model.  In addition, an F-test was done comparing the pooled OLS model to the FE 
model.  
Heteroskedasticity was also checked using a version of the White Test to 
determine whether there is a correlation between any of the independent variables and the 
variance in the error term.  The null hypothesis is that the independent variables will be 
significantly correlated with the residuals, resulting in a high r-squared and a significant 
F-test.   
Results  
Exhibit 3.7 contains the results for the regressions using telecom adoption as the 
dependent variable.  It’s important to note that the R-squared for economic development 
indicators are typically very high, due to the aggregate data being used.  The model was 
tested for multicollinearity by checking the correlation of the variables, the correlation of 
the coefficients, and the variance inflation factors.  For all of these tests, the GDP per 
capita squared, FDI squared, and trade squared variables were all omitted.  Both the 
variable check and the coefficient check had only two results higher than 0.6.  The VIFs 
ranged between 1 and 2, with the average for the model at 1.46.  This is relatively low, 
suggesting that despite using national economic indicators, the model does not have a 
significant problem with multicollinearity.  All of the variables were kept in the model 
for the additional tests discussed below.   
Both the B-P and Hausman tests rejected their null hypotheses at the 1 percent 
level, suggesting that the FE model is most appropriate—as we would expect due to the 
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country-specific variables that are correlated with the DV and explanatory variables.  The 
B-P test shows that there is clustering, and therefore the RE model is preferred over CC.  
The Hausman test demonstrates that there is a significant difference between the RE and 
FE models, and that the FE is preferred.  In addition, the F-test for the significance of the 
fixed effects intercepts indicates that FE is preferred over pooled OLS. 
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Exhibit 3.7: CC, RE, and FE Results 
 Constant 
Coefficients 
Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Lagged GDP per capita 0.030 0.008 0.097 
 (0.002)** (0.004)* (0.006)** 
Lagged GDP per capita 
squared 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) 
FDI (% GDP) -0.876 1.970 2.650 
 (0.806) (0.753)** (0.701)** 
FDI squared 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.001)* 
Trade (% of GDP) 1.174 2.235 2.445 
 (0.329)** (0.500)** (0.568)** 
Trade squared -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.002)* (0.002) 
Privatization 78.847 66.297 19.770 
 (15.923)** (17.137)** (15.803) 
Population density 0.026 0.019 0.167 
 (0.010)* (0.020) (0.092) 
Services (% of GDP) 0.924 2.921 6.427 
 (0.506) (0.717)** (0.791)** 
Government 
expenditures (% of GDP) 
3.649 2.626 3.633 
 (0.899)** (1.243)* (1.340)** 
Regulatory agency 80.131 73.041 31.049 
 (11.911)** (11.516)** (10.467)** 
Privatization * agency 54.735 125.382 106.885 
 (20.555)** (20.044)** (17.897)** 
FDI * GDP per capita  -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00008 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Constant -226.313 -348.828 -1,196.472 
 (27.614)** (42.593)** (62.439)** 
Observations 1727 1727 1727 
R-squared 0.79  0.71 
Number of id  154 154 
Number of countries: 154.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 5%.  ** Significant at 1%.  
In addition, the model was also tested for heteroskedasticity using the White test.  
Running the regression with the square of the residuals, the resulting R-squared was 
0.996, demonstrating that the independent variables did explain much of the residuals.  
The F-test for the model was also significant at the 1 percent level along with many of the 
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T-tests for the variables.  This may be due to issues inherent in economic indicators, such 
as autocorrelation, which may be influencing these tests.  However, given that the FE 
model is still the most appropriate, and that it allows for omitted variables to be 
correlated to explanatory variables, the results for the White test do not suggest that the 
model estimates are unusable. 
The major independent variables in the model were privatization and regulation.  
A completed T-test of the variables showed that the agency and interaction terms were 
both positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while privatization was not significant 
in the fixed effects model.  The coefficients for agency and interaction terms on the 
dependent variables of 31 and 106.9, respectively, on average hold the other factors 
constant.  Therefore, countries with a regulatory agency on average will have an 
additional 31 fixed and mobile subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants than countries that do 
not, holding all other variables constant.  In addition, those that have privatized and 
created an agency have 106.9 additional fixed and mobile subscribers per 1,000 
inhabitants on average than countries with neither, holding all other variables constant.  
With a mean of 272 for the dependent variable, these increases of 31 and 106.9 suggest 
that the benefits of undergoing the privatization and regulatory reform processes are 
valuable to countries seeking to accelerate ICT adoption.  
In a similar fixed effects model that left out the interaction term for agency and 
privatization, the coefficient for privatization was significant and positive at the 1 percent 
level.  The coefficient for privatization was 93 while the coefficient for agency was 56.3.  
This suggests that the interaction term and the privatization variable are explaining the 
same variation in the dependent variable.  In contrast, agency is still positive and 
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significant.  This suggests that there are few countries with an agency but that have not 
privatized, yet there are countries that have privatized but not created an agency.  The 
results from these two fixed effects models – one with and one without the interaction 
term – suggest that there is a common sequence of events in which countries privatize 
their monopoly and then create their agency.  
Lagged GDP per capita is significant at the 1 percent level, influencing the DV 
0.097 on average for every 1 unit increase in lagged GDP per capita, holding everything 
else constant.  In comparison, this model with non-lagged GDP per capita and GDP per 
capita squared results in the same coefficient to the fourth decimal place, 0.0969, and was 
still significant at the 1 percent level.  This suggests that although the Granger test 
rejected the null hypothesis of non-causality, the causal relationship between ICT 
adoption and GDP per capita was not significantly biasing the coefficient.  
For the coefficients of the other independent variables, each maintained its 
significance and direction with the introduction of lagged GDP per capita.  However, 
most of these coefficients were slightly higher with the lagged variable than with the non-
lagged variable.  This included trade as a percentage of GDP, which had a coefficient of 
1.97 with the non-lagged variable and 2.65 with the lagged variable within the fixed 
effects model.  Another example was services as a percentage of GDP, where the 
coefficient increased from 5.65 with the non-lagged GDP per capita variable to 6.43 with 
the lagged variable.  The significant exception to this shift was the interaction term for 
privatization and agency, where the coefficient decreased from 120.13 with the non-
lagged variable to 106.88 with lagged GDP per capita.  Conversely, the coefficient for 
privatization increased from 8.93 to 19.77 with the lagged variable while agency 
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increased from 23.61 to 31.05.  The interaction term and the agency variable were both 
significant at the 1 percent level and privatization was not significant.  Although the 
coefficients for the individual institutional variables increased with the introduction of the 
lagged variable, the overall relationship between these two variables, their interaction 
term, and the dependent is of a similar magnitude, direction, and significance with both 
the lagged and the non-lagged GDP per capita variable included.  
Gross FDI was positive and significant at the 1 percent level while FDI squared 
was significant at the 5 percent level, with coefficients of 2.65 and 0.001, respectively.  
The interaction term for FDI and lagged GDP per capita is also significant at the 1 
percent level with a negative coefficient of -0.00008.  This low coefficient is due to the 
high maximum for the variable, where a one-unit increase for FDI * GDP per capita 
would only decrease the DV by 0.00008.  More importantly, the negative coefficient 
suggests the two variables are not complementary and therefore a shift in FDI within a 
low GDP per capita country will have a larger effect on the DV than a shift in a high 
GDP per capita country, holding all else constant.  This is supported in the literature, 
where these increases in FDI can lead to technology transfer, having a large effect on the 
ICT market of a developing country while countries operating at the technology frontier 
are likely to see fewer direct benefits to their ICT adoption rates. 
Trade was significant at the 1 percent level but had a positive coefficient of 2.45, 
and trade squared is negative and significant at the 10 percent level.  This suggests that 
for countries with low levels of trade, the variable has a positive relationship with the 
DV; and at higher levels of trade, the relationship becomes negative, as was 
hypothesized.  In addition, the services and government expenditure variables were both 
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positive and significant at the 1 percent level, while population density was positive and 
significant only at the 10 percent level.   
As shown in Exhibit 3.5, a majority of countries are now choosing to liberalize 
their market through independent regulatory agencies along with privatizing their state-
owned operators.  Several exogenous factors are driving these countries to undergo this 
transition, including international regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
regional organizations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or 
the EU, foreign competition from global carriers, and international investment (Henisz et 
al., 2005).  However, these factors may be pushing these countries to transition without 
the necessary policy or institutional reforms necessary to sustain them (Baudrier, 2001).  
The larger context for this transition within ICT sectors is good governance, which is 
difficult to implement and maintain, particularly within developing countries (Bortolotti, 
2007).  This has resulted in nations, such as Thailand, that have not been able to maintain 
their higher rates of adoption after privatization and reforming regulations due to poor 
governance structure (Jirachaipravit, 2007).  
Exhibit 3.8 shows four versions of the constant coefficients: one CC model 
without variables for privatization or regulatory agency, two CC models with only one of 
these two variables, and then a CC model with both of them.  These different versions of 
the CC model were run to determine the relationship between the two key explanatory 
variables – privatization and regulatory agency – with the other independent variables.  
FDI has a much stronger relationship with the creation of an independent regulatory 
agency than privatization because the coefficients for FDI in the CC models with agency 
are higher.  This may be due to the higher level of good governance that is needed for 
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both increasing FDI and successfully completing regulatory restructuring.  This supports 
Globerman and Shapiro’s study, which suggested that governance infrastructure is a key 
determinant of FDI (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002).  In contrast, the relationship between 
government expenditures and privatization is stronger than with the creation of an 
agency.  This relationship may be stronger because the ICT privatization of a developing 
country will coincide with a larger privatization effort as the national government shifts 
from a primary to a supporting role within the economy, as suggested by Bortolotti 
(2007).   
Exhibit 3.8 also shows that the coefficient for privatization, at 148.3 in the second 
column, is higher than the coefficient for agency, at 134.8 in the third column.  This 
supports Wallsten’s study, which suggested that countries move through this transition 
sequentially, first with the privatization and then with the regulatory agency (Wallsten, 
2002).  The higher coefficient suggests that more of these developing countries have 
undergone privatization and have yet to create their independent regulatory agency.  This 
also is supported by the interaction term between these two variables and included in the 
fixed effects model discussed above. 
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Exhibit 3.8: Constant Coefficients Regression Results for Dependent 
Variable – Fixed and Mobile Telephone Penetration 
  
 No 
Privatization, 
No Agency 
Privatization, 
No Agency 
Agency, No 
Privatization 
Agency and 
Privatization 
Lagged GDP 
per capita 
0.033 0.029 0.033 0.030 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Lagged GDP 
per capita 
squared 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign direct 
investment 
-1.574 -1.586 -1.841 -1.790 
 (0.412)** (0.392)** (0.406)** (0.393)** 
FDI squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Trade 1.795 1.417 1.399 1.192 
 (0.354)** (0.336)** (0.338)** (0.328)** 
Trade squared -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
Population 
density  
0.034 0.032 0.030 0.030 
 (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.011)** (0.010)** 
Services 2.692 1.529 1.479 0.942 
 (0.525)** (0.504)** (0.516)** (0.502) 
Government 
expenditure 
1.217 3.001 2.807 3.726 
 (0.952) (0.909)** (0.925)** (0.900)** 
Privatization  148.319  111.704 
  (10.113)**  (10.484)** 
Regulatory 
agency 
  134.806 98.243 
   (9.538)** (9.856)** 
Constant -242.513 -224.977 -251.217 -234.930 
 (29.515)** (28.042)** (28.265)** (27.424)** 
Observations 1762 1755 1727 1727 
R-squared 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.79 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
* Significant at 5%.  ** Significant at 1%. 
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Threats to Validity 
Below is a brief discussion of the various threats to validity of the model, 
including misspecification, data availability, and multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity   
There is a wide enough difference between the types of measures included in the 
dependent variable, which includes two ICT indicators, and the independent variables, 
which are social, economic, and institutional indicators, that multicollinearity should not 
be a problem with the model.  It is more of a possibility that some of the independent 
variables are explaining the same variation in the dependent variable.  This could include 
GDP per capita and several of the economic development variables, such as services.  But 
most of the dependent variables are measuring such different factors that the potential 
threat should be small.  
Several tests were already performed for the fixed effects model.  The model was 
tested for multicollinearity by checking the correlation of the variables, the correlation of 
the coefficients, and the variance inflation factors.  None of these checks had high enough 
results to suggest concern for multicollinearity. 
Heteroskedasticity   
The model also tested for heteroskedasticity using the White test, running a 
regression with the square of the residuals to see if the independent variables explain 
much of the residuals.  This test was performed to determine whether independent 
variables are explaining the dependent variable’s error term, particularly focusing on the 
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relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, GDP per capita, FDI, 
and trade.  The non-linear relationship between the dependent variable and these three 
variables begins to break down as a country’s level of GDP per capita, FDI, or trade 
decreases.  Countries tend to bunch together with a weaker correlation between these 
variables and adoption.  This becomes less of a problem for the high-income countries, 
with the variance declining.   
Autocorrelation   
Autocorrelation has the potential to be a serious problem.  There is little 
likelihood that a country’s level of adoption for a given year will vary widely from the 
next year’s level.  A country’s adoption level will build on the previous year’s level – 
also meaning that it will rarely decline from one year to the next.  Autocorrelation can 
cause problems with the standard errors and could inflate the significance of the 
independent variables.   
Causality   
This study attempts to control for the problem of causality with pooled time-series 
cross-sectional regression, but the policy treatments could simply be codifying what is 
already happening within the country.  Trends over time are hard to separate from the 
true effect – many of the variables are increasing each year, making it difficult to 
determine the effect across those variables.  These national statistics may not be 
measuring the necessary trends within the market that result in the privatization process 
and a regulatory agency.  Similarly, these two explanatory variables could be an 
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outgrowth of market conditions, presented during the rapid ICT adoption but not the 
cause of the growth.   
Simultaneity Bias 
This model attempted to control for the causal relationship between ICT adoption 
and GDP per capita with a lagged explanatory variable.  This concern was based on the 
results of a Granger causality test that rejected the non-hypothesis of non-causality.  
However, the coefficients of GDP per capita and lagged GDP per capita were both 0.097, 
suggesting there was little coefficient bias as a result of the Granger causality.  
Model Misspecification Due to Omitted Variable  
Due to data availability, there may be variables that are not included in the model.  
As an example, R&D expenditures, education expenditures, and urbanization are 
correlated with ICT adoption.  However, it is difficult to obtain these variables for low-
income countries – potentially producing a bias within the model.  To mitigate this 
misspecification, several variables were included as proxies for these variables, such as 
services and population density, that manage to capture the relative sophistication of a 
country’s economy.   
Data Availability 
There are several additional limitations to the model’s data, the first being the 
issues surrounding the dependent variable.  There are many critical drawbacks to 
available measures of ICT metrics.  Without reliable regional or sub-national 
information, international databases from the World Bank and ITU are forced to rely on 
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national statistics, which hide regional discrepancies within countries.  Many developing 
countries have very high levels of ICT inequality and the national statistics conceal the 
lack of infrastructure and investment in their rural or low-income areas.  This inequality 
could certainly lead to bias within the model over time.  Countries with similar levels of 
ICT adoption, but widely varying degrees of inequality, could have very different 
outcomes in their efforts to accelerate ICT penetration. 
Independent Variable Formatting  
There may also be misspecification with the way the data is represented in the 
model.  For example, total FDI as a percentage of GDP is only one way out of more than 
six that this information can be represented.  Choosing the wrong format could easily 
create a problem with the coefficients or standard errors.  This variable formatting may 
also influence the other independent variables in the model, impacting each other in 
unpredictable ways.  Because the r-squared is so high with economic development 
models, one solution would be to add variables to the model through trial and error once 
additional variables are collected and reformatted.     
Discussion 
The results from the model were largely consistent with my expectations and the 
existing literature.  A country’s GDP per capita explains a large share of the dependent 
variable’s variation, but it can also overstate the connection between high income and 
high levels of telecom adoption.  By including privatization and regulatory variables, in 
addition to economic development metrics, the model was able to account for much more 
of the variation across countries.  Because countries with independent regulatory agencies 
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typically have strong government involvement, this suggests that adoption may be closely 
tied to governance issues rather than simply economic growth.  Although a low-income 
country cannot leapfrog past high-income countries in terms of telecom adoption, 
developing countries with good governance should be able to pull ahead of other 
countries with the same level of GDP per capita.  
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Section 4: Pitfalls of the National ICT Policy Implementation 
Process – A Comparative Study of Malaysia and Thailand 
 
Introduction 
Thailand and Malaysia have both undergone a rapid transformation of their ICT 
sectors, including their networks, national policies, institutions, and regulatory regimes.  
It is my contention that the privatization of the monopoly operator and the creation of a 
regulatory agency are the foundation for all other governmental ICT initiatives designed 
to accelerate telecommunications adoption.  This is a difficult process to successfully 
implement, with many countries unable to sufficiently reduce the authority of the PTT to 
develop an agency that is politically independent.  Despite these difficulties, this process 
is vital to the success of a national ICT market.  The creation of a competitive market and 
a government regulator is the basis on which all other regulatory reforms, institutional 
reforms, and national ICT policies must rest.  If a country cannot achieve a politically 
sustainable balance of power between the government, the former monopoly, and the 
competitive players, then that country cannot sustain rapid ICT adoption. 
As countries privatize their monopolies, governments must work to open their 
telecom market to new entrants while supporting new infrastructure deployments – in 
short, helping to drive demand while supporting the development of the ICT sector 
(Gasmi, 2000).  However, the policy initiatives underpinning these regulation and 
utilization efforts must be precisely sequenced to support a thriving ICT sector within a 
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developing country (Wallsten, 2002).  Successful governments have closely coordinated 
their ICT market policies with the private sector to achieve regulated and sustainable 
competition.   
Within this institutional and market context, I examine the ICT adoption paths of 
Malaysia and Thailand.  Both of these countries are at similar levels of economic and 
political development, although Malaysia has had a more stable macroeconomic and 
political environment since the Asian Crisis of 1997.  Each country has modeled its ICT 
institutional structure and policies on the successful example of Singapore, along with 
South Korea and Japan, for their national broadband and infrastructure initiatives.  
Despite these similarities, political considerations in Thailand have influenced the 
privatization of the monopoly operator and the creation of the regulatory agency 
according to government officials interviewed for this case study.  These considerations 
have led to a less competitive environment for the ICT market and the country has not 
been able to sustain its pace of ICT adoption, resulting in a plateau in Thailand’s 
progress.  
This case study section discusses and compares the ICT market, regulation, and 
policies of Thailand and Malaysia.  The section is divided into six parts.  The first 
includes the case study methodology while the second provides an overview of the 
economic conditions within Malaysia and Thailand, with a specific look at international 
firms and investment.  The third part provides a detailed discussion of the current 
conditions of the ICT sectors in Thailand and Malaysia, including an examination of 
adoption levels and market competitiveness along with a comparison to other middle-
income countries.  The fourth part studies the regulatory regime of both of these middle-
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income countries while the last part offers my conclusions about Thailand’s and 
Malaysia’s ICT sectors based on this case study analysis.  
Case Study Methodology 
The case study will outline and compare the policy and implementation 
trajectories of these two middle-income countries as well as the hurdles that impeded 
government implementation.  Data sources for this country study include international 
indices, secondary surveys, governmental reports, and third-party research on ICT 
industries, government regulations, and ICT policies.  The research also includes 
fieldwork in Thailand and Malaysia, completing 24 interviews with key officials 
responsible for design and implementation of the national ICT strategies.  
Interviews were completed with stakeholders in the public and private sector.  
These government interviewees include officials at ministries of communication, science, 
and technology agencies; ministries of finance; and national telecom regulators.  In 
addition, several outside experts located at think tanks or other organizations were 
contacted and interviewed.  All of these interviewees were contacted and interviewed in 
confidence; therefore, no names will be referenced in this study.  However, the ministry 
or organization where interviewees were employed will be cited where appropriate.  
These interviews helped to clearly define the policy evolution that has taken place as well 
as highlight successes and failures within the implementation process.  From the private 
sector, these interviews focused on local telecommunications firms to understand their 
plans for ICT investment and their support for the national strategy.  In addition, 
interviews were completed with outside experts and additional officials, including those 
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in the Ministry of Finance.  A list of the ministry or organization for interviewee is 
included in Appendix A along with the interview protocol in Appendix B. 
Using the results of these interviews, I examined the commonalities between 
Thailand and Malaysia in their ICT strategies, implementations, and hurdles.  I also 
analyzed how Singapore’s and South Korea’s ICT reform processes have influenced 
Thailand’s and Malaysia’s policy designs.  Using this comparative information from 
these two middle-income countries, I made national strategy and policy implementation 
conclusions based on gaps in their current ICT outcomes.  These two case study countries 
will be used to examine the following research questions:  
• Are public sector policies and programs necessary for initiating and sustaining 
ICT growth?   
• How does the governmental role successfully transition from monopoly operator 
to a supporting player in the ICT sector?  
• Have weaknesses in Thailand’s institutional structure and regulatory regime led to 
a growing gap in penetration rates between Thailand and Malaysia? 
I would argue that there is strong internal validity to the case study due to the 
political, economic, and ICT sector similarities discussed in detail below.  Both Thailand 
and Malaysia are middle-income countries with similar GDP per capita growth patterns 
and are at similar levels of political development.  However, Thailand has suffered a 
recent setback due to its democratization as a result of a coup in 2006.  Malaysia and 
Thailand have implemented national ICT strategies and institutional reforms based on the 
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Singaporean model.  Despite these similarities, the two countries have experienced a 
large and widening gap in ICT adoption outcomes – making them excellent target 
countries for this case study research.  
There are external validity limitations with two case study countries that are both 
middle-income, Asian exporting economies.  There are limits to the generalizability of 
these conclusions to countries in other regions or other income categories.  This is 
particularly true of low-income countries, which face far different demand and 
infrastructure challenges than Malaysia or Thailand due to their macro-economic status.  
However, these cases do offer clear lessons to other middle-income countries that are 
undergoing their own national ICT policy and institutional reform process. 
Economic Conditions 
Other East Asian countries used a combination of direct industry supports and 
protections to drive high-tech exports and, in turn, accelerate economic development.  
Two of the most notable are South Korea and Singapore, where local industry was 
protected from foreign competition but the government was willing to use its political 
capital to cut support to failing businesses while rewarding successful firms with new 
opportunities (Amsden, 1989).  The danger politically for any developing country is that 
a government will not be independent enough to stand up to special interests and political 
favorites that do not meet the standards for protection, but have enough political power to 
ensure government support anyway (Levy, 1994).  Korea and Singapore are examples of 
the few countries that have been able to do this successfully.  In contrast, Thailand and – 
to a lesser extent – Malaysia have not been able to successfully enforce these 
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development policies (Jomo, 2003; Ritchie, 2005).  By placing political considerations as 
a primary factor for determining which sectors to protect and promote, these two national 
governments have limited the technological development and innovation capacity of local 
industries – which, in turn, has had a detrimental effect on economic development.   
This third part of the case study section includes a discussion of the economic 
conditions within Thailand and Malaysia, examining the continued influence of the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 on the growth trajectories of the two countries.   
Thailand 
Thailand’s economy was the first to be struck by the 1997 Asian financial 
contagion and was one of the countries most affected by the crisis.  Thailand took several 
years longer than other Southeast Asian countries to restart its growth due to a 
combination of poor regulatory oversight, political influence, and over-leveraged capital 
(see Exhibit 4.1).  In interviews with Thai government officials and ICT policy experts, 
several interviewees argued that the Thai government has yet to implement the necessary 
government and financial reforms to avoid a similar crisis.  The GDP per capita of 
Thailand has long grown at rates similar to Malaysia’s, although it trailed by 
approximately $1,000 per capita during the early and mid-1990s.  After the crisis, 
Thailand was approximately $2,000 below Malaysia due to its longer turnaround period 
and slower growth into the early 2000s. 
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Exhibit 4.1: Comparison in GDP per Capita Indicators from 1987 to 
2005 for Thailand and Malaysia 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $)
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2006. 
The economy has also been hampered by the political instability caused by the 
standoff between the parliament and the prime minister, who was forced out by the 
military in a quiet coup d’etat in 2006.  This instability has had a large dampening effect 
on capital investment and FDI according to government officials at the finance ministry 
along with private consumption within the country.  This is especially damaging to the 
Thai economy, which only recently had seen its inflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP 
rebound in 2005, increasing to 2.6 percent after experiencing inflows that averaged only 
1.1 percent from 2002 to 2004 (World Bank, 2006).  The coup has also delayed the 
approval of 10 infrastructure “mega-projects” that had been proposed by the previous 
government for improving transportation, irrigation, and ICT networks, among others.  
Although these projects had been delayed by the impasse between the parliament and the 
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prime minister, it is unlikely that they will be implemented by the government installed 
by the military with the same large budgets originally envisioned – potentially slowing 
the expansion of ICT access within Thailand.  The current Thai government is 
constrained by a number of factors, including the lack of an electoral mandate, an 
aversion to continuing the policies and initiatives of the ousted prime minister, and 
concerns about unsustainable spending on infrastructure projects. 
The Thai economy is diverse and includes strong agricultural, manufacturing, and 
service sectors, with a strong focus on exports – which remain the key driver of economic 
expansion.  The agricultural sector has long been a central industry in Thailand, helping 
to drive exports, but Thai agriculture is facing strong international competition (Abonyi, 
2005).  This has pushed Thailand’s share of the global market lower in recent years.  
Although the value-added sectors within processing and distribution have expanded, 
success in global markets generally has been limited to relatively few companies.  
Thailand has also been successful at developing an automotive sector focused on 
production of light trucks.  This success has led to export of vehicles and auto parts 
regionally and internationally.  The industry, which was once closely protected by the 
government to foster its growth, must now contend with the reduction of these 
protections – and they will be reduced further if a free trade agreement is reached with 
the US.  Once the economy is more open to international firms, this sector also will face 
the difficult challenge of significantly improving productivity to compete effectively.  
The software industry has been a key component of the government’s long-term strategy 
to bolster the development of local ICT industries.  Supported by a range of direct and 
indirect government support, the industry is still in its infancy, lacking international 
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presence.  Domestic demand for ICTs far outstrips domestic capability, creating a sector 
that is dominated by imports of hardware, software, and professional services.  Taken 
together, these three sectors represent key areas of growth opportunity for Thailand and 
industries that could benefit from higher ICT utilization to improve productivity. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia is striving to reinvent itself from a manufacturing exporter to an 
advanced services and technology innovator (Shari, 2003).  The country’s manufacturing 
facilities, even within the electronics industry, had been low on the global product supply 
chain and handled mostly assembly and other finishing processes.  The country is 
currently at a crossroads in its development, where it can no longer rely on its 
manufacturing base alone to spur economic growth and development.  Its technology 
policies have yet to place Malaysia among the global innovators.  Recently, Malaysia had 
been an example of a country that has focused almost singularly on technology 
development through foreign investment and technology transfer.  However, the national 
government is now attempting to move its economy away from a dependency on MNC 
product exports and toward technology design or innovation (Lall, 1999).  The national 
technology policy is at the center of the government’s attempt to create an opportunity to 
achieve the status of an advanced industrialized nation. 
Most noticeable about the Malaysian economy is the central position of the 
electronics exports sector within economy policy.  In the 1970s, the Malaysian 
government decided to focus on these exports and has strived to diversify the economy 
ever since (Rasiah, 2003).  The sector chosen by the national government was to be the 
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electronics industry since it had already been expanding rapidly and was set to take off.  
As the semiconductor market was taking off, fierce competition between Japanese and 
American firms continually pushed prices lower and companies were searching for ways 
to decrease costs.  Japanese and American firms began locating their facilities in 
Malaysia in the 1970s to tap into the country’s low-wage workers, economic stability, 
and financial incentives, such as its 10-year pioneer status (Hobday, 1999).  The 
Malaysian states also began setting up free trade zones (FTZ), starting with Penang, 
which quickly grew into one of the global centers of the semiconductor supply chain 
(Wah, 1999).  This helped usher Malaysia out of the agriculture phase and into the 
manufacturing phase of development.  This growth pole strategy worked wonders for 
economic growth, but ignoring other sectors only reinforced the county’s reliance on a 
single sector within manufacturing for its economic survival.   
The spillover from the industry has been slow coming; and when it has come, it 
has had a relatively limited benefit because the electronics manufactured in Malaysia are 
almost strictly for export and there is little local content (Bunnell, 2002).  As a result, 
there were few growth opportunities for indigenous firms indirectly linked to the sector, 
save for a few suppliers (Lall, 1999).  Within much of the Malaysian electronics 
manufacturing industry there is an over-reliance on MNCs for capital, technology, and 
management.  This reliance has created few linkages between local suppliers and global 
firms (Hobday, 1999).  These linkages have begun to some degree, but these local 
suppliers’ level of technical complexity for the ICT industry remains below the 
government’s goals.  This sector has moved beyond simple assembly work that was 
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prominent in the 1970s, but not enough indigenous capability has developed to grow 
local businesses (Kam, 1999).   
ICT Adoption within Malaysia and Thailand 
Several developing countries including Malaysia and Thailand have announced 
their national policies within the last 10 years (Ramasamy, 2004).  Because both were 
modeled after Singapore’s national ICT policies and institutions, the national plans and 
ICT institutions of the two countries are very similar (Lallana, 2004).  However, the 
implementation and successes of the two countries have differed considerably.  I 
completed a series of interviews with government, private sector, and university 
stakeholders in Thailand and Malaysia in 2006 to help determine the cause behind these 
two differing experiences.  This research found that key factors for both countries 
included transparent telecom privatization and regulation, strong political institutions and 
leadership, and sustained public-private coordination.   
This fourth part of the case study section is broken into three components.  The 
first provides an overview of the technological conditions in Thailand and Malaysia.  The 
second discusses ICT penetration rates within the two countries, including the challenges 
and successes across the different ICT services, such as mobile phones and broadband.  
The third component examines the competitive environment in Thailand and Malaysia 
and discusses the wide disparity in competitiveness across the various ICT services in 
both countries.   
Fixed line telephony and broadband penetration is below average for Thailand, 
given its level of economic and technological development.  This situation was much 
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worse in 2000, when the government began working to catch up through its ICT Master 
Plan.  Although broadband rates are improving, this is not due to the government 
intervention but higher demand by more affluent customers.   
Level of ICT Penetration  
Thailand  
The fixed and mobile market within Thailand had followed a trajectory similar to 
that of many other developing countries, including Malaysia, according to data collected 
by the World Bank (2006).  The wireless market had increased dramatically since 2000 
(see Exhibit 4.2).  However, it has stagnated since 2003 while the wireline market has 
remained flat, leaving a four-to-one disparity between the two markets.  Starting in 2003, 
Thailand saw a rapid rise in Internet usage within the country – although this may be 
hampered if the government cannot support mobile broadband services.  A notable 
difference between Thailand and Malaysia is the wireless adoption rate, which flattened 
out in 2004 (World Bank, 2006).  According to interviews with operators in Thailand, 
this flattening of the adoption continued through 2006 and was caused by the regulatory 
and legal issues surrounding the market.  These regulatory challenges have resulted in 
limited investment in the sector and dampened competition.  This has left Thailand 
lagging far behind its neighbors in total adoption as well as market growth rates since 
2003.  
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Exhibit 4.2: ICT Adoption Rates in Thailand 
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Source: World Bank, 2006. 
There is a lack of high-quality fixed line infrastructure in Thailand that can 
support DSL services, limiting the adoption rates.  According to officials at the Ministry 
of ICT, this has left Thailand with a total of 500,000 broadband subscribers, held mostly 
by competitive players such as True Corporation, a competitive fixed and mobile 
provider.  Company officials argue that True has a last mile advantage over all the other 
service providers with its 3 million high-quality access lines that are DSL-ready.  
Because the incumbent’s lines are not adequate to support next-generation services, 
True’s position in Bangkok and the suburbs has pushed the company to the top of the 
market.  True does offer wholesale leases on its access lines.  However, its high prices 
leave no room for margins and make the leased line business model financially 
unsustainable.  
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This competitive landscape has left little broadband price competition in Bangkok 
and little incentive for True or other providers to deploy in provincial areas.  The 
Ministry of ICT has set a target of 1 million subscribers by year-end 2007.  However, 
there is no strategy in place to implement this policy.  In addition, service providers will 
be pushing to negotiate with the government that any expansion of their networks into 
rural areas should count toward their universal service obligation, which is set at 4 
percent.  
Another key factor limiting the deployment of broadband services in Thailand is 
the regulatory structure supporting the adoption of third generation (3G) wireless 
technologies.  3G mobile services can support mobile data connections at broadband 
speeds.  Officials with the national regulator have suggested that Thailand has fallen 
behind its neighbors in this sector.  No mobile carriers are even applying for an import 
license of 3G platforms as of late 2006.  The regulatory structure for 3G wireless is split 
between the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and an as yet unformed 
National Broadcasting Commission (NBC).  All seven commissioners for the NBC have 
been rejected by a federal court and no further action has been taken since the parliament 
was dissolved by the prime minister.  Without the NBC, there can be no new entrants into 
the market and no additional spectrum can be allocated to existing wireless providers.   
The Thai market has become increasingly risky for service providers.  For 
example, two major competitors in the mobile market, AIS and DTAC, have been bought 
by Temasek Holdings of Singapore and Telenor of Norway, respectively.  With the 
regulatory uncertainty and rapid technology change, company spokespersons at the 
competitive operators have argued that they require deep pockets and expertise to survive 
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the telecom market reforms while making the leap to next-generation networks.  This 
leap in technology is particularly risky for countries such as Thailand that are not 
designing or manufacturing these new platforms.  This forces service providers to invest 
in foreign technology and vendors that will not tailor their solutions for the specific 
requirements of the market.  That leaves local service providers with the risky bet of 
trying to forecast future directions of the global infrastructure market.  A wrong forecast 
can leave providers with a network technology that global vendors do not support and 
without the necessary capital to migrate their networks.   
This situation within the telecommunications market will continue to limit the 
economic development prospects and technology innovation capabilities of the country.  
The regulatory, financial, and infrastructure hurdles facing telecom competitors are 
distorting the Thai market.  The market power of a handful of players has left the country 
with few options for service, limited deployment, and relatively high prices.  In addition, 
delays by the NTC and the central government in clarifying the regulatory structure are 
only leading to worsening conditions as the country falls farther behind its neighbors.   
Malaysia 
Malaysia has moved quickly to push out telecommunications infrastructure within 
the country (see Exhibit 4.3).  Until the mid-1990s, the teledensity of the country 
languished at fewer than 100 lines for every 1,000 people (World Bank, 2006).  Many 
developing countries have shifted their focus from deploying more mainline connections, 
which are landlines to homes and businesses, to wireless penetration.  Malaysia’s 
wireline penetration rate peaked in 2000 before starting to decline due to the explosion of 
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wireless users.  Internet usage managed to take off a decade ago and reached almost 40 
percent of the population as of 2004.  This lack of wireline penetration could hinder 
Internet access if Malaysia cannot continue to support the rollout of mobile broadband 
services and telecenters (Firth, 2001).  Total broadband usage reached 1 percent as of 
2004. 
Wireless access grew rapidly after 1999, managing to outnumber landlines almost 
four-to-one in fewer than six years (World Bank, 2006).  The disparity between wireline 
and wireless users in Malaysia is common across many developing countries (Gray, 
2004).  There are many reasons for this market situation, the most notable of which is 
geography.  Countries with mountainous areas or islands have difficulty cost-effectively 
connecting users with landlines.  Installing a cell tower to serve an area within a 
developing country is easier and less costly than stringing copper wires, allowing 
wireless service to be expanded quickly.  
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Exhibit 4.3: ICT Adoption Rates in Malaysia 
Source: World Bank, 2006. 
Wireless technology also lets competitive players into the markets more easily 
because they do not have to go through the cost and expense of laying landlines.  
Telecommunications competition is the best way to ensure that prices decline, service 
improves, and coverage expands (Lee, 2002b).  Because landline services are typically 
still in the hands of a government-owned or -controlled monopoly in developing 
countries, little is done in terms of services price, quality, and footprint.  This has allowed 
wireless services to leapfrog over landlines, bringing telecommunications access to a 
majority of people.  Although Malaysia has successfully rolled out telecommunications 
infrastructure, there are still gaps in its access.  Several areas within the country, 
particularly rural areas, have not experienced a rapid increase in teledensity.  This 
regional lack of telecommunications infrastructure has led the government to refocus 
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national policies on expanding the infrastructure in areas outside of the capital (James, 
2003).   
Exhibit 4.4 depicts a comparison of mobile adoption rates in Thailand and 
Malaysia based on data from the World Bank (2006).  This exhibit demonstrates that 
Thailand was able to effectively liberalize its market and almost match the rate of mobile 
penetration with Malaysia in 2003 before hitting a plateau the following year.  According 
to interviewed government officials and think tank telecommunications experts, this is a 
direct result of the lack of clear regulatory, policy, and institutional structure in Thailand 
hampering private sector investment in the telecommunications industry, as discussed 
below. 
Exhibit 4.4: Mobile Phone Adoption Rates in Thailand and Malaysia 
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Source: World Bank, 2006. 
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ICT Challenges Facing Developing and Rural Countries 
Although the institutional, economic, and technological environments of Thailand 
and Malaysia are similar, there are two key differences between the countries that impact 
their ability to adopt ICTs: a disparity in GDP per capita that has grown in recent years, 
and an increasing gap in rural population as a share of the total population.  As mentioned 
above, Thailand’s GDP per capita is nearly $2,000 lower than Malaysia’s while its rural 
population is almost 68 percent of the total (World Development Indicators, 2006).  This 
is over twice as high as Malaysia’s rural population, which was at 33 percent in 2005 
after declining from 50 percent in 1990 (World Development Indicators, 2006).  
The regression model discussed in Section 3 demonstrates the positive correlation 
between the ICT penetration rate and GDP per capita, with the national penetration rate 
measured as the number of fixed and mobile subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants.  A 
country’s GDP per capita has a strong and positive relationship with ICT adoption, as 
demonstrated in Section 3’s model.  Increases in GDP per capita can lead to higher 
disposable incomes, which can be spent on new ICT services (Bassanini, 2002).  In 
addition, as a country improves its GDP per capita, it is likely to shift from an agrarian 
economy to one that focuses on manufacturing and service sectors (Wong, 2002).  These 
sectors, particularly in advanced services, have higher levels of ICT adoption, which 
assists in accelerating national penetration.  However, GDP per capita increases do not 
account for the wide variation in ICT adoption across countries – resulting in many 
example countries with lower incomes but higher ICT penetration rates than Thailand. 
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The model in Section 3 also demonstrated the positive relationship between ICT 
penetration and population density, included as a proxy for urbanization.  This is due to a 
number of factors that increase the costs of serving rural areas and potentially limit 
penetration rates.  Network infrastructure deployment costs will be higher in comparison 
to urban areas due to lower density in rural areas; this increases the length of last mile 
access networks (Galperin, 2005).  This lower density also increases the operational costs 
of carriers, requiring them to cover a larger area with a scarce number of technicians.  In 
addition, the income disparity between rural and urban areas also presents a significant 
challenge, with carriers experiencing lower revenues per person in rural areas (Li, 2005).  
None of this suggests that carriers cannot find a financially sustainable business model 
serving rural subscribers; but it does suggest that there are additional hurdles to 
increasing penetration rates within these areas.  
It is important to note that these rural population and GDP per capita metrics do 
not account for all of the variance in ICT penetration rates.  In fact, several example 
countries have low levels of urbanization similar to Thailand’s or a similar GDP per 
capita, but have managed to successfully accelerate their ICT penetration rates (World 
Development Indicators, 2006). 
Rural and Middle-Income Case Countries 
The model in Section 3 suggests that population density and GDP per capita have 
a positive and significant relationship with ICT adoption within developing countries.  
However, several countries that have levels of rural population and GDP per capita 
similar to Thailand’s have successfully initiated and sustained rapid ICT adoption.  In 
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addition, several countries that did not surpass Thailand in 2005 are now estimated to 
have overtaken that country’s penetration rate for fixed and mobile subscribers.  The 
charts in Exhibits 4.5 and 4.6 depict the ICT adoption rates in countries selected for their 
appropriate levels of GDP per capita and rural populations. 
Thailand vs. Countries with Similar GDP per Capita 
Each of the countries included in Exhibit 4.5 has levels of GDP per capita that are 
similar to or lower than Thailand’s.  For example, in 2005, Thailand’s GDP per capita 
was $7,740, while Algeria’s was $6,283, Ecuador’s was $3,863, and Jamaica’s was 
$3,819 (World Development Indicators, 2006).  Despite being low- or middle-income 
countries, several have been able to maintain rapid growth rates within their ICT sectors.  
Thailand’s ICT adoption rate has been surpassed recently by Belarus, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela.  Algeria is also on pace to overtake Thailand’s penetration rate 
in 2007, while additional countries, such as Jamaica and Macedonia, have lower GDP per 
capita but have maintained a higher rate of adoption for the past 10 years.  The chart in 
Exhibit 4.5 depicts the trends for fixed and mobile subscribers per 1,000 people for the 
countries discussed above.  
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Exhibit 4.5: Mobile Phone Adoption Rates in Middle-Income Countries 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2006. 
Thailand vs. Countries with Similar Rural Populations 
With 68 percent of its population living within a rural area, Thailand has one of 
the lower levels of urbanization for a middle-income country.  However, several 
countries that have similar-sized rural populations have managed to successfully 
accelerate their ICT adoption rates (see Exhibit 4.6).  With more than 50 percent of their 
populations in rural areas, all of the countries included in the chart below have rural 
populations of a similar size to Thailand.  For example, in 2005, China’s rural population 
was 60 percent of the total, Bosnia’s was 54 percent, Guatemala’s was 53 percent, 
Guyana’s was 72 percent, and Moldova’s was 53 percent (World Development 
Indicators, 2006).  Each of these countries has managed to accelerate and maintain its 
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accelerated ICT adoption rates, with several countries on track to overtake Thailand by 
2007.   
The most notable is China, which has a similar-sized rural population and a lower 
level of GDP per capita, at $6,011 in 2005 (World Development Indicators, 2006).  The 
country has been able to foster accelerated growth in its ICT sector, with its fixed and 
mobile subscribers estimated to reach 626 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2006 (Yankee Group, 
2007).  In contrast, Thailand’s ICT adoption rate is estimated to be 618 in 2006 (Yankee 
Group, 2007).  The chart below presents the ICT adoption trends of countries with similar 
levels of rural population.  
Exhibit 4.6: Fixed and Mobile Phone Adoption Rates in Rural 
Countries 
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2006.  
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Competition in the Telecommunications Market 
Thailand  
The Thai ICT market has been hindered by the lack of competitive delivery of 
services, limiting adoption and driving up prices (Jirachaipravit, 2007).  Until recently, 
the state-owned enterprise TOT had a legal monopoly over domestic communications in 
Thailand; and until the creation of the independent commission, the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) was also its own regulator.  With this firm acting as its own regulator, 
the organization was given the ability to offer concessions to other players to raise 
revenues for themselves and the government.  In the early 1990s, TOT began offering 
concessions to two competitors, AIS and True, to deliver mobile services.  When I 
interviewed competitive carriers, they argued that rather than seeking to bolster 
competition, these concessions were designed to raise funds for TOT and the 
government.  This trend continued when two additional concessions were born out of the 
1997 economic crisis.  This focus on short-term revenues rather than creating a long-term 
plan for fostering ICT market liberalization has left the country without a sustainable 
competitive landscape.   
More recently, after the creation of an independent regulatory commission, two 
additional mobile licenses were granted to TOT and another former state-owned 
monopoly, which are both deploying wireless services.  Under this regulatory structure, 
two former monopoly state enterprises are now competing with their own concessionaires 
according to an official interviewed at the Ministry of Finance.  Unfortunately, this is not 
uncommon in Thailand, where two ministries use their overlapping authority to create 
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state-owned entities that compete for market share.  Another example includes the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry, which both created monopoly textile 
firms, leading to intense competition between the two.  In many cases, this is how 
competition is introduced into a given economic sector.   
Officials at the national regulator stated that with the ICT market operating under 
a monopoly until recently, adoption rates were hindered by slow responses to customer 
requirements and inefficient service delivery.  The former fixed line monopoly, TOT, 
was slow to offer widespread broadband services due to this slow response to customer 
demand along with its highly bureaucratic procurement system, which stretched out the 
process for purchasing broadband platforms by several years.  A competitor, True 
Communications, was able to take advantage of TOT’s slow deployment and has 
expanded its broadband market without any significant competition.  A former official 
with the Ministry of ICT suggests that this lack of competition within the market has led 
to expensive and low-capacity broadband services from a private company that are 
limited only to the capital.  
The demand for ICT services already exists in Thailand, but high prices and poor 
customer service are preventing adoption rates for broadband and other services from 
taking off (Jirachaipravit, 2007).  Fixed line telephony and broadband penetration is 
below average for Thailand’s level of economic and technological development in 
comparison to its economic peers.  However, the country was further behind in 2000, 
prompting the government to begin working on efforts to catch up to its neighboring 
countries through an ICT policy and institutional reform process.  Although broadband 
adoption rates are improving, this higher demand is driven largely by affluent customers 
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in the capital rather than specific government intervention.  This has led to adoption 
within some segments of the population, particularly within planned communities, that 
can now access broadband service.  In response, service providers have begun developing 
plans for deploying voice and data services to compete.  However, this has yet to 
substantially increase services within the market. 
Another former state-owned company, CAT, had a monopoly on international 
internet gateways until it was opened up recently by the national regulator, with licenses 
pending for several service providers.  CAT was also its own regulator, like TOT, and 
was also able to offer concessions to operators within the market, creating both market 
competition and regulatory confusion under the previous structure.  Several interviewees 
within the government and at competing carriers argued that under the CAT monopoly, 
the cost of international bandwidth was prohibitively expensive, increasing the costs of 
hosting and international data transport.  These high costs have limited the country’s 
opportunities within the business process outsourcing market, which has grown rapidly as 
offshore back-office centers have begun opening in Thailand’s Southeast Asian neighbors 
(Ismail, 2003).  Specifically, the higher traffic costs offset Malaysia’s and Singapore’s 
higher labor costs, reducing Thailand’s competitive advantages in the market.  In another 
recent example, a government agency was forced to host an international website because 
the cost of supporting international traffic to the site would be four times the cost in 
Thailand.  Mobile operator AIS was the first company aside from the former state-run 
monopoly to receive a license from the national regulator to lease international internet 
gateway facilities and offer services.  Previously the company had leased an international 
trunk from CAT for international calling, which left AIS with only a 22 percent share of 
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international revenues according to company officials.  AIS was the first to apply for the 
license and others, including fixed line operator TT&T, have applied and expect to 
receive theirs soon as well.  Although this market is opening up with new international 
gateway licensees, so far these new providers have been slow to reduce international 
connectivity costs within the market.   
TT&T, the former monopoly provider, had a concession under the old regulatory 
structure to offer services to rural provincial customers.  Unfortunately, the concession 
fee for TT&T, which was set through auction at 42 percent of gross revenue, is a 
symptom of the government’s focus on government income rather than services to the 
population.  With this high burden of the concession fee, TT&T’s spokespersons 
suggested that the company’s business model quickly became unsustainable.  TT&T was 
able to win the concession auction through its high bid; but because it was not based on a 
sound business model, the company has consistently lost money as a result.  With their 
rural business losing money and little competition within the broadband market, the 
owners of TT&T started a new venture called TTT to deliver broadband services.  
Because the previous concession did not allow for broadband services, the company has 
been forced to secure a new broadband license from the national regulator, which is much 
less costly than the concession from TOT.  Although this will help bring competition to 
Thailand’s broadband market, the convoluted licensing and corporate structure created by 
the regulatory scheme has resulted in significant barriers to market entry that will be 
difficult for additional providers to overcome (Gray, 2004). 
The brightest spot within the Thai competitive landscape is the mobile wireless 
market.  In addition to CAT, TOT, and True mentioned above, there are three other 
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mobile service providers: DTAC, AIS, and Thai Mobile.  The largest providers, AIS and 
DTAC, have an intense competition within the Thai mobile market, driving both 
companies to respond with reduced pricing structures.  These low mobile prices have 
driven the market to several times the size of the fixed line market.  However, there are 
risks within the market.  According to domestic carriers and officials with the national 
regulator, foreign competitors have not been able to sustain their presence within the 
market.  Hutchison, a large multinational provider, attempted to enter the market by 
subsidizing handset costs for subscribers, but was only able to secure 2 percent of the 
market.  At the same time, the high market risks have pushed AIS, DTAC, and Thai 
Mobile to sell to foreign owners to secure access to the financial resources required to 
deploy mobile broadband technology.  Although several providers have received a 3G 
license from the regulator, or are working to request one, not one provider has deployed 
any mobile broadband network infrastructure due to the high costs and regulatory risks.  
Without a clear and stable regulatory environment, no providers will move quickly to 
enter the mobile broadband market, even with the deep pockets of foreign investors to 
support them (Levy, 1994).  This leaves Thailand falling behind its neighbors in terms of 
both adoption levels and the technological evolution of the mobile market. 
Malaysia  
Telekom Malaysia Berhad (TMB), which was incorporated in 1984 and privatized 
in 1990, is the former Malaysian monopoly operator.  Company spokespersons report that 
the company is still partially owned by the government, with a 45 percent stake, but this 
has been reduced from 70 percent in 2000 and may be reduced even further as the 
government’s investment agency considers divesting from the company.  Although the 
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fixed line market has been open to competition for almost 10 years, TMB has continued 
to dominate the market – operating over 95 percent of the fixed lines within the country.  
However, the company has been forced to undergo a transformation as its traditional 
fixed line business erodes – declining annually since 2001 as end users switch to mobile 
phone service due to the high prices and poor performance of the monopoly, according to 
company financial reporting.  Unlike the fixed line market, the mobile sector has robust 
competition and has been growing rapidly for the past 10 years.  The competitive services 
offered by new entrants have stagnated TMB’s own mobile offering, from the wholly 
owned subsidiary Celcom.  Celcom has a significant share of the mobile market, but that 
share has also declined over the past year.  This has driven the company to seek revenue 
growth and margins in nearby markets, such as Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka, 
representing a majority of the company’s total subscribers.  This regional expansion by 
TMB follows the example of Singapore’s SingTel, which has also moved quickly into 
neighboring markets due to market saturation and declining margins in its home market. 
The continued decline in the fixed line market and the market saturation of the 
mobile sector have pushed TMB to refocus its domestic efforts on the broadband sector.  
The government, with its National Broadband Plan, has also sought to accelerate private 
sector investments by expanding the national network infrastructure to increase the 
country’s ability to support broadband services (Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission, 2006).  TMB will utilize its extensive fixed line network to 
quickly deliver broadband services, tapping into the pent up consumer and business 
demand for high-speed connections.  However, this increase in broadband, through voice 
over Internet Protocol services will also create an additional conduit for end users to 
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switch from their traditional telephony services, further eroding the monopoly’s market 
share in favor of competitive providers.   
The significance of TMB’s mobile market position is that no single carrier has the 
market power to limit competition; and through low prices, mobile services have acted as 
a substitute to the fixed line market (Gasmi, 2000).  Although the internet access markets 
still require additional competition, this mobile market circumstance is testimony to the 
benefits of proper privatization and regulation of the market, ensuring that the barriers of 
entry are reduced, that market power is limited to ensure price competition, and that the 
market is stable enough to support investment.   
A competitive operator, Maxis, is the largest mobile service provider and is 
currently moving to capitalize on the opening of wireless broadband licenses by the 
national regulator.  In addition to the wireless offering, the company is also deploying 
fixed line network infrastructure that will compete with TMB’s broadband offerings.  
Like TMB, this operator is also partially owned by the government; but at 20 percent, its 
share of government ownership is significantly lower than that of the former monopoly.  
Due to low margins and mobile market saturation, Maxis has also expanded into 
Indonesia, India, and other Asian countries to ensure revenue growth, competing directly 
with TMB for regional market position. 
The third major mobile operator is DiGi Telecommunications, which is 61 percent 
owned by a foreign operator, Telenor of Norway.  This arrangement runs against the 
national policy on foreign ownership, which limits foreign control to 49 percent.  
However, in interviews, non-governmental telecommunications experts suggested that 
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the government wants to avoid punishing Telenor and driving it out of the market.  As a 
result, the government has been flexible in allowing the company to divest to 49 percent 
with a five-year waiver.  The company has been able to expand its revenues by offering 
new mobile data services.  However, there will be limitations on those offerings.  
According to press releases from the national regulator, DiGi lost its bid to win a license 
for third generation (3G) mobile broadband services due to the regulator’s preference for 
domestic providers and now faces a stiff competitive challenge from these other 
providers.  At the same time, the company is reliant on the domestic wireless market at a 
time when the market is saturated and the other two major operators are expanding 
regionally.  Although the provider’s foreign ownership helps ensure its financial 
sustainability, its relatively weak market power both domestically and regionally suggests 
that the Malaysian mobile sector’s competitive landscape may not be stable over the long 
term.  
The Malaysian regulator’s approach to DiGi demonstrates the careful balance that 
developing countries must have when dealing with foreign owned operators.  The country 
would like to limit FDI within telecommunications companies to 49 percent, but it has 
given Telenor a five-year waiver and has even given the company a one-year extension.  
At the same time, the regulator has offered new 3G licenses to four domestically owned 
operators, giving them an opportunity to compete in the single growth area of the 
saturated Malaysian market, but leaving out DiGi due to its large foreign ownership 
stake.  The national regulator suggested that it must give local firms priority when 
licensing a scarce national resource such as 3G spectrum licenses.  Simultaneously, the 
regulator has encouraged DiGi to seek out a partnership with one of the local firms that 
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have won a license, potentially solving the issues of 3G licensing as well as the foreign 
ownership requirements.  In this case, it does not seem that the regulator’s goal is to 
block foreign participation in mobile broadband services, but to ensure the continued 
market power of the local firms. 
Two new competitors in the market, MiTV Corporation and TT dotCom, are 
using new licenses offered by the regulator to enter the 3G mobile broadband market in 
2007.  These companies, in addition to Maxis and Celcom, beat out DiGi to offer these 
new mobile data services.  The MiTV network will be deployed through a combination of 
domestic and international funding as well as a public offering.  TT dotCom is also using 
this new wireless license, like MiTV, but is focusing on offering residential broadband 
services to fixed locations – competing directly with the DSL services of TMB.  The 
market entrance of these two new providers will expand competition within the mobile 
market, pushing prices lower and driving the existing operators to expand their current 
mobile data network and service deployments. 
It is not easy to determine the correct level of openness within a developing 
country’s telecommunications market (Lall, 1999).  Malaysia has attempted to strike the 
right balance by inviting domestic and foreign operators into the market, but limiting the 
market power of foreign operators through licensing and FDI limits.  These two factors 
influencing the market also interact with one another, making it difficult to gauge how 
the market will react and increasing the likelihood of unintended consequences.  This also 
shows how quickly a developing country – whether it is Malaysia, Thailand, or another 
country – can shift the competitive landscape too heavily in favor of foreign or domestic 
operators.  Developing countries may go through similar stages of ICT adoption and 
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market development.  However, the policies, regulations, and market supports must be 
carefully tailored and continually readjusted to avoid market failures. 
Telecommunications Regulatory Structure  
The creation of an independent commission to design and enforce 
telecommunication regulations is a key component to ensuring a competitive market and 
accelerating ICT adoption (Nambiar, 2006).  Both Thailand and Malaysia have 
undergone this process, creating a regulatory agency, reforming the laws, and privatizing 
the telecom sector’s monopoly.  However, the two countries have had very different 
outcomes, with Thailand facing significant political influence in each of these processes. 
This part of the case study is divided into three components.  The first explores 
the regulatory agencies of both countries.  The second component discusses the 
privatization process of the state-owned telecommunications monopoly, paying particular 
attention to the political issues surrounding privatization in Thailand and the limits this 
flawed process have placed on ICT adoption within the country.  Last, this part examines 
the universal service obligations placed by the national regulators on the incumbent and 
competitive operators in Thailand and Malaysia.  These obligations can raise the 
necessary funds for rapidly expanding access within a developing country, if the 
mechanisms for raising and disbursing the monies are carefully designed and 
implemented. 
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Independent Regulatory Agency 
Thailand  
Recently, Thailand’s government created an independent telecommunications 
regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), which is working to 
rebalance the overall competitive environment of the telecommunications market.  In 
interviews with national regulator officials, they suggested that this was a departure from 
the previous government’s focus on simply balancing carrier competition through 
regulating state-owned service provider structure.  The official went on to suggest that the 
goal of the NTC is to empower stakeholders to manage their own competitive position 
with legitimate means.  Under the 2006 fair trade practices legislation, these regulatory 
reforms include capping tariffs, requiring carriers to unbundle their network elements, 
and develop contracting standards for arrangements between carriers as well as with their 
customers.  This is an “ex post” regulatory action, where the NTC is defining anti-
competitive behavior of existing operators and has been given power by the parliament to 
investigate and fine those in violation of these regulations.  A common example includes 
major carriers utilizing their market power to price squeeze competitors.  The Commision 
hopes that these new regulations will help balance the competitive landscape and open up 
the market to additional investment from both foreign and domestic operators that may 
have been waiting for the reforms before investing. 
This process has been hampered by both institutional and political hurdles 
(Jirachaipravit, 2007).  After the telecommunications law creating the NTC had been 
enacted, but prior to the selection of the commissioners, the NTC’s responsibilities were 
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housed in the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD) and run by its staff.  The staff of this 
parastatal transferred to the NTC once the commissioners were selected, leaving the new 
commission with an encumbering bureaucracy.  Political hurdles have included the major 
carriers sending their proxies to serve on the board of the NTC.  This opened the door to 
criticisms from market watchers claiming that customer-friendly reforms, such as number 
portability, have been slowed down out of deference to the operators.  
For the Thai carriers, it is currently unclear what the regulations will be on 
licensees for broadband, mobile, and other services.  The NTC has reserved the right to 
revisit the issue and set regulations on pricing and universal service, but there is no 
indication of what form that will take or the time frame for this action.  In addition, 
although the NTC is working to set up new regulations in 2007 for interconnection and 
other issues, it is unclear whether these regulations will cover concessionaires such as 
True Corporation in addition to licensees such as TTT.   
The current regulatory structure for the mobile telephone sector is the result of 
difficult political negotiations between the government, the former state-owned 
incumbents, and the mobile wireless carriers.  According to government officials 
interviewed for this research, the country must undergo a lengthy political process to 
unwind the industry from this arrangement to shift to a license-based framework.  Thus 
far, the process of converting the existing concessions into licenses has taken 10 years 
and the NTC expects this process to continue with legal actions taken by carriers to 
change or influence the reforms through the court system.   
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The original concessionaires, the telco providers TOT and CAT, along with the 
private sector licensees all want to reduce their revenue sharing responsibility under the 
new licensing framework created by the NTC.  However, Ministry of Finance officials 
state that these carriers also argue for continuation of the government guarantees that 
existed under the concessionary system.  In essence, this amounts to requesting a greatly 
reduced cost structure while providing monopoly guarantees – a system that would 
simply not be sustainable or competitive.  Similar problems exist across a range of issues 
that are also connected to the competitive footing across providers, such as spectrum 
allocation, tax requirements, and tariff structures.  Each of these issues will need to be 
resolved in concert with the shift to the new licensing structure.  As a result, the process 
has become politicized and publicized as carriers seek out support from various interest 
groups and the public for their demands within the negotiation.  This has slowed down an 
already difficult and lengthy process and was made worse in 2006 due to larger economic 
and political instability. 
Another important reform includes the regulations on the charges carriers apply to 
another carrier for transporting a competitor’s voice or data traffic, known as 
interconnection charges (Jensen, 2005).  This new regulation will allow for private 
arrangements between carriers for transporting competitor traffic through a cost-based 
interconnection system.  This will not include a price ceiling, but these interconnection 
arrangements will be made public and carriers will have to allow other providers the 
same deal.  This will reduce the costs for competitive players to enter the market while 
reducing the likelihood for collusion through private deals.  However, in my interviews 
competitive carriers suggested that these new regulations will certainly give additional 
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market power to the two largest mobile providers, AIS and DTAC.  These providers will 
be able to demand higher prices from the smaller mobile competitors, which are not able 
to buy discounted capacity in bulk, but that do need to access to their competitors’ 
networks to complete a high percentage of their calls.  This may place these smaller 
competitors at a significant disadvantage to the market leaders, potentially limiting long-
term prospects for adoption rates. 
Malaysia  
The telecommunications market had been a monopoly controlled by the precursor 
to TMB, known as Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad (STM), which was run by the 
Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications, and Post.  This ministry was also the 
telecommunications regulator, creating a government-owned and -controlled monopoly 
within the sector.  In 1994, the Ministry instituted a new National Telecommunications 
Policy that began the slow process of liberalizing the sector, according to interviewed 
ministry officials.  This new policy allows new entrants into the market.  However, the 
government reserved the right to limit the total number of competitors to ensure the 
economic viability of the sector. 
In the late 1990s, Malaysia underwent a transformation of its regulatory structure 
and laws (Lee, 2002a).  Malaysia underwent an institutional reform process, renaming the 
Ministry of Telecommunications, Energy, and Post as the Ministry of Energy, 
Communications and Multimedia (MECM) (Painter, 2004).  The change was part of a 
larger effort to adapt government agencies to the technology and convergence that were 
under way within the market between communications, media, and the Internet.  
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Malaysia’s original vision for its transformation into a knowledge society under the 
evolving Vision 2020 plan included developing a content creation and distribution sector 
(Wee, 2003).  By expanding the purview of the Ministry, the government hoped to 
provide additional government support to these efforts.  
At the same time, two national acts were approved in 1998: the Communications 
and Multimedia Act (CMA) and the Communications and Multimedia Commission Act.  
These acts defined the new regulatory and market structure for telecommunications and 
in 1999 created the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), 
which consolidated telecommunications oversight within the country under one entity.  
The MCMC consolidates the regulatory functions that had been housed within the 
Ministry of Energy, Communications and Multimedia, the STM, and the Ministry of 
Information.   
Under the previous structure, the STM was both the operator and directly under 
the Ministry, which limited its ability to act as an impartial monitor of the competitive 
landscape within the market.  Under the new Commission, the regulator now has its own 
budget and staff as well as additional legislative authority to pursue its regulatory 
functions, according to interviews with Commission officials.  These functions include 
the enforcement of regulations, review, and recommendations on licensing applications; 
liaison with industry trade groups; and draft regulations and policy recommendations to 
the MECM.  Although the MCMC provides these policy and licensing recommendations 
to the MECM and is a separate government entity, the Ministry still makes the final 
decision and implements ICT policies.  
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The second act, the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, outlined four 
key areas of regulation that were to be the focus of the Ministry and the Commission to 
support the sector’s transition into a competitive market.  These four areas included 
economic regulations that focused on incentives for operators to balance the competitive 
landscape and to expand ICT access through universal service obligations.  Under the 
previous regulatory structure of the SMT, there were no specific regulations that allowed 
for the enforcement of penalties against anti-competitive behavior.  This is vital if the 
government is to intervene on behalf of telecommunications competitors to prevent the 
abuse of market power by the dominant players. 
This key provision within the act aims to provide the government with the legal 
authority to enforce regulations against anti-competitive behavior by operators.  Abuse of 
this market power can limit the financial viability of competitive operators, reducing their 
share of the market and limiting service access, affordability, and reliability (Levy, 1994).  
Yet, the provisions of the CMA allow for these anti-competitive actions to be ignored if 
they are within the national interest.  In addition, only the Ministry may deem actions to 
be anti-competitive, rather than the MCMC, which further expands the opportunities for 
regulatory capture.   
The act also included technical regulations such as security and service 
specifications for telecom operators as well as interoperability requirements between the 
operators.  These interoperability requirements are important to prevent larger operators 
from using their market power to undermine new entrants into the sector.  The third and 
fourth areas of the act were consumer and social regulations, which ensured service 
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reliability and affordability along with incentives to local content developers and 
distributors to promote Malaysian culture. 
The creation of the MCMC and the CMA policy structure allowed the market to 
begin the process of rebalancing the competitive landscape, giving new entrants the 
opportunity to compete cost-effectively against the former monopoly.  However, there 
have been several criticisms of the current regulatory system (Nambiar, 2006).  For the 
MCMC to meet international regulatory best practices, the body would need to operate 
with more transparency, offering a public view into its deliberations and 
recommendations.  Not all of the policy and regulatory recommendations offered by the 
MCMC to the MECM are made publicly available, limiting the overall transparency of 
the Commission.  
More importantly, the government is currently represented in the MCMC by one 
of the five commissioners – and all five commissioners are chosen by directly the 
Ministry.  This suggests that the Commission is not as independent as it needs to be – a 
circumstance that is complicated further by the predominance of the Ministry over 
regulatory and policy decisions.  There is also little the Commission can do to act as an 
impartial third party in disputes between operators or act as an appeals body for operators 
that wish to contest a decision handed down by the Ministry.   
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Telecommunications Privatization Process  
Thailand  
Due to the ad hoc nature of the privatization process within Thailand, several 
operators have their own sector within the market where they are an incumbent carrier 
(Hossain, 2003).  The privatization process and the introduction of competition began as 
a result of membership into the WTO.  The overall market has improved greatly over the 
past five years.  However, regulatory reform efforts have ebbed and flowed.  This has 
forced the NTC to play catch-up now as the country has seen its competitors accelerate 
their reforms and ICT adoption rates even faster in the same time period.  
Under a recent Corporatization Act, the government developed a structured 
process for privatizing state-owned enterprises.  This act required the SOE to create a 
committee of government, union, and industry officials dedicated to the privatization 
process and outlines the requirements for the oversight tasks that must be completed over 
the course of privatization.  Experts in law, telecommunications, and finance from the 
academic community are also included along with officials from other SOEs.  Ministry of 
Finance officials stated in interviews that members of the committee are required to be 
free of any conflicts of interest and cannot be associated with the privatizing SOE.  The 
committee approval carries a great deal of weight; the cabinet only has review authority 
and cannot veto the approval.  Unfortunately, the process for committee review has not 
been transparent because the proceedings and positions are not made public.  Because the 
process itself is not transparent and the committee has so much independent power, all of 
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the checks and balances are over committee member selection.  As a result, there is little 
effort to improve the transparency and operations of these committees. 
During the same period, the parliament moved the regulatory oversight of SOEs 
from the Ministry of Finance to Thailand’s Securities and Exchange Commission.  The 
goal was to transfer the investment burden back onto the state enterprise rather than the 
central government.  To help achieve this goal, the government guarantee was withdrawn 
from many SOEs.  To create a migration path for these companies, the government 
developed a sliding scale, where if the corporatized SOE is still more than 75 percent 
owned by the government, the guarantee is still in place.  If the ownership is over 50 
percent, then the SOE can request the guarantee.  The government hoped that by moving 
away from government guarantees, which act as incentives against efficient operation, 
they would be able to help shift the focus of the SOEs from simply expanding 
infrastructure to market-optimized service delivery. 
In the telecommunications markets of most countries, carriers build, own, and 
operate (BOO) the network infrastructure (Smith, 1995).  In Thailand, the concessionaire 
carriers were operating under build, transfer, operate (BTO) regulations, meaning that the 
state-owned enterprises TOT and CAT legally own the networks that are built by their 
concessionaires in addition to the large fees collected based on revenues.  To transition 
the market and increase incentives for private investment, committees were set up to 
direct this concession conversion process.  This process required the industry to move 
from BTO to BOO and provide carrier licenses to each of the market’s competitors.   
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According to an official with the Ministry of Finance, this process was created 
based on input from international experts and best practices from other developing 
countries.  The regulatory instability of the telecommunications market undermined the 
process almost from the beginning.  The act changed the SOE’s corporate practices, 
allowing for more flexible hiring, labor standards, procurement, budgeting, and 
accounting that were not possible as a public-sector company.  However, it did not 
require a change in the SOE’s structure or give the Ministry of Finance the necessary 
powers to evaluate whether restructuring was necessary under the privatization process.  
The Ministry could not break up an SOE into component pieces or structure several 
overlapping subsidiaries under a holding company.  The end result was that the Ministry 
could not ensure the newly privatized SOE would not be able to abuse its market power 
to limit the competitive market environment.   
The first two state-owned enterprises to undergo this new process were TOT and 
CAT.  The process lasted over two years for each of them and required lengthy 
discussions around the membership of new boards of directors and the corporate structure 
of the newly privatized companies.  Although both fought and stalled the process, due to 
concerns about leaving the comfort zone of government support, the TOT privatization 
was relatively easy because the company was remaining under the same corporate 
structure.  TOT was simply transferring ownership from public to private hands and the 
company had anticipated the transition.  An official at the national regulator stated that 
TOT had even set up a privatization office eight years earlier. 
The Ministry of Finance official stated that the process for CAT was more 
difficult than TOT because CAT was being split into two companies: a telecom provider 
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and the post office.  Although TOT was viewed as financially sustainable, there was 
concern that CAT’s telecom business would not be able to survive as a stand-alone 
company without the post office.  There were discussions around merging CAT and 
TOT, but this was tabled due to the different corporate cultures and political concerns 
over the market power of the new entity.  These concerns about CAT’s sustainability 
turned out to be well founded.  Although the post office became an example of a 
profitable and successful SOE transition, the telecom operator is quickly losing its 
financial viability.   
After this lengthy process and only limited success in telecommunications market, 
the Thai government limited the oversight tasks and sped up the process for the other 
SOEs undergoing privatization, according to both governmental officials and outside 
experts.  A state-run fuel company, PTT, was privatized in only five meetings – pushed 
through by support from its previous benefactor, the Ministry of Industry.  The capital 
airport was also privatized just as quickly, leaving little time for forging a liberalized and 
competitive market within these sectors.  In addition, both of these entities had police 
powers and were able to keep these powers once they were privatized.  In a telling 
example, the Ministry did not have the political capital to remove these powers during the 
corporatization process, resulting in private entities having police powers.  It is this lack 
of transparency, political considerations, and rushed process that has left these privatized 
sectors without clear regulatory structures or competitive environments.  This short-
sightedness has severely limited the growth potential of these sectors, including 
telecommunications, limiting the supply, quality, and price reductions one could expect 
from the corporatization of a state-owned industry. 
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Malaysia  
The privatization process in Malaysia started in the 1980s and was prompted by 
rising government deficits – leading the government to seek out quick revenue sources 
such as privatizing the telecommunications monopoly.  This process was also sparked by 
the government’s conclusion that the private sector was in the best position to expand the 
market, allowing the government to reduce its administrative burden of deploying and 
maintaining the national network (Lee, 2002b).  This is a central position that the 
government continues to demonstrate through its ICT policies, creating a supportive role 
for the government within the sector rather than that of a lead financier and arbiter of 
market developments (Ritchie, 2005).     
The monopoly provider Telekom Malaysia Berhad, renamed from Syarikat 
Telekom Malaysia Berhad in the mid-1980s, was taken public in 1990.  Originally, only a 
quarter of the company was owned by the private sector, growing slowly to 30 percent by 
2000.  Over the past several years, this transition has accelerated, giving the private 
sector a 65 percent stake with the possibility of increasing in the near term.  The 
government continues to hold a golden share, allowing it to veto company decisions that 
are deemed to be adverse to the national interest.  A similar arrangement has been made 
in other privatized monopolies, both in Malaysia and in Thailand, as well as within 
developed countries that have undergone the privatization process. 
Although the national regulator has offered licenses for the fixed line and mobile 
sectors, Malaysia has not been successful at opening its fixed line market.  As mentioned 
above, this market continues to be dominated by TMB, which has not seen its market 
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share or power decline since liberalization.  These offerings were not able to gain market 
share, despite the national regulator offering five fixed line licenses.  This is due to the 
high capital costs of entering the fixed line market, which has kept out competitive 
offerings according to competitive carriers in Malaysia.  This limited competitive 
situation has been true within both developed and developing countries.  Even in the US 
market, there is little fixed line competition to the former monopolies with the exception 
of the cable companies – operators that spent decades building out their own parallel 
fixed line networks. 
In contrast, as noted above, the liberalization of the mobile market has been much 
more successful.  With significantly lower capital costs, several mobile providers have 
been able to compete cost-effectively against the former monopoly (Proenza, 2006).  In 
addition to Celcom, TMB’s subsidiary in the mobile market, three other licenses were 
granted to operators.  These three competitive companies began operations in the mid-
1990s and have since merged into two players, with Maxis leading the market.  The 
mobile sector, in contrast to the fixed line sector, is marked by price competition, service 
expansion, and market saturation. 
The third major market to undergo liberalization is the Internet access sector, 
which had previously been served by monopoly provider JARING since the 1980s.  This 
Internet service provider is a subsidiary of the MIMOS research and development group, 
a government-owned entity.  In 1996, the market was opened to TMB to begin offering 
dial-up services.  At this time, the government still had a controlling stake in TMB, 
making the only two licensed ISPs both government controlled.  In 1998, the market was 
further liberalized and opened to five new licensees to deliver Internet services, of which 
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only three deployed services.  There has been some competition within the dial-up 
market, with TMB’s market power declining but still representing over 50 percent of 
market share as of 2005.  Meanwhile, company reports state that TMB still represents 
over 90 percent of the broadband market.   
The other licensees, such as Maxis, have focused their competitive deployments 
within the more lucrative business market.  This has left the larger consumer market 
without significant broadband competition, allowing TMB to avoid price competition 
while minimizing the costs of expanding its network.  This is not surprising because 
TMB has over 95 percent of the fixed line market.  Fixed copper line infrastructure is 
required for DSL deployment; and without cost-effective access to these lines, no 
competitor will be able to capture a significant share of the fixed line broadband market 
(Proenza, 2006).  Malaysia has not been able to utilize the national regulator to set 
requirements on TMB, such as forcing the incumbent to allow competitors access to 
wholesale broadband services that they can sell as retail services.  The US has faced a 
similar market failure.  It has not been able to mitigate the market power of the former 
incumbents to allow new entrants to overcome this barrier to entry. 
This may change in Malaysia with the deployment of broadband mobile solutions, 
which could open the market up to a new wave of competition.  However, it is unclear 
whether these services will be successful in Malaysia, as they have been in Japan and 
Korea, where uptake has been high.  Many other developed countries, most notably in 
Western Europe, have few subscribers despite spending vast sums on infrastructure and 
spectrum.  If the market can reach a critical mass in Malaysia, it may become a 
technological work-around for competitive carriers, like Maxis, to offer a full range of 
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telecommunications services over their wireless networks – avoiding the time and 
resources necessary to deploy a parallel fixed line network. 
Universal Service 
Thailand  
A key component to Thailand’s reforms is the launch and management of the 
universal service fund.  According to officials with the national regulator, the obligation 
is set at four percent; but it is unclear how growing broadband revenues will be dealt with 
or if the universal service fund will be used to deploy broadband infrastructure in addition 
to traditional fixed line infrastructure.  The universal service obligation for carriers was a 
requirement under the telecom legislation.  However, there is little guidance to the NTC 
on implementation.   
Several open questions remain, including whether all carriers should pay into the 
fund; and of those that are included, whether the treatment of wholesale carriers should 
differ from retail providers.  Another key question is the implementation of the tax on a 
sliding scale that depends on the current levels of infrastructure deployment within rural 
areas, which allows providers to reduce their USO from the full 4 percent.  Most 
important, the regulator still needs to define the policy mechanism for injecting the 
universal service funds into the market, whether that is through direct subsidy to 
customers or to the providers for their deployments to under-served areas (Gasmi, 2000).   
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Malaysia 
For the Malaysian USF, broadband is also part of the universal service obligation; 
added to the USO by the cabinet in 2005, targeting areas with lower than average 
penetration rates.  The USF is managed by the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission, the governmental entity that is responsible for determining the 
level of USF support by region and collects the six percent fees from telecom operators.  
MCMC officials stated in my interviews that 89 areas within Malaysia are receiving 
funds, and telecom operators bid in a tender process to win the opportunity to build 
infrastructure within these areas, with a single winner of the tender per region.  The 
universal service fund also continues to support deployment of the PSTN to households 
and payphones in low-income and rural areas.   
The government has set the national goal of 25 percent broadband penetration for 
households based on wireline deployment of ADSL infrastructure (Malaysian 
Communications and Multimedia Commission, 2006).  In 2005, the MCMC stated in its 
report that the country had 1.3 million subscribers or 23 percent of households connected 
with broadband.  The key component of this deployment initiative uses government 
intervention to spur private sector investment in areas that have little or no infrastructure.  
This intervention continues until the area reaches five percent penetration, which the 
government has determined through demand modeling as the level required to develop a 
critical mass of private sector support.  After this five percent threshold, the government 
begins to throttle back its broadband support and encourages private service providers to 
enter the region. 
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Conclusions 
These two cases demonstrate the limitations of using regression modeling to 
analyze ICT adoption across developing countries.  The indicators that can be quantified 
within a regression model would not adequately explain the differences in Malaysia’s and 
Thailand’s adoption rates.  Both countries were able to claim that they had privatized 
their monopolies, created regulatory agencies, and developed competitive mobile 
markets.  Until the context and details of those accomplishments are analyzed, only then 
do the wide differences in the two countries’ approaches become apparent.  By 
examining these cases, we can begin to understand the underlying causes, such as poor 
policy implementation, of the widely different outcomes in ICT adoption for the two 
countries (Krongkaewa, 2003).  These underlying causes are also vital to other middle-
income countries when formulating the proper policies and approach to implementation. 
Malaysia is only a few years ahead of Thailand in terms of GDP per capita.  
However, the country’s ability to adopt and utilize ICTs has far surpassed that of 
Thailand.  Malaysia was able to accomplish this rapid adoption rate by ensuring that the 
political challenges did not override the economic and technological decision-making 
process of the government – avoiding the costs of poor technology choices that can lock 
in future decisions and hamper development.  Malaysia was also more successful at 
modeling itself after the institutional and regulatory structures of Asia’s top-performing 
economies along with their national ICT policies.  Although Malaysia has supported only 
limited fixed line and broadband development, the country has followed the example of 
South Korea, as written by Amsden, cutting off underperforming political favorites.   
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Rapid acceleration of ICTs can be launched through the reforms completed in 
Thailand, which opened the mobile market to competition.  However, the country was not 
able to sustain this growth for long without the institutional reforms necessary to 
maintain the competitive balance within the market.  Thailand was almost able to match 
Malaysia’s level of mobile adoption in 2003, when both investment and ICT adoption 
flattened.  This was caused by unnecessarily high risks in the market brought on by poor 
regulation within the market.  Thailand had very similar plans and institutions as 
Malaysia, but it did not give them the political capital, budget, or authority to properly 
implement these plans.  Without the ability to fight the market power and political clout 
of the large operators, the ICT agencies were unable to prevent the warping of the ICT 
policy implementation. 
To successfully implement a national ICT strategy and in turn accelerate adoption 
rates, a national government must quickly evolve its role within the market in reaction to 
the changes across technology, end-user demand, and global competition.  It is not 
enough for a government to transition from the monopoly operator to a privatized 
provider; the state must shift from direct to indirect supporter across a range of policies 
and markets – each market evolving at its own pace and requiring its own level of state 
involvement.  This effort is complicated by the rapid changes in technology, end-user 
demand, and global competition – exogenous factors that are well beyond the control of 
the government but have a profound impact on the success of policy implementation.   
If the privatization and regulation processes are flawed by political 
considerations, severe limits will be placed on the government’s ability to implement ICT 
policies no matter how they are formulated.  The privatization process diffuses the market 
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power from the PTT to other operators, allowing for a more balanced competitive 
landscape.  The creation of an independent regulatory agency concentrates the necessary 
authority to sustain the competitiveness of the market while allowing other ICT agencies 
to execute their strategies without political interference.  Without this diffusion of market 
power and the concentrated political control of the regulator, the dominant ICT operators 
will use their political leverage to prevent the evolution of the ICT market, rendering any 
national ICT strategies ineffective. 
The trajectories of economic development and technological innovation do not 
follow one another exactly, but each one influences and overlaps with the other.  A 
middle-income country cannot focus on technological development while ignoring 
economic development without significant development consequences, limiting a 
country’s ability to transition to an advanced services economy.  The recent political 
events in Thailand are limiting both economic and technological development, while 
Malaysia has been better able to manage the transition.  Thailand will be able to regain its 
lost technological footing, but only after it can get its political system in order.  Malaysia 
may not be a candidate for developed country status in 2020, as its prime minister had 
originally envisioned, but it has effectively leveraged its competitive advantages within 
the global economy by bolstering its technology expertise and innovation to expand the 
country’s technology niches.  Malaysia has more work to do to expand its innovative 
capacity.  However, the country will be able to continue on its path of increased ICT 
adoption and economic development for the foreseeable future. 
 224 
Section 4: References 
Abonyi, George. (2005, September). “Policy Reform in Thailand and the Asian 
Development Bank’s Agricultural Sector Program Loan.” Economics and Research 
Department Working Paper, Series No. 71, Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Amsden, Alice. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization.  New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Bassanini, Andrea. (2002). “Growth, Technology Change, and ICT Diffusion: Recent 
Evidence from OECD Countries.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18(3), 324-344. 
Bunnell, Tim. (2002, March). “Multimedia Utopia? A Geographical Critique of High-
Tech Development in Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor.” Antipode, 34(2), 265.  
Feinson, Stephen. (2003, June). “National Innovation Systems Overview and Country 
Cases.” Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Collectives: Understanding The Role of 
Science and Technology Policies in Development.  Eds. Bozeman, Barry et al.  Synthesis 
Report on the Findings of a Project for the Global Inclusion Program of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. 
Firth, Lucy. (2001, April). “Case Study: Broadband, The Case of Malaysia.” Regulatory 
Implications of Broadband Workshop Document 6, ITU New Initiatives Programme.  
Galperin, Hernan. (2005). “Wireless Networks and Rural Development: Opportunities for 
Latin America.” Information Technologies and International Development, 2(3), 47-56. 
Gasmi, F. and J.J. Laffont, W.W. Sharkey. (2000). “Competition, universal service and 
telecommunications policy in developing countries.”  Information Economics and Policy, 
12, 221-248.  
Hobday, Michael. (1999). “Innovation in Electronics in Malaysia.”  Industrial 
Technology Development in Malaysia, 76-106. Eds. Jomo K. S., Greg Felker and Rajah 
Rasiah.  London and New York: Routledge. 
Hossain, L. (2003). “Is a formalised structure a necessary prerequisite for implementing 
national telecommunications plan in developing and developed economies?” 
Technovation, 23, 39–49. 
Hsiao, Frank S. T. and Mei-Chu W. Hsiao. (2003, February). “’Miracle Growth’ in the 
Twentieth Century – International Comparisons of East Asian Development.”  World 
Development, 227-257. 
Ismail, Rahmah and Ishak Yussof. (2003). “Labour market competitiveness and foreign 
direct investment: The case of Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.” Papers in 
Regional Science, 82, 389–402.  
 225 
James, Jeffrey. (2003). Bridging the Global Digital Divide.  Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Jensen, Mike. (2005, September). “Interconnection Costs.” Paper prepared for World 
Summit on the Information Society, Geneve: International Telecommunications Union. 
Jirachaipravit, Ayuth and David Probert. (2007). “Technology management and 
broadband internet regulation: the case of Thailand.” International Journal of 
Technology Management, 40(1-3), 157-175.  
Jomo K.S., Rajah Rasiah, Rokiah Alavi, and Jaya Gopal. (2003). “Industrial Policy and 
the Emergence of Internationally Competitive Manufacturing firms in Malaysia.”  
Manufacturing Competitiveness in Asia: How International Competitive National Firms 
and Industries Developed in East Asia, 106-172.  Ed. Jomo K.S. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
Jomo K. S. (2003). “Growth and Vulnerability Before and After the Asian Crisis: The 
Fallacy of the Universal Model.”  Development and structural change in Asia-Pacific: 
globalising miracles or end of a model?, 171-197. Eds. Martin Andersson and Christer 
Gunnarsson.  London : RoutledgeCurzon. 
Kam, Wong Poh. (1999). “Technological Capability Development by Firms from East 
Asian NIEs: Possible Lessons for Malaysia.” Technology, Competitiveness, and the 
State: Malaysia’s Industrial Technology Policies, 53-64.  Eds. Jomo K.S. and Greg 
Felker.  London: Routledge. 
Krongkaewa, Medhi and Nanak Kakwani. (2003). “The growth–equity trade-off in 
modern economic development: the case of Thailand.” Journal of Asian Economics, 14, 
735–757. 
Lall, Sanjaya. (1999). “Technology Policy and Competitiveness in Malaysia.”  
Technology, Competitiveness, and the State: Malaysia’s Industrial Technology Policies, 
148-179.  Eds. Jomo K.S. and Greg Felker.  London: Routledge. 
Lallana, Emmanuel C. (2004). “An Overview of ICT Policies and e-Strategies of Select 
Asian Economies.” United Nations Development Programme-Asia Pacific Development 
Information Programme, Reed Elsevier India Private Limited. 
Lee, Cassey. (2002a, March). “Telecommunications Reforms in Malaysia” Centre on 
Regulation and Competition, University of Malaya, Working Paper Series Paper No. 20. 
Lee, Cassey. (2002b, September). “The Institutional and Policy Framework for 
Regulation and Competition in Malaysia Regulation, Competition and Development: 
Setting a New Agenda.” CRC International Workshop, University of Manchester. 
Levy, Brian and Pablo T. Spiller. (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of 
Law, Economics and Organization. 
 226 
Li, Wei, Christine Zhen-Wei Qiang, and Lixin Colin Xu. (2005). “Regulatory Reforms in 
the Telecommunications Sector in Developing Countries: The Role of Democracy and 
Private Interests.” World Development, 33(8), 1307-1324. 
Lim, Phillip Wonhyuk. (2000, May). “Path Dependence in Action: The Rise and Fall of 
the Korean Model of Economic Development.”  Research Fellow, Korea Development 
Institute. 
Nambiar, Shankaran. (2006, November). “Enhancing Institutions and Improving 
Regulation: The Malaysian Case.” EABER Working Paper Series Paper No. 4, Paper 
prepared for discussion at the Microeconomic Foundations of Economic Performance in 
East Asia Conference, Manila. 
Painter, Martin. (2004, July). “The Politics of Administrative Reform in East and 
Southeast Asia: From Gridlock to Continuous Self-Improvement?” Governance: An 
International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 17(3), 361–386.  
Proenza, Francisco J. (2006). “The road to broadband development in developing 
countries is through competition driven by wireless and internet telephony.” Information 
Technologies and International Development, 3(2) 21-39. 
Ramasamy, B., A. Chakrabarty, and M. Cheah. (2004). “Malaysia’s leap into the future: 
an evaluation of the multimedia super corridor.” Technovation, 24, 871–883. 
Ranis, Gustav. (1989, September). “The Role of Institutions in Transition Growth: The 
East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries,” World Development, 17(9), 1443-1453. 
Rasiah, Rajah. (2003). “Foreign ownership, technology and electronics exports from 
Malaysia and Thailand.” Journal of Asian Economics, 14, 785–811. 
Ritchie, Bryan. (2005). “Coalitional Politics, Economic Reform, and Technological 
Upgrading in Malaysia.” World Development, 33(5), 745–761. 
Shari, Ishak. (2003). “Economic Growth and Social Development in Malaysia, 1971-98:  
Does the State still matter in an era of Economic Globalisation?” Development and 
structural change in Asia-Pacific: globalising miracles or end of a model?, 109-124. Eds. 
Martin Andersson and Christer Gunnarsson.  London: RoutledgeCurzon.   
Smith, Peter. (1995). “Subscribing to Monopoly: The Telecom Monopolist’s Lexicon—
Revisited.” World Bank, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Network, Viewpoint 
53, Washington, D.C. 
Wah, Lai Yew and Suresh Narayanan. (1999). “Technology Utilization Level and 
Choice: The Electronics and Electrical Sector in Penang, Malaysia.” Industrial 
Technology Development in Malaysia, 107-124. Eds. Jomo K. S., Greg Felker and Rajah 
Rasiah.  London and New York: Routledge. 
 227 
Wallsten, Scott. (2002, February). “Does Sequencing Matter? Regulation and 
Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms.” World Bank Working Paper. 
Wee, Victor. (2003, July). “Vision 2020 and Enhancing Competitiveness.” Prime 
Leadership and Management Course, 28(2), Intan: Bukit Kiara.  
Wong, Poh-Kam. (2002). “ICT production and diffusion in Asia: Digital dividends or 
digital divide?” Information Economics and Policy, 14, 167-187. 
Wong, P. (1999). “National Innovation Systems for Rapid Technological Catch-up: An 
Analytical Framework and a Comparative Analysts of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.” 
Paper presented at the DRUID’s summer conference, Rebild, Denmark. 
World Bank. (2006). “World Bank development indicators data base 2006.” Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Yankee Group, (2007). “Asia Mobile Forecast 2007.” Boston, MA: Yankee Group. 
Zysman, John. (1983). Government, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the 
Politics of Industrial Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Zysman, John. (1994). “How Institutions Create Historically-Rooted Trajectories of 
Growth” Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(1). 
  
Section 5: Institutional Structure and Fostering ICT 
Utilization in Malaysia and Thailand 
 
Introduction 
One of the key components of East Asia’s success has been the creation of 
national institutions, which have successfully supported technology adoption within these 
countries.  By advancing national technology capacity, a country’s technology 
institutions are an important contributor to economic development (Feinson, 2003).  
Despite the increased international competition for high-skilled workers and investment, 
Malaysia and Thailand have managed to build economies with increasing levels of 
technology adoption and utilization.  These advancements have come through a 
combination of indigenous capacity building and international investment from 
multinational corporations (MNCs), both of which were closely directed by the national 
technology institutions (Hsiao, 2003).  
This aspect of government involvement in the ICT sector includes supporting the 
increased utilization of communications technologies across a broad range of sectors 
within the economy.  This would include increasing availability of ICT applications to 
individuals and organizations within the public, business, and educational sectors in the 
economy as well as among consumers.  Penetration rates for telephones and the Internet 
can increase steadily within a country, but utilization rates for these technologies may not 
expand without government initiatives, particularly within poor and rural areas.  Middle-
 229 
income countries may not experience the productivity and developmental benefits of 
ICTs, which have been measured within OECD countries, without public sector support 
to ensure that these benefits are diffused across the country (Schreyer, 2002).   
By focusing on ICT utilization in addition to access, government efforts can 
support productivity gains across economic sectors within middle-income countries.  This 
institutional support for increased utilization can take many forms, including 
government-supported technology training; aggregating demand and serving as an anchor 
tenant; fostering e-government, e-health, and other services; universal service funds; and 
governmental safeguards for services such as e-commerce (Frieden, 2005).  The 
communications services will need to be adapted to the needs of the local economic, 
political, and cultural environment, particularly if these services are originally introduced 
by an international entity.  To meet local requirements, these national efforts require 
public-private-university coordination to successfully adapt ICT services imported 
internationally and to enhance services created indigenously (Balaji and Keniston, 2005).   
For these policies, it is important to distinguish between countries operating on 
the technology frontier and those that are transferring and adapting technologies from 
other countries (Steinmueller, 2001).  The major issue with developing countries 
attempting to catch up technologically is when the skill sets of the workforce developing 
under one economic stage are not adequate to adapt to the new stage (Steinmueller, 
2001).  ICTs can assist in the knowledge transfer and the lowering of required skill sets 
for employees.  However, this still requires a baseline level of capability (David, 1997).  
In addition to a lack of local expertise, progress in technology adoption can also be 
slowed by market structures that limit innovation and competition, reliance on poor local 
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infrastructure that hampers technology adoption (such as relying on low-quality phone 
lines for Internet access), and distribution problems due to geographic and market 
constraints. 
Supporting ICT utilization requires government intervention to ignite and support 
the innovation process within the country.  In addition to public-private cooperation, this 
effort requires governmental intervention to ensure spillovers between MNC branch sites, 
free trade zones, and entrepreneurial incubators and the rest of the economy (Storm, 
2005).  This process is easily susceptible to concentrating investment as well as societal 
benefits and positive externalities.  Within a developing country, lack of transparency can 
lead to a single city becoming the sole beneficiary of the ICT investment and policies 
(Porter, 1998).  The government needs to focus on accelerating innovation, increasing 
utilization, and diffusing benefits simultaneously to receive the full economic benefit that 
ICTs can have on a country.  So far, few developing country governments have 
demonstrated that they are capable of launching an effort like this, let alone making it 
politically and economically sustainable for the long term. 
Research Questions 
This case study approach will outline the economic, political, and technological 
environments of Thailand and Malaysia, highlighting the key policy and institutional 
choices that have resulted in their respective technological utilization rates.  This case 
study analysis will focus on the growing gap between the two countries, where Thailand 
has not been able to keep pace with Malaysia, which has accelerated its ICT utilization 
rate.  Malaysia has achieved this by successfully completing a series of ICT institutional 
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and policy reforms that have created a competitive ICT market while directly supporting 
the local ICT industry.  This case study section relies on the same secondary and primary 
sources detailed in Section 4 to examine the commonalities and differences in ICT 
institutions and policies between the two countries.  This ICT utilization study is driven 
by the following research questions: 
• Is development of a domestic ICT sector a key component of larger ICT adoption 
efforts?   
• Are institutional reforms necessary to sustain the growth in the local ICT sector? 
• What lessons can be drawn from the examples of Malaysia and Thailand for other 
middle-income developing countries?   
This section is divided into four parts.  The first outlines the economic and 
technological context for Malaysia and Thailand with a detailed focus on international 
investment and technology transfer.  The second part offers a detailed look at the ICT 
institutions, including the ministries of ICT and science.  This part includes a discussion 
of the evolution of these institutions, the cross-border influence between the two 
countries, and the organizational challenges facing these agencies.  The third part 
provides an overview of the design and implementation process for the national ICT 
policies as well as the key challenges facing the national institutions in implementing 
these policies.  The final part includes a discussion of the conclusions drawn from these 
two cases on the government’s role in improving ICT utilization. 
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Economic and Technological Environments in Thailand and 
Malaysia 
Both countries are at a crossroads in their development; neither can safely rely on 
manufacturing alone to spur economic growth.  Exhibit 5.1 summarizes key national 
indicators for the two countries plus Singapore’s indicators for comparison.  The national 
ICT policies are at the center of the government’s attempt to create new economic 
opportunities while improving its ability to compete globally. 
Exhibit 5.1: National Economic and ICT Indicators for Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore 
Economic Indicators, 2005 Thailand Malaysia Singapore 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 7,720 9,681 26,390 
Services, value added (% of GDP) 46 40 66 
Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 2.6 3.0 17.2 
Urban population (% of total) 32 67 100 
Technology Indicators, 2005 
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 110 172 425 
Mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 469 771 1010 
Internet users (per 1,000 people) 159 435 571 
Broadband subscribers (per 1,000 people) 9 19 153 
ICT expenditure (% of GDP) 4.1 7.0 9.4 
High-technology exports (% of manufactured 
exports) 27 55 57 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2005. 
Malaysia is a great example of a developing country that has focused almost 
singularly on technology development through foreign investment.  While attracting a 
great deal of foreign direct investment, the country’s economy has grown dependent on 
exporting MNC goods to foreign markets (Blomstrom, 1998).  The industry is moving 
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slowly toward designing and innovating its own products.  However, currently many of 
Malaysia’s manufacturing facilities are low on the global supply chain.   
Many developing countries have shifted their focus from deploying fixed lines to 
wireless penetration.  Malaysia has managed to push both wireline and wireless 
infrastructure, with average penetration for wireline doubling since the 1990s despite a 
slowdown in growth during the Asian crisis.  Wireless access grew even faster, managing 
to slightly outnumber landlines in less than a decade.  A number of areas within the 
country, particularly outside the Malay Peninsula, have been neglected during the rapid 
increase in teledensity.  This lack of telecommunications infrastructure in these areas also 
highlights a larger problem of concentrated investment and governmental support to the 
detriment of the rest of the economy (James, 2003).   
Thailand closely studies its neighbors to benchmark its own ICT policies and 
institutional structure.  When Thailand was implementing structural reform in 2002, 
Malaysia was undergoing a similar effort and Thailand ended up mirroring Malaysia’s 
ICT institutional restructuring.  Now that Thailand is working on a second round of ICT 
reforms, it has looked to Malaysia again to see how its ICT structures have evolved.  
Despite being very concerned about losing international investment to Malaysia, 
Thailand does not have the high levels of governmental coordination and marketing that 
other Southeast Asian economies do.  Thailand is currently competing with countries that 
have low-cost labor, such as China, as well as countries with high levels of skilled labor, 
like Singapore.  
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International Investment and Technology Transfer 
The section below discusses FDI, MNCs, and the role of technology transfer 
because these issues are vitally important to the creation and expansion of a developing 
county’s ICT sector. 
Thailand 
An important component to the development of local industries and the 
acceleration of technology adoption is the foreign investment and technology transfer 
from global corporations located in Thailand (Jansen, 1995).  Like other developing 
countries, Thailand’s high-tech industries in particular must rely on international 
investment and technology transfers (Kohpaiboon, 2006).  Through technology and 
knowledge transfer from these MNCs to local branches and suppliers, a developing 
country can rapidly expand the capabilities of local industry to adopt and utilize 
technologies.  Thailand has attracted significant amounts of FDI into its economy, 
reaching over 6 percent of GDP before the financial crisis in 1997.  However, the country 
has not been able to expand this investment since the technology collapse in 2001 (World 
Bank, 2006).  In addition, successful diffusion requires government intervention as well 
as coordination with the private sector to ensure that these technologies diffuse 
throughout the economy rather than concentrate within a single industry or region.  
Thailand has not been able to address this issue.  In addition, the government has failed to 
directly link its approach to foreign direct investment with its efforts to enhance local 
technological capabilities.  This is in contrast with Malaysia and Singapore, which were 
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able to utilize FDI to expand local technology capabilities and accelerate adoption 
(Wong, 1999).  
According to interviews that I completed with the Ministries of ICT, Finance, and 
others, there are increasing concerns within Thailand about losing MNC investment to 
neighboring countries.  Although FDI incentive efforts are run by the Office of the Board 
of Investment, Thailand does not have the high levels of governmental coordination 
incentives, or marketing that other Southeast Asian economies use to increase their 
foreign investment.  Several government officials each commented that Thailand is 
currently competing with low-cost countries, such as China and Vietnam, with which it 
cannot compete on price, and countries such as Malaysia and Singapore that have a much 
higher level of available talent for ICT and S&T.  This situation makes it particularly 
difficult for Thailand to attract investment in technology sectors, which are deemed 
strategically important to the long-term growth of the economy.   
As mentioned above, one key issue facing Thailand is the fact that it does not 
offer tailored packages for industry sectors, even those targeted by the S&T Master Plan, 
such as biotechnology.  The government offers one incentive package that has lower 
hurdles for importing capital and employees as well as preferable terms for taxes, leases, 
and other benefits.  However, unlike neighboring Malaysia and Singapore, these 
packages are not tailored to fit the needs of particular industries, which may be capital-, 
resource-, or labor-intensive, reducing the effectiveness of the government’s effort.  In 
response to this need, officials at Thailand’s science ministry stated that they are 
currently working with the Board of Investment to put together a tailored package for the 
hard disk drive industry to attract companies such as Seagate and Fujitsu. 
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The Thai government began work on a bi-lateral Free Trade Agreement with the 
US that will increase US investment while opening the market to additional US-based 
MNCs.  The officials at the ministries of science and finance stated that the agreement 
would also begin to lower the protections around the Thai technology sectors, affecting 
the status of fledgling industries, such as the local software sector, and making them 
vulnerable to international competition.  In turn, Thai government officials argued that 
this agreement would put pressure on the science ministry and other agencies to support 
these ICT and S&T industries against increased competition from US firms moving into 
the market.  The negotiations have stalled in 2007 due to political instability in Thailand 
along with internal Thai governmental divisions on the benefit of the agreement.   
A major component to enhancing local ICT industry development is the creation 
of a venture capital industry that invests in startups that are either commercializing local 
research or adapting international technology to the local market (Ramasamy, 2004).  The 
local Thai venture capital (VC) community organized itself into the Thai Venture Capital 
Association in 1994, with members from the financial, accounting, legal, and advisory 
services industries.  The VC community focuses its investments on firms that have 
reached their expansion stage.  As a result, Thailand faces significant hurdles supporting 
early round startups with adequate financial backing due to the high levels of risk – a 
common problem for many developing countries.  The Thai government has supported 
the expansion of the small venture capital community through tax incentives and a 
number of government-backed funds (Intarakumnerd, 2004).  These VC funds target both 
small business development and areas affected by the financial crisis, seeking to fill in 
gaps left by the private sector.     
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In addition to the private sector, Thai enterprises also tap international lender 
sources such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and particularly firms that were 
state-owned enterprises, according to officials at the Ministry of Finance.  A majority of 
this international funding comes through bi-lateral sources, such as the Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC).  The last ADB loan – which was part of the emergency 
loans of the International Monetary Fund bailout package after the financial crises of 
1997 – was paid off in 2003.  Thailand used JBIC funding to support new power plants 
and the new international airport in Bangkok.  These sources of funding are important to 
Thai SOEs because many of them operate at a significant loss but remain vital to the 
deployment of national infrastructure (Ali, 2003).   
Malaysia 
Malaysia has been very successful at attracting FDI and MNCs in the 
manufacturing and IT sectors, reaching a level few developing countries can match 
(Jomo, 1997).  Hundreds of MNCs and billions of dollars in FDI have flowed into the 
country, particularly into the free trade zones (FTZ) and technology parks set up near the 
regional manufacturing and technology centers.  This includes over 1,700 technology 
companies – both domestic and international – in Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor 
as of 2007, according to the MSC’s online reporting.  Government officials interviewed 
for this research suggest that there is close coordination across government ministries as 
well as between the private and public sectors to promote targeted ICT sectors.  The 
public and private sectors also develop FDI incentive programs, creating packages 
tailored to specific firms and sectors.  Fueled by these foreign corporations, Malaysia has 
become a top exporter globally, boosting economic growth and local incomes.  Of 
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particular importance is the IT sector, which has grown rapidly through the involvement 
of foreign capital and MNCs.  The government has been able to attract a wide range of 
software and IT MNCs, and meet its internal targets for relocating firms within the 
technology parks, even after the global technology downturn in the early part of the 
decade.  This resilience despite downturns at home and abroad is a testament to the 
coordinated efforts of the public and private sectors to attract technology transfer, 
investment, and employment opportunities.  
Few ASEAN countries approach the high rate of FDI that Malaysia has 
maintained during the past 10 years, reaching 9 percent of GDP.  However, Singapore is 
the other notable exception.  The country was able to maintain investment through the 
financial crisis and saw a brief decline in 2001 due to the global technology slowdown.  
In 2004, its FDI rate was 4 percent of GDP and increasing year-over-year.  Both Korea 
and Japan averaged around 2 percent of FDI during their development phases, preferring 
instead to use licensing agreements with MNCs to foster technology transfer rather than 
direct investments (Ismail, 2003).  This policy choice within Korea and Japan proved to 
be very beneficial in developing indigenous innovation capacity, where Malaysian policy 
is now focused.  Jomo (1997) argues that one of the main political reasons for allowing 
such a high influx of FDI into the country was to balance the economic power between 
the ethnic Malays and the minority ethnic Chinese, which have a disproportionate 
influence within the economy.  The FDI was encouraged by the Malaysian government as 
a way to lower the Chinese minority’s economic influence while supporting the growth 
of Malay-owned firms (Jomo, 2003).  This has allowed the country to rapidly expand its 
global presence within the ICT sectors.  However, it has also increased the country’s 
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dependency on MNCs and FDI.  In addition, several sectors such as the electronics 
industry have not significantly expanded their roles and are limited to providing low-skill 
assembling within the global supply chain.   
This predominance of foreign investment has created a gap in funding available to 
start-up technology firms in Malaysia and has led the government to develop 
entrepreneurial financing options for local firms.  This has prompted the Malaysian 
Industry-Government Group for High Technology (MIGHT) to support the development 
of a financing corporation that coordinates with private sector financial institutions to 
lower the barriers for investment, according to officials within the organization.  The 
finance corporation’s activities include completing due diligence on prospective firms for 
investment while helping to foster relationships between start-up firms and private sector 
investment houses.  These activities are vital to jump-starting local technology start-ups 
since the venture capital industry in the country is very small and relatively new.  This 
government entity also identifies global technology niches – such as biotechnology, 
photonics, and advanced manufacturing – where Malaysian firms will have a competitive 
advantage due to the large base of local technology expertise. 
Another important focus area has been fostering skills training from MNCs, 
particularly from US firms.  While Japanese and European firms send a larger percentage 
of their employees to off-site training, a much larger percentage of US firms have 
Malaysian employees in middle- and top-management positions including managing 
director (Wah, 1999).  This translates into allowing a full range of technologies, from 
simple to complex, to be implemented in Malaysian facilities under Malaysian managers.  
The end result of these managerial positions for Malaysians within US firms is on-site 
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skills development that potentially could create a class of experienced entrepreneurs that 
can help Malaysia achieve its goals for building local innovation capabilities. 
ICT Institutions  
Until 10 years ago, a vast majority of countries opted for public provisioning of 
telecommunications services.  Today, virtually every government in the world has – to 
greater or lesser degrees – begun to shift toward more private, more international, more 
competitive, and more distributed and de-centralized management of their ICT industries 
(Wilson, 2003).  Wilson states that developing country governments are not moving at 
the same pace as developed countries, nor are they using the same agencies or getting the 
same results.  Wilson also suggests further that regulatory and institutional issues are the 
critical success factors for the growth in ICT penetration rates within Malaysia and 
Thailand.   
This part of the case study section is divided into four parts, with this introduction 
providing the background on the ICT and technology institutions of Thailand and 
Malaysia.  The second component examines the institutional development of the Ministry 
of ICT in both countries, studying in particular the evolution of the ministries in the past 
10 years.  The third component provides a similar study of the ministries of science and 
technology, while the fourth examines in detail the influence of Singaporean institutional 
reforms on both countries.  Last, this section offers a discussion of the hurdles both 
countries must overcome to improve the design of their ICT institutions.  
A key component to the success of ICT strategies has been the creation of 
national technology institutions, which have successfully supported technology adoption 
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within these countries (Zysman, 1983).  These institutions exist in both Thailand and 
Malaysia.  However, Malaysia has been more successful in coordinating these entities to 
support its national ICT policy implementation.  These structures consist of both 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that direct, support, and fund national 
technology initiatives.  These structures include advisory boards, business development 
and training agencies, R&D institutes, and commercialization programs.  Malaysia’s 
technology institutions, by advancing national technology capacity, are an important 
contributor to economic development (Feinson, 2003).  Exhibit 5.2 presents the 
organizational chart of Malaysia’s ICT institutional structure. 
Exhibit 5.2: Malaysia’s ICT Institutional Structure 
 
Prime Minister’s Office 
Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
National Innovation Council 
Malaysian Science and Technology Information Center 
 
Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology  
Ministry of Communications 
Academy of Science Malaysia 
Science Advisor Office 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
National Productivity Corporation 
Small and Medium Industries Development Corporation 
 
Although Thailand has an institutional structure similar to Malaysia’s, the 
country’s agencies do not have the budget, authority, or monitoring capabilities to 
implement its ICT policies transparently.  In addition, the country has volatile regulatory 
conditions, leaving ICT operators without a credible commitment by the government to 
enforce and maintain the regulatory regime.  This commitment is essential to the long-
term investment environment, which is key for the capital-intensive telecommunications 
and IT industries (Weingast, 1995).  In contrast, an independent regulator in the sector, 
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which is only now being formed, increases market certainty and long-term stability.  The 
ICT sector will invest heavily in their infrastructure only if the necessary regulatory and 
institutional structures exist (Levy, 1994).  Exhibit 5.3 presents the organizational chart 
of Thailand’s ICT institutional structure. 
Exhibit 5.3: Thailand’s ICT Institutional Structure 
 
Prime Minister’s Office 
Ministry of Science and Technology Ministry of Industry 
National IT Council 
Department of Science Service 
 
Thailand Institute of S&T Research 
Ministry of ICT 
National S&T Development Agency 
Thailand Development Research Institute 
Department of Industrial Promotion 
Electrical and Electronics Institute 
Institute for SME Development Corporation 
 
These countries have both developed ICT strategies containing three key strategy 
areas, focusing on ICT infrastructure deployment, ICT training, and ICT industry 
development.  Malaysia and Thailand have taken these basic ICT initiatives and adapted 
them to the needs of their local economic, political, and cultural environment.   
The network infrastructure deployment plans have been based on South Korea’s 
very successful government initiatives to support ICT network expansion (Frieden, 
2005).  These plans focus on increasing access, deploying fiber networks, and expanding 
universal service obligations.  Some of these efforts have been successful, depending on 
the demand for ICT services that already exists within each country.   
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The second key area includes workforce skill development to assist in ICT 
knowledge transfers from MNCs while increasing local technology innovation 
capabilities.  Thailand has moved to support training and skills development through its 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Industry.  However, Malaysia has made it a 
primary focus for its national development strategy.   
The third area, IT industry development, was the primary area of focus for the 
private sector and the two national ICT strategies.  In 2003, Thailand created Software 
Park and the Software Industry Promotion Agency to bolster its fledgling industry.  In 
Malaysia, the IT sector has grown rapidly through the involvement of foreign capital and 
MNCs, both of which are coordinated through the Multimedia Super Corridor.  Through 
the MSC, the government was able to attract a range of software and IT MNCs.  The 
country is now focused on increasing the technology transfer and training from these 
global IT firms into its local ICT industries.   
According to interviewed officials from MIGHT, the organization has identified 
several high-tech sectors that offer Malaysia a niche to compete in the global market.  
These sectors will benefit from a cooperative public-private effort to coordinate training 
and R&D efforts to bolster local capacity in these areas.  Although this policy was only 
recently announced, it is a vital step in Malaysia’s national strategy to utilize ICTs and 
develop a knowledge-based economy. 
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Institutional Development for Ministries of ICT  
Thailand  
In 2006, Thailand began working on its second round of institutional reform – 
before the coup that created an unstable political situation that has slowed this reform 
effort to a halt.  The first round was completed in 2002, which resulted in the creation of 
several new ministries including the MICT.  Interviewed ministry officials stated that one 
current proposal for this second round of reform is to combine the Ministry of Science 
and Technology and the Ministry of ICT.  The goal is to combine the expertise and 
funding of the two ministries to elevate and accelerate the efforts for developing an ICT 
industry and increasing access and utilization of ICTs across the population.  Ministry 
officials stated in interviews that the MICT was created from parts of several other 
ministries: 
• Ministry of Transport and Communications: Coordinating the infrastructure-
intensive ministries of transportation and communications was more appropriate 
in the past, when the focus of the telecommunications industry was extending 
fixed line assets.  With the advent of new services and technologies, including 
mobile wireless, this ministry was broken up into two pieces – with the 
Communications division going to the newly formed MICT. 
• Ministry of Science, Technology, and Energy: Until the reform process, the 
science ministry had IT policy and regulatory structure in its purview.  The 
National Electronics and Computer Technology Center (NECTEC) argued that IT 
and communications technologies were converging, and that it no longer made 
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sense to have separate ministries in charge of these two technology sectors.  
Therefore, the IT component of the Ministry of Science and Technology went to 
the MICT. 
• National Statistical Office (NSO): This office was previously in the Office of the 
Prime Minister before being moved to MICT.  The NSO provides statistics on 
ICT adoption as well as other government and private sector indicators. 
It was debated whether to move NECTEC, the national innovation agency 
discussed more fully below, under the MICT because it had previously been responsible 
for developing ICT policy for the country.  For ministries or departments that are purely 
governmental, moving across the government’s organization structure is not a difficult 
move.  However, NECTEC is an independent agency with its own law establishing its 
purview and regulations; to house the independent agency within the MICT would 
require a new law, which would take several years to pass.  Officials at NECTEC stated 
in their interviews that they were also unwilling to give up its status because it would no 
longer be able to compete for technical personnel with the higher salaries of the private 
ICT sector.  As a result, NECTEC was not moved under the MICT in the first round of 
reform.  Unfortunately, this divided effort has created coordination and resource 
allocation problems.  Neither the new ministry nor NECTEC has the critical mass of 
expertise to support ICT adoption and utilization policies on its own, which has resulted 
in the proposal for a second reorganization.  
Malaysia  
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The Malaysian government has undergone two institutional restructurings of the 
agencies that support the development of the Malaysian ICT sector.  Prior to 2004, the 
Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of ICT were together in a single ministry 
that focused on infrastructure and services and represented Malaysia at international 
regulatory and trade bodies.  These two ministries were put together in 1998 through the 
Communications and Multimedia Act, which deregulated the telecommunications 
industry and created the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission. 
Although the MICT had only been active for a few years, the agencies within the 
Ministry were split again into two components.  The MICT’s responsibility over ICT 
infrastructure has been transferred to the Ministry of Energy, Water, and 
Communications (KTAK), which also became the primary agency for international 
bodies, such as ASEAN, the ITU, and APEC.  The Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (MOSTI) continued to focus on R&D and S&T development while supporting 
a joint effort with KTAK to implement Malaysia’s ICT policies.  After working together 
in the MICT, KTAK and MOSTI personnel still coordinate closely on their overlapping 
policy portfolios.  They are also working out a more balanced approach to representing 
the Malaysian government at international organizations, such as the ITU, by sending 
representatives from both agencies.   
Evolution of Ministry of Science and Technology  
The administrative organization charged with coordinating the design and 
implementation of Thailand’s national ICT policies and initiatives is the National IT 
Committee (NITC).  When the Committee was created in the early 1990s, NECTEC 
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acted as the secretariat, developing ICT policy and frameworks for the country.  The 
Committee is officially headed by the prime minister and includes members of IT, 
telecommunications, banking, and other industry trade groups.  A former official with the 
NITC stated that a deputy PM is typically assigned to run the Committee, in addition to 
other duties and obligations.  As a result, the Committee’s ability to develop and 
implement ICT policies would vary widely depending on the personal interests of the 
deputy assigned.  Those with a strong interest would inject their vision into the 
Committee, where it would cascade through the other ministries, accelerating efforts and 
improving initiative outcomes.  In contrast, ICT policy design and implementation would 
suffer a significant slowdown under deputies who were not as interested in this NITC 
leadership position. 
Thailand – National Electronics and Computer Technology Center 
The national innovation agency, NECTEC, was created through the National 
Science and Technology Development Act by Parliament as an independent agency – 
also called “semi-governmental” – to focus on R&D efforts within the electronics, 
information technology, and communications technology industries (Intarakumnerd, 
2004).  This classification requires a specific act of Parliament to create the agency and 
puts its employees outside the traditional civil service requirements.  Most notable are the 
employment contracts that replace the employment-for-life arrangements typical in other 
agencies.  Although it is a riskier job situation, these employees draw a higher salary and 
have much more flexibility regarding work procedures and regulations for the agency.  
Rather than the civil service regulations, NECTEC’s are set by its own board, which is 
headed by the Minister of Science and Technology.  This flexibility allows NECTEC the 
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ability to hire and retain the necessary technical personnel to carry out its mission to 
bolster R&D activities within Thailand. 
NECTEC was placed under National Science and Technology Development 
Agency (NSTDA), which is part of the Ministry of Science and Technology and was 
created as part of the same act.  Officials interviewed for this research stated that NSTDA 
is focused on developing and supporting S&T policy within the Thai industry through 
four key divisions: nanotechnology, biotechnology, material sciences, and NECTEC.  
The development agency works with major universities to develop and commercialize 
technology innovations and has recently set up a Technology Licensing Office to work 
with universities to license and commercialize their research.  The Ministry of Science 
and Technology completed its own master plan for science and technology policy.  This 
plan identified several industrial sectors to target for support by NSTDA and the other 
agencies within the ministry, including food processing, automotive, garment, and others.  
According to NSTDA officials, prior to this plan, university and government researchers 
had applied for funding based on their own disparate interests, which left R&D efforts 
uncoordinated within these sectors.  To receive funding under the science master plan, 
researchers and ministries must demonstrate how their funding and policy support the 
government’s S&T goals. 
Once the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology was created in 
2002, NECTEC was no longer the policy-making arm of the National IT Committee and 
the agency no longer had monitoring and evaluation responsibilities for the ICT sector.  
Although it had written the IT policy framework, IT2010, and its telecommunications 
sector companion, Master Plan 2002-2006 (NECTEC, 2006), the agency was not able to 
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design or write the follow-up plan in 2007 – even though this new plan would still draw 
on the IT2010 framework created by NECTEC.   
Before developing the IT2010 policy framework, NECTEC evaluated its previous 
framework, IT2000, for the successes and challenges of implementation.  The program 
evaluation was conducted by outside consultants from the ICT industry and university 
departments.  Once completed, it was used as a guideline for designing the new policy 
framework, the IT2010.   
With a critical shortage of expert manpower at the MICT, the ministry has 
outsourced some design components to NECTEC to complete, according to interviews 
with NECTEC officials.  However, there is no ongoing evaluation due to manpower and 
funding shortages; and it is unclear whether the MICT, which is responsible for writing 
the Master Plan in 2007, will evaluate the implementation of the previous ICT plan.  This 
policy and oversight confusion has led to a significant disconnect between the original 
goals and intent of the ICT policy framework and the initiatives implemented by the 
MICT and the other ministries.  The split in bureaucratic responsibilities has also limited 
the Thai government’s ability to adequately track and benchmark ICT policies against its 
stated goals. 
Officials at NECTEC stated that the agency focuses much of its work on applied 
R&D efforts, commercialization efforts, and technology transfer.  Its agenda is tailored to 
ensure that there is commercial demand for the R&D activities currently being funded by 
public and private sources.  In addition, the agency runs its own labs, staffed by 
researchers that complete university training through NECTEC scholarships both in 
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Thailand and abroad.  These researchers are contracted to the government for twice the 
length of their schooling.  However, NECTEC loses many non-scholarship researchers to 
the private sector due to uncompetitive compensation packages.  Similar to the National 
Science Foundation in the US, NECTEC provides grant funding to university researchers 
in addition to its own labs, particularly in areas where the agency is lacking in expert 
personnel. 
The national innovation policies aimed at developing the ICT sector are designed 
by NECTEC and the MICT for implementation across the other ministries.  Interviews 
with officials at NECTEC and the MICT confirmed that once NECTEC develops the 
policy, the Ministry of Science and Technology presents it to the cabinet for approval.  If 
the policy is approved, it is set as a national policy for all of the ministries and 
departments to follow.  Although NECTEC and MICT are responsible for the ICT 
policies within the country, both of these government organizations are short on funding 
and manpower.  This is due to the lack of large-scale projects, which tend to receive the 
most funding and political attention.  NECTEC, the MICT, and the Ministry of Science 
and Technology have very limited authority, political influence, and budget while the 
Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Transport all have high levels of political power 
due to their budgeting authority for large infrastructure projects. 
Thailand – Software Industry Promotion Agency  
The Thai government has set a target of creating an indigenous IT sector, but the 
private sector has made little headway.  The government has been working on a series of 
IT bills to support the sector, but in the last nine years has only passed two.  As a result, 
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there is no master plan or policy strategy for developing this IT sector – although it is 
outlined in IT2010.  There have been some successes by the Software Industry Promotion 
Agency and within the Software Park, a national technology park devoted to the industry.  
However, the Software Park has done little outside of training individuals and SMEs 
(Gray, 2004).   
Formerly a part of the MICT, the Software Industry Promotion Agency is a public 
organization similar to NECTEC, with flexible regulations and employment contracts.  
According to discussions with an executive at SIPA, the agency has focused on deploying 
several pilot programs aimed at improving government services.  One pilot was 
completed using local software developers to build an online interface for the 
immigration service.  Another example included the development of an online portal to 
promote Thai regions for business investment and job creation.  This is similar to the 
efforts of local US chambers of commerce, aggregating key economic, demographic, and 
quality of life indicators for prospective investors and businesses.  Although this is an 
easy step for a US region, in Thailand the data is spread across many disparate agencies 
and databases, making integration difficult.  SIPA also tracks and provides information 
on available ICT experts and upcoming graduates to attract investment in the software 
sector. 
In addition, a Software Park was developed by the NSTDA as part of an industry 
support policy designed for the National IT Committee.  The Software Park has the same 
independent agency status as NECTEC and offers office space and shared computer 
facilities to small software entrepreneurs.  The park also offers a firm matching program, 
linking small software companies to larger Thai and international partners.  Both SIPA 
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and the Software Park have similar goals and there is overlap between the two efforts due 
to a lack of institutional coordination.  
Implementation problems related to supporting the development of a local 
software industry include the challenges of utilizing the government as an anchor tenant 
for the software produced by these firms.  Thailand cannot simply buy foreign software 
off-the-shelf; the country needs tailored solutions that take into account the cultural, 
political, and economic environment of the country (Gray, 2004).  However, the local 
Thai software firms tend to use open source software (OSS) as the kernel for the 
development of their products.  Government procurement of this software would lower 
the IT costs versus Western products, such as those from Microsoft.  Currently, few 
government users have OSS-based Thai software installed due to regulations instituted by 
the government auditor, which requires ministries to compile and justify each of their IT 
purchases.   
The auditor has become the de facto standard setter within the government 
bureaucracy.  In order to make a purchase, ministries must demonstrate how this 
alternative IT resource will outperform the standard option in all circumstances and 
provide details for the hardware or software, such as the specific Linux kernel that the 
OSS is based on.  In contrast, the forms and review process for a Microsoft purchase are 
relatively easy, funneling government users toward this de facto standard.  According to 
government officials and industry observers, one hope to reverse this trend is for MNCs 
that are partners with local firms to advocate for government reforms that would open the 
market.  Like systems integrators and hardware manufacturers, MNCs have been much 
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more vocal in supporting the Thai government than their local counterparts.  A wider 
opening of the government market will help bolster this nascent ICT sector. 
Malaysia – Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
Malaysia’s Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation identifies target 
sectors for national technology policies for the next 10 years, focusing on areas where the 
Malaysian government can support private sector competitive advantages.  Its activities 
include risk assurance for private sector development, and monitoring and evaluation of 
policy implementation.  MOSTI was previously the permanent secretary for the NITC, 
which is similar to Thailand’s NITC; is also chaired by the prime minister; and is 
coordinated across the private sector and several ministries for ICT policy 
implementation in Malaysia, including education and energy, water, and 
communications. 
In interviews, ministry officials described additional initiatives including 
technology development and innovation, as well as best practice development for R&D 
within the local S&T industries including the ICT sectors.  MOSTI also supports 
improved coordination across private and public research centers through strong 
leadership directed by the prime minister’s office.  MOSTI views its role as an ICT 
enabler through increased investment, expanded R&D activities, and enhanced 
innovation capacity.  MOSTI also is responsible for regulating and enforcing the 
Communications and Multimedia Act.  This regulation is in coordination with the 
national regulatory commission. 
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Through the NITC, MOSTI conducted an assessment of national ICT needs in 
2006 to revise the national ICT policies and initiatives.  The Malaysian government is 
currently in the middle of its 2006-2010 economic plan and ministerial budgets have 
already been set.  But MOSTI will utilize the 2007 budget to launch its initiatives and 
then move to revise the 2008 budgets during the mid-plan review.  This flexibility of 
funding is key to Malaysia’s ability to respond to the rapidly changing landscape within 
the ICT sectors.  From the NITC planned report on ICT needs, focus areas on the ICT 
road map include: 
• Industry Building – Identification of key companies to attract in each focus area, 
the pull factors, the strategies to build local companies, etc.  
• Capability Development – Identification of the current capability level, the gaps 
that need to be addressed, and long- and short-term strategies needed to develop 
the capabilities.  
• Infrastructure Development – Identification of infrastructure needed to support 
the growth of ICT focus areas, including investments. 
• R&D and Technology Development – Identification of R&D and technology 
needed to support each focus area and types of institutes necessary; collaboration 
between research institutions and industry. 
• Community Development – Identification of target groups, social development 
projects, and key public services necessary for community development. 
 255 
• Special Project Development – Identification of special projects required to drive 
ICT adoption in non-ICT areas.  
A steering committee, which includes ministry stakeholders as well as business 
leaders there as observers, was formed to administer this effort and handle project 
approval.  Once the steering committee approves a project, it is passed on to the full 
NITC for approval and then presented to the prime minister’s cabinet.  The stakeholder 
ministries, such as education, are involved at each of these three steps of the process to 
ensure buy-in and continued support across the ministries for funding and 
implementation. 
Malaysian Industry-Government Group for High Technology 
MIGHT is a non-profit quasi-governmental organization that operates under the 
oversight of MOSTI, Malaysia’s innovation and science agency.  The organization is 
charged with supporting and operationalizing “Malaysia Incorporated,” which is modeled 
after Japan and Singapore’s public, private, and academic coordination to innovate and 
compete in the global marketplace.  This coordinated initiative, called the “triple helix,” 
to build innovation capacity is driven by the stakeholders in these three sectors across the 
country (Kam, 1999).  MIGHT is made up of 15 to 20 business, government, and 
academic leaders and is co-chaired by the PM’s science adviser.  All policy proposals, 
once accepted by MIGHT, flow through the science adviser to the PM’s office and then 
to the cabinet for approval and funding.  MIGHT has successfully bridged the gaps across 
these three sectors and coordinated with competitive firms within the private sector to 
support globally competitive industry development.   
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In the early 1990s, there was little coordination within Malaysia’s private sector 
let alone across the public or academic sectors.  In 1993, the organization was under the 
prime minister’s office when it was moved to MOSTI.  The decision was made to place 
the organization under the prime minister to bolster its ability to draw political support 
from the PM as well as the other executive agencies.  Aside from these political 
considerations, this move was also necessary due to MIGHT’s focus on specific 
privatized industries that cut across multiple agencies and as a result had previously not 
received the necessary governmental support to bolster their development.  One example 
outside the ICT sector is the aerospace industry, which had previously fallen under the 
communications, transport, and finance ministries.  With no single ministry leading the 
effort to support this industry within Malaysia, and no single ministry able to coordinate 
across the overlapping efforts, there was a lack of support and coordination.  Under 
MIGHT’s direction, a national aerospace blueprint was developed through 12 months of 
policy meetings by a technical committee that included the airlines and manufacturers, 
and a steering committee that was chaired by the prime minister’s science adviser.  Once 
presented to the prime minister, the government funded a multi-year effort that was 
coordinated by a purpose-built policy vehicle chaired by the prime minister – the 
Malaysian Aerospace Council – that evaluates the progress of the national aerospace 
blueprint every six months. 
According to interviewed officials, MIGHT’s process of governmental support is 
to use successful interventions, whether they are within the aerospace or ICT industries, 
as pilot programs for launching efforts across a range of technology sectors.  For MIGHT 
to target a given sector, it must fall within the portfolio of several ministries, have already 
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undergone the privatization process, and cannot have a private sector organization 
already operating to support sector development.  This last requirement prevents the 
government from duplicating private sector efforts or reducing the incentive within the 
private sector to establish these coordinating bodies on their own.  MIGHT also looks to 
see where Malaysia can find global technology niches, where it is feasible for the 
country’s existing technical expertise to compete internationally while driving national 
exports and innovation.  It also looks to leverage the existing industrial and technological 
base within the country.  The other areas of focus for MIGHT include entrepreneurial 
development financing, pharmaceuticals, and radio frequency identification (RFID) tags. 
Malaysia – National RFID Program 
As mentioned above, there is a clearly defined process for evaluating the technology 
niches that will receive support through the ICT road map.  This includes an assessment 
of the market demand for a given information technology, the viability of this 
technology, Malaysia’s ability to compete in this market, and the global competition 
within this sector.  Once this technology for global export is chosen, a road map will be 
created for governmental support that will include key performance indicators (KPIs) 
developed and monitored by MOSTI. 
The goal of the national RFID program is to develop a cluster of firms capable of 
supporting the development, innovation, and marketing of this emerging technology.  
RFID tags are inexpensive chips that can be used to track inventory by a range of 
industries, most notably retail and logistics.  The program’s larger goal is to support the 
revival of the national semiconductor industry, which has seen its market share and 
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margins shrink due to global competition and the global technology slowdown in the 
early 2000s (Rasiah, 2003).  Although Malaysia is third in the world for semiconductor 
manufacturing, the country’s design houses for hardware, software, and middleware had 
begun to whither and lose their attractiveness to top engineering talent during this 
downturn.  Malaysian wafer facilities, built with government funding, were very 
competitive but had lost out to global companies with combined chip design and 
application capabilities.  In response to this situation, the government decided that it 
could not rely on manufacturing capabilities alone and began working to support the 
development of chip applications along with the revival of the country’s chip design 
houses.  The government support for the revival of the national semiconductor industry 
included MIGHT negotiating a technology license from Japan for an RFID chip and then 
leasing this technology to a newly created private company, Senstech.   
To build a sustainable level of supply and demand, the government has created a 
multistage plan for development and deployment.  The first phase includes using the 
government as a test bed and to have the government act as a coordinator across the key 
private sector players to begin the transition away from bar codes.  The government is 
offering these government agencies the right to use these RFID chips if they are suitable 
to the program.  The government has also agreed to act as the anchor tenant for the 
technology once it is produced, purchasing the chips for governmental applications to 
jump-start the industry.  These governmental purchases will be used for government 
programs as well as by state-owned enterprises in sectors such as cattle tagging, logging, 
and auto manufacturing.  However, if agency or SOE testing demonstrates that these 
chips are not suitable, end users can transition to other available RFID sources.  The 
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second phase includes extending the program to wholesale and retail logistical support 
within Malaysia.  To serve the needs of these sectors, the program will expand production 
to benefit from the economies of scale that are essential in lowering the costs of 
individual RFID chips.  The final step will focus on the international markets and 
competing against global firms for exports.  This phase’s approach is key to developing a 
financially viable sector while positioning Malaysia’s semiconductor at the forefront of 
this growing ICT sector. 
Malaysia – Multimedia Super Corridor 
The Multimedia Super Corridor is a large technology park devoted to ICT sector 
development and is the cornerstone of the government’s efforts for supporting the 
development of ICT industries within Malaysia (Bunnell, 2002).  The MSC is run by the 
Multimedia Development Corporation (MDeC), which has representation within 
Malaysia’s National IT Council.  Another key institution supporting the MSC is the MSC 
Implementation Council, which focuses on technology sector investment and 
development.  The MSC Implementation Council is chaired by the prime minister and the 
MDeC acts as the permanent secretary.  Other ministries provide oversight for these 
efforts, with MOSTI approving MDeC policies and programs, and the Ministry of 
Finance approving budgets and five-year development plans.  MDeC’s focus on the MSC 
is complementary to MIGHT, which has a broader portfolio of expanded technology 
industries nationwide.  
Officials that manage MDeC claim that the organization has been designed as a 
one-stop shop of government services for MNCs.  Previously, these international firms 
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and investors had to work with multiple ministries individually, which slowed the 
approval process for importing equipment, capital, and employees.  Today, MDeC will 
work with MNCs and the relevant ministry, such as immigration, to fast-track requests.  
MDeC also completes an annual firm census of the companies operating within the MSC, 
monitoring the utilization of the facilities and the number of investments, employees, 
revenues, and profits.  This information is reported to MOSTI to be incorporated into the 
S&T policy planning process in conjunction with the Malaysia Industrial Development 
Authority.   
The MSC effort is driven by KPIs, which are benchmarked annually with goals 
for exports, employment by function, and investment, among others.  To help ensure 
these targets are met, there is regular communication between MOSTI and MDeC as well 
as monthly dialogue between MDeC and its MSC tenants.  MDeC also reviews the 
operations and tax status of each business and has revoked the licenses of both MNCs 
and local SMEs for breach of contract.  A majority of the companies with revoked 
licenses have been local; these SMEs have difficulty maintaining their efforts to compete 
within ICT sectors.  
The MDeC is also working to bolster the development of these SMEs through a 
program that targets these firms at each stage of development.  Starting with support for 
idea creation, seed capital, first stage, and all the way up to IPO, there is a tailored 
program within the MSC to support the investment, training, supplies, and industry 
connections of these firms (Jomo, 2003).  There is also significant funding and expertise 
available to support R&D efforts.  The MDeC is also working to improve 
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commercialization efforts of university research by matching faculty and students with 
MSC companies as well as providing incubators for university-based start-ups.   
The MDeC is currently implementing plans to expand the MSC to additional 
population centers around Malaysia (Bunnell, 2002).  This effort is championed by each 
state within Malaysia, with the MDeC coordinating the development of the regional 
technology parks.  To avoid duplicated efforts and state-level competition, each of the 
new MSCs must differentiate their economic and innovation goals to win approval to 
develop a park.  One example is the MSC in Penang, which is focused on the electronics 
industry and leverages the state’s robust semi-conductor industry.  As of 2006, four 
additional MSCs had begun development with the support of government tax breaks, no 
labor restrictions, no hurdles for fund transfers, and government guarantees on 
communications services.   
These regional MSCs also have the advantage of additional land that they can 
lease to MNCs, whereas the original MSC outside Kuala Lumpur has no additional land 
available for new investors.  States are given permission to lease this additional land at no 
cost to attract global ICT companies to their MSCs.  In addition, MSCs have been built 
out with transportation, water, power, and telecommunications networks to meet the 
stringent requirements of ICT sector MNCs.  The government provides this support for 
10 years with a mid-term review to ensure that the business activities are still meeting the 
requirements set by the MSC, which limit MNC investment to knowledge sectors.   
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Influence of Singapore and Other Countries on Institutional Structure 
Thailand watches its neighbors very closely to benchmark its own ICT policies 
and institutional structure.  Thailand was implementing its first structural reform when 
Malaysia was undertaking a similar effort.  As a result, Thailand mirrored its 
restructuring after its neighbor.  Now that Thailand is considering working on a second 
reform, it has looked to Malaysia again to see how that country has evolved its ICT 
structure.  Both countries’ science ministries were previously permanent secretary to the 
National IT Councils.  In addition to Malaysia, Thailand’s ICT agencies have looked to 
other countries in Asia to develop its ICT policies and institutions, including Singapore, 
Japan, Korea, and other ASEAN countries (Koh, 2006).  Singapore has been widely 
viewed has having a successful ICT sector as well as an institutional and regulatory 
reform process (Painter, 2007). 
The Malaysian government closely examines the ICT policies and institutions of 
other Asian countries for its own reform efforts.  For broadband and other ICT 
infrastructure deployments, Korea’s program was used as a model; while Singapore was 
used to reform institutional structure and policy implementation mechanism (Koh, 2006).  
In 2002, MOSTI completed an evaluation of its institutional and program structure to 
assess areas that required improved performance.  After reviewing Singaporean ICT and 
innovation policies (Wong, 1999), this study concluded that Malaysia needed to 
reevaluate its process for choosing its global technology niches to compete 
internationally.  Wong suggested that Malaysia had focused too heavily on services to the 
exclusion of infrastructure development.  In response, KTAK was designed to support the 
government’s ICT efforts while reducing the likelihood of duplicated efforts across the 
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other agencies.  Malaysia also examined the Indian government’s effort to support 
software development and service industry outsourcing.  These policy reviews are 
completed by Malaysia and its Asian neighbors through official visits, ASEAN 
exchanges, and informal relationships between government officials. 
Another example of cross-national policy pollination of ICT policies is the 
Malaysian government’s emulation of Thailand’s SchoolNet program.  After visiting 
Thailand, the Malaysian communications ministry lobbied within the government for 
funding to deploy a national school network to improve access to educational resources 
and distance learning.  Within the year, the program had approval from the ministries of 
treasury, communications, and education.  Using MCMC licensing fees, all Malaysian 
schools and universities were connected within 18 months using a range of broadband 
access technologies, finishing by mid-year 2005.  SchoolNet has connected almost 
10,000 schools at 384 Kbps, which is the standard set by the Malaysian government for 
broadband.  Program implementation is run by the National Broadband Plan Secretariat, a 
small agency that monitors ICT initiatives and executes pilot programs for new initiatives 
before they are rolled out by the private sector.  MyREN, a program similar to SchoolNet, 
has connected 15 university campuses with up to 8 Mbps connections.  Malaysian 
government officials cited the Thai example as the inspiration for the policy and rollout 
of the program as well as providing a catalyst for rapidly approving and funding the 
initiative.   
Another example of ICT best practices imported from other Asian countries is the 
Malaysian government’s support for the deployment of telecenters.  Officials at the 
science and technology ministry stated that the original program design had called for the 
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use of post offices throughout the country to host PCs and Internet connections, but 
offered little training for staff or end users.  This lack of training led to few users or 
benefits for the target regions.  In response to this low usage, the Malaysian government 
reviewed international best practices for telecenters supported by a grant from the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency.  These best practices suggested raising the budget of 
the telecenters to expand the number of PCs, to operate standalone facilities, and to 
ensure that staff members are properly trained through national ICT train-the-trainers 
programs.  This program developed a cadre of skilled staff who could then direct training 
courses of their own for local users.  Other program changes included grouping end-user 
training sessions by level of expertise, which dramatically increased the number of users.   
The increase in the number of PCs also helped to ensure there was a critical mass 
of users, while the addition of expensive hardware and software programs – including 
those from the engineering field – gave entrepreneurial users an opportunity to cost-
effectively access these tools.  The central government also increased the salaries for 
these telecenter staff members and expanded the number of years that it covered the 
telecenter costs.  This was done to give the centers more financial stability once they 
transition to covering their own equipment and labor costs after five years.  At the end of 
the five years, an evaluation will be completed to assess whether each region has reached 
a high level of broadband penetration through public and private sector efforts.  For those 
that have not, government-supported telecenters will continue; while other regions will 
operate their own telecenters. 
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Challenges Facing National ICT Institutions 
Thailand  
Within Thailand, leadership issues and conflicts of interest have both been major 
impediments to policy implementation.  The country’s National Information Technology 
Committee is officially headed by the prime minister, but this position was typically 
delegated to a deputy minister.  As a result, the ability of the Committee to develop and 
implement ICT policies would vary widely depending on the personal interests of the 
deputy assigned.  Policy implementation would suffer a slowdown under deputies who 
were not interested, according to participants who were later interviewed.  More recently, 
the prime minister headed the NITC himself, but was also found to have a conflict of 
interest – potentially steering the Committee to benefit his personal business interests. 
Another major hurdle for ICT institutions and agencies in Thailand is the lack of 
program evaluation.  ICT programs are developed by ministerial CIOs.  They are 
evaluated only at the project level and this limited monitoring is completed in a vacuum.  
The focus of the evaluation work is on gathering quantitative data on hardware 
deployment, not on qualitative data on ICT utilization and the economic benefit of the 
ICT initiative.  Most important, there is no overall benchmarking or evaluation effort by 
the government against its own master plan – an essential component to ICT strategy 
success (Docktor, 2004). 
Although there is no overarching benchmarking or evaluation effort by the 
government, one avenue for monitoring and evaluation is the submission of ministry-
level ICT Master Plans to the MICT and the Budget Bureau (Banerjee, 2004).  These 
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Master Plans are developed by ministerial CIOs and mapped back to the national ICT 
plan for justification.  However, there is no set criteria for doing this.  Plans may be 
rejected due to political considerations or may be rubberstamped to avoid bureaucratic 
confrontation.  When plans are reviewed, they are only completed at the project level 
with little connection to the government’s larger efforts.     
Another key component missing from the MICT’s efforts is the establishment of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) aimed at harnessing the expertise of the private sector 
and the financial support of the government to spur ICT sector development.  This has 
been a key focus of discussion and is recognized as crucial within the ministry – 
particularly because neighbors such as Malaysia have successfully implemented PPPs 
across several technology sectors (Shapira, 2005).  However, there is little activity or 
implementation around fostering PPPs, particularly in ICT applications.  Currently, when 
the government implements a PPP for its e-governance programs, there is a tendency to 
become overly reliant on the vendor for customization or changes downstream, according 
to officials.  This leaves government ministries vulnerable to high additional costs for 
these programs as their IT requirements change over time.   
Malaysia  
By housing ICT infrastructure programs within KTAK, Malaysia can emphasize 
ICT infrastructure deployments while concentrating the necessary budget and authority 
on implementing those policies within a single agency.  However, officials with KTAK 
and the ministry both reported that this new institutional structure does not have the 
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critical mass of ICT expertise that was within the original Ministry of ICT and is now 
spread out among separate agencies. 
Although there have been many successful efforts to launch government 
technology initiatives, this has not been the case across all potential sectors.  Interviewed 
officials with MIGHT suggested that in areas falling under the purview of a traditional 
sector ministry, such as agriculture, there have been fewer new initiatives to support 
private sector development and little institutional reform to be more responsive to market 
changes.  MOSTI works in conjunction with the Economic Planning Unit, a civil service 
agency, to develop institutional restructuring plans for each of the other ministries.  There 
is a review and restructuring process for reducing agency overlap, which has restructured 
and dismantled several agencies, most recently in 2004, to make the government more 
responsive to market changes.  These changes were deemed necessary and supported by 
the prime minister to enhance governmental efforts to bolster national competitiveness.  
However, there is still a significant tendency for traditional sector agencies to strongly 
resist any governmental restructuring and revitalization effort. 
Design and Implementation of ICT National Plans 
This seventh part of this case study section includes a detailed examination of the 
national ICT policies of Thailand and Malaysia.  The national plans of both countries are 
remarkably similar, owing much to their design based on the successful plans of 
Singapore and South Korea.  However, the implementation and outcomes for these plans 
have been starkly different, with Thailand’s policies hampered by a lack of funding, 
staffing, and evaluation.  A second component closely examines these challenges facing 
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Thailand, as well as Malaysia, as both national governments aim to expand ICT adoption 
through policy intervention.  
Thailand  
There are three major components to Thailand’s national ICT policy documents: 
the IT2010 Policy framework, the Master Plan 2002-2006, and individual policies of the 
ministries.  The IT2010 policy is a framework designed by an agency within the science 
ministry, the National Electronics and Computer Technology Center, for the National IT 
Committee that outlines the broad policy goals for the country.  The framework was a 
broad vision for the country and does not detail specific policy initiatives or designate 
specific ministries.  
The policy effort that started in the 1980s, and that led to the ICT Master Plan, 
began with the Thai IT sector (Intarakumnerd, 2004).  Twenty years ago, the government 
effort was solely focused on telecommunications and the private sector wanted to 
broaden the scope to include software.  At the time, the nascent Thai software and IT 
industry wanted a long-term view of government support for the development of the ICT 
industry to improve investment planning and attract FDI.  According to officials who 
drafted the original master plans, the government carefully examined the efforts already 
under way in Singapore and then in Malaysia for best practices in formulating their own 
ICT policies and institutions.   
In the 1990s, the NITC worked with NECTEC to influence government ICT 
policy, developing what became the IT2000 plan by the middle of the decade.  The 
IT2000 plan was a five-year road map for government policies, specifically aimed at 
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bolstering the local Thai software industry.  In addition, it also called for better access to 
IT networks through strengthened investment in network infrastructure, a reduction in 
tariffs, and other policy changes as well as a focus on improving the human IT capacity 
within the country.  The policy was designed to accelerate the growth of the IT industry 
specifically as well as to enhance business and governmental productivity more 
generally.   
The IT2000 plan succeeded in building awareness regarding the IT needs of the 
government and its constituents among the various ministries.  Officials, who were later 
interviewed, worked to develop the internal capacity of the ministry through training and 
HR efforts while expanding ICT utilization across the government.  These ministries 
began to set aside parts of their budget for expanding ICT access within these regions. 
Building on the IT2000 policy, NECTEC developed the IT2010 policy 
framework.  This was a 10-year blueprint for governmental ICT goals and policies.  This 
document did not outline specific programs, metrics, or ministries for implementation.  
Instead, the framework was a broad overview of Thailand’s efforts to develop a 
knowledge-based society and economy.  The ICT Master Plan, based on the IT2010 
framework, was the operational blueprint for the government and was to be the 
benchmark for the ministries in developing and coordinating their ICT budgets and 
programs.  The plan was shortened to five years over concerns shared by Ministry of ICT 
officials that the 10-year time horizon of the framework was too long to accurately 
forecast the national ICT needs, or to formulate evaluation metrics and mechanisms that 
could track over that length of time.   
 270 
The MICT is shifting its focus from e-governance programs to building out 
infrastructure to support the interconnection of government departments and facilities.  
The current plan calls for the incumbent players to deploy and support the network 
through a long-term contract.  The government hopes to reduce the annual costs of 
network capacity through the deployment of fiber-based platforms nationally.  In addition 
to cost savings, the government hopes this new network will boost inter-departmental 
communication, enhance the e-governance solutions already in place, and help drive 
ministries toward a common back-office IT solution over the long term. 
Malaysia  
The explicit goal for Malaysia’s economic policy has been to develop a 
knowledge-based economy capable of supporting globally competitive technology 
sectors (Shari, 2003).  Originally articulated by the prime minister in 1996, and called 
Vision 2020, the plan sought to implement nationwide efforts to bolster the indigenous 
technology innovation and capacity (Wee, 2001).  This goal would be achieved through 
close relationships with MNCs, particularly those working in the information, 
communications, media, and software sectors (Shapira, 2005).  This plan focused on 
transferring technology and expertise rather than relying on becoming a piece of the 
global manufacturing supply chain.  In the past, Malaysia held a relatively low position 
within the supply chain that had left the country with little value to add within the chain 
or prospects for productivity gains (Lall, 1999).  The Vision 2020 plan also emphasizes 
increasing local skills through training, expanding local suppliers through deeper 
linkages, and greatly enlarging the national technology infrastructure.  It was hoped that 
 271 
outside capital and technology, along with internal adaptation and innovation, would 
allow Malaysia to become a developed country within two decades (Kam, 1999). 
The Malaysian broadband infrastructure goals were developed in 2004 and have 
now become a component of a larger ICT infrastructure policy, the Malaysian 
Information, Communications and Multimedia Services 886 strategy (also known as 
MyICMS 886).  This five-year strategy is named after the eight ICT services, eight 
infrastructure areas, and six growth areas – such as content development – that the effort 
will focus on.  Prior to the design of this policy, the Malaysian minister of 
communications traveled to Korea to understand the policies and implementations of the 
national Korean IT839 infrastructure policies.  The Korean program is focused on a 
similar set of services, infrastructure, and growth areas with the goal of developing 
ubiquitous connectivity to accelerate Korean innovation and productivity.  This strategy 
includes both wireline and wireless infrastructure and is viewed as the key infrastructure 
area for driving services and growth areas.   
All of the component programs of the MyICMS 886 are funded through the USF 
or directly by the private sector, with the exception of the government network along 
with the secondary and tertiary education networks, MySchoolNet and MyREN.  These 
programs are run through a large directorate within the MCMC along with a 
Coordination Committee.  The MCMC monitors and evaluates these private sector 
programs and licenses them for continued USF budgetary support. 
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Challenges for ICT Policy Implementation  
Thailand  
The policy implementation hurdles faced by Thailand have included a lack of 
government coordination and leadership, conflicts of interest among key officials, no 
program monitoring, and limited policy enforcement (Krongkaewa, 2003).  From the 
beginning, Thailand’s ICT strategy was very top-down, with programs and policies 
driven by government ministers rather than by the needs of the private sector.  The goals 
set within the plan were also ambitious, particularly with a five-year time frame, and 
would have required careful coordination within the government to follow the national 
ICT plan.  Instead, the various ministries used the ICT Master Plan for initial budgeting 
only, failing to use the plan for program design or evaluation – resulting in overlapping 
and siloed efforts across the ministries.   
The goals set in the ICT Master Plan created by NECTEC were very optimistic 
about what could be accomplished under the plan over the 5 years, with programs and 
policies driven by the government rather than the needs of the private sector.  There were 
also severe coordination issues between NECTEC, which was setting these difficult 
goals, and the recently formed MICT, which was charged with implementation.  When 
the ICT Master Plan was designed, NECTEC had believed that it would be a major 
component of the new MICT – constituting the core of the MICT staff – and coordination 
issues were not considered a significant threat.  However, when this did not occur the 
MICT was forced to contract the policy design work to NECTEC – leaving the 
government without a single organization to design, implement, and evaluate the master 
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plan.  With most ministries working on their own ICT efforts independently, this resulted 
in significant policy and program overlap as well as bureaucratic in-fighting against what 
they saw as interference from the MICT. 
During the implementation of the master plan, there was a wide range of success 
across the ministries in deploying technologies for internal use as well as in managing 
ICT programs.  The difference often is due to the leadership within the ministry, with 
success tending to rely on the personal interest of the permanent secretary and minister.  
Other primary hurdles include a lack of operational funding, not enough technical 
expertise to maintain the project, and not enough capable managers.  In addition, there is 
no formal office staffed to implement these policies or innovative programs.  According 
to officials at the Ministry of ICT and the Ministry of Finance, the Thai government does 
have a KPI system in place for government activities.  However, it does not include ICT 
KPIs at this point.  The MICT did not have the evaluation expertise or resources to fulfill 
this role, so there was no enforcement or monitoring system in place.  These KPIs need to 
be added to improve the government’s monitoring capabilities for ICT efforts.   
With the end of the first Master ICT Plan, there is no evaluation planned by the 
MICT prior to developing the next iteration.  Due to political and cultural considerations, 
evaluations are conducted strictly at the individual program level and tend to minimize 
failures according to government officials.  With most projects deemed a success, little or 
no organizational learning can occur.  Although detailed performance metrics for an 
evaluation process were laid out in the Master Plan, these are broadly defined for national 
progress.  They do not mesh with the specific policy and program goals set within the 
plan.   
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One example from the master plan included the goal of introducing computers 
into each village.  Evaluation and monitoring of the program was left to the MICT to 
clearly define PC usage at the village level.  This has not been completed.  There is also 
plenty of room to skew the results of these programs, particularly for those focused on 
applications and utilization.  For example, although the MICT tracks the number of PCs 
across the various ministries, it does not study how PCs are being used or affecting 
productivity.  More generally, the ministries will use the ICT Master Plan for initial 
budgeting purposes only.  After this initial stage, ministries do not return to the master 
plan to assist with program design or benchmarking.  This results in overlapping and 
siloed efforts across the ministries, which is exactly what the master plan seeks to avoid. 
Finance and ICT ministry officials have stated in interviews that the Budget 
Bureau does perform some ongoing evaluation, but not at the level of detail that had been 
previously completed for the ICT policy frameworks by NECTEC.  For ministries and 
their departments to receive ICT funding from the central budget, each must have its own 
CIO and must submit its own master plan for ministerial ICT programs and policies.  The 
individual ministries then use this plan to design and implement their annual initiatives.  
Each ministry and department must submit its own plan annually to be benchmarked 
against the national master plan before the Budget Bureau will disperse the ministry’s 
ICT funding from the central budget.   
Under the current system, many of the goals set by the previous master plan have 
not been met.  This suggests that the new plan will have to rely on the original plan for 
policies and goals, with a reprioritization based on the evolving technologies and market 
environment.  To keep momentum from failing each time there is a shift in ministry 
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heads, the effort should be decentralized for execution at the department level, rather than 
the ministerial level, but with stricter enforcement guidelines. 
Malaysia  
To develop KPIs for Malaysia, MOSTI followed the example of the OECD to 
include R&D benchmarks based on input indicators such as publications, patents, and 
technology balance of payments.  Of the output KPIs tracked for Malaysia’s programs, 
publications have increased significantly while patents have stagnated according to an 
official with MOSTI.  This lack of patent applications is not necessarily due to reduced 
R&D investment, but rather inadequate funds set aside for patenting within the local 
private sector and the lengthy patent process required.  Currently, the process requires 
three to four years for a patent, which could be reduced through increased training of 
patent office staff.  This process could also be improved through increased support for 
intellectual property rights and legal support to ICT sector firms.  This would require 
coordination across the government and local legal firms.  MOSTI, in conjunction with 
MDeC, needs to use its KPIs and other information to educate the country on the direct 
benefits of the ICT strategies to sustain financial and political support. 
In Malaysia, the ICT policies focus on infrastructure, industry support, and human 
capacity development.  The Malaysian government needs to focus on accelerating 
innovation, increasing utilization, and diffusing benefits simultaneously to receive the full 
economic benefit that ICTs can have on a country (Jomo, 2003).  Malaysia has taken the 
policy step of focusing on government interventions to ignite and support the innovation 
process within the country.  This means working with universities, the private sector, 
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MNCs, and non-profit organizations to bolster technology transfer, FDI, and technology 
training.   
Conclusions 
The transition from low-cost labor source within the global supply chain to 
international competitor is a difficult one.  Thailand is currently experiencing the 
difficulties of making this transition and is caught between the low-cost labor of China 
and Vietnam, and the higher levels of expertise within Malaysia and Singapore.  Many 
middle-income countries get trapped in between as they transition because they do not 
have the critical mass of technology and expertise to create centers of excellence around 
their ICT industries.  Instead, they lose their international investment and employment 
opportunities to countries with cheaper labor or to those with more expertise.   
ICTs can help accelerate the transition process by reducing transaction costs, 
increasing transparency, and enhancing links across sectors and with neighboring 
countries.  These national efforts then bolster research and knowledge transfer, which 
accelerates productivity growth and helps to diffuse economic benefits.  To capture these 
benefits of ICT adoption, a middle-income country needs a strong state intervention that 
supports and regulates the private sector in delivering affordable access across the 
country.  In addition, the national government must also focus on spreading the economic 
benefits beyond capital while ensuring that technology and expertise from MNCs are 
transferred to local firms across the economy – as Malaysia is currently striving to 
achieve.  The government has carefully crafted incentives for local and international 
businesses to invest in Malaysian ICT industries while demonstrating its willingness to 
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withdraw these incentives from local and international firms that no longer meet the 
standards for support. 
An unwillingness to cut off government support can lead to huge uncertainty and 
risk within the ICT market, reducing investment in the sector.  This limited investment 
slows the process of technology innovation and utilization, hampering both supply and 
demand within the sector.  Innovation suffers as local firms avoid the high risk of 
adapting newer technology to a local market that is poorly supported.  A lower level of 
supply and innovation can in turn dampen demand, limiting the reach of ICT services to 
select consumers and businesses able to afford them (Mephokee, 2005).  To avoid this 
vicious cycle of reduced investment and demand, a market must address the hurdles for 
utilization through coordinated public-private efforts.  Reaching a critical mass of users 
requires such initiatives as training, subsidies, and adapting the technology to the local 
environment.   
For middle-income countries, these cases suggest that the evolving role of the 
state must include coordinating across public-private actors while supporting the 
diffusion of technology access and its economic benefits across the country.  These cases 
also demonstrate the importance of setting aside implementation budgets, designating 
agency personnel, and developing an evaluation and KPI system for feedback from 
agencies and target populations. 
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Section 6: Discussion and Further Research 
Over the past two decades, telecommunications has evolved to become an 
essential service for the economic development of developing countries; viewed as vital 
for development like clean water, power generation, and new roads (James, 2003).  More 
recently, the goal of bringing affordable telecommunications access to each household 
throughout entire population, particularly those in rural areas, has become a priority 
among national governments and within the international community as an economic 
development tool (Luger, 2002).  Developing countries require close coordination of 
private and public sector resources to reach high levels of ICT adoption (Jomo, 1997).  
Countries with strong coordination and institutional support have been able to harness 
their public-private resources to produce indigenous capacity for accelerated ICT 
penetration, utilization, and innovation – which, in turn, directly supports the 
advancement of the economy. 
ICT Policy Development 
A number of national efforts are currently under way to develop technology 
sectors and increase adoption rates in developing countries, but many of these initiatives 
do not have a clear understanding of their potential impact and benefit on the economy – 
and are therefore difficult to justify politically or economically.  The stated goal of this 
research was to provide a set of tools for local and international policy makers and 
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technology providers to help assess the benefits of technology initiatives while tying 
them to the larger issue of economic development.   
For local policy makers, this research could be used to assess the best practices of 
other developing countries along with qualifying the benefits of their policies to help 
justify additional governmental programs and initiatives within the ICT sector.  For 
international policy makers at global organizations and institutions, the model and stages 
of ICT adoption could help identify countries behind their peers in technological 
development and refine the allocation of resources to enhance the impact of the aid.  For 
local and global technology providers, such as global carriers and ICT companies, both 
the model and stages of adoption could be used for decision making on investments.  This 
research could help these companies identify the trajectory of a country that is under 
consideration for new or additional investment.  
ICT development requires acknowledgement of societal diversity across countries 
and within regions.  Although overarching models for deployment and utilization can be 
developed, these models need to be flexible enough to be tailored to the national and 
regional requirements of the end users.  This customization of ICT deployment models is 
based on a country’s social, historical, economic, political, and cultural environment.  
ICT projects that are likely to succeed will build upon existing formal and informal 
structures in the region.  Projects that are not tailored to the society may be unsuited to 
meet the region’s needs at launch and lack the required local support to achieve 
sustainability. 
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ICT Investment – Is It Worth It?  
An important question had been whether ICT investment could be linked to 
productivity and economic growth.  This is particularly important in developing 
countries, which must determine whether to allocate their resources to ICTs or to another 
developmental initiative, such as health or education.  Gordon (2000) suggests that 
although the computer age has indeed brought back productivity gains to developed 
economies after a 20-year slump (1973-1995), it does not measure up to gains made from 
previous innovations.  He argues that this is particularly true of the modern age of 1913 
to 1972, ushered in by electricity, internal combustion, and apparently indoor plumbing.   
He goes on to suggest that because the productivity gains have been concentrated 
largely within the computer industry itself, the greatest benefits of computerization lie in 
the 1990s with little or no gains to be made in the future.  Gordon argues that the 
underlying reason for this is that computers and communication technology are 
delivering nothing new.  Two-way communication was offered by the telephone, instant 
news by the radio, extension of the day by electric light, and reduced transaction costs 
thanks to the gas motor. 
At the turn of the previous century, the inventions of gas motors and electricity 
existed and had been used commercially for years.  However, it was not until widespread 
adoption and innovative methods for utilization became commonplace across numerous 
sectors that the economy saw sustained and impressive productivity gains.  Despite the 
belief that 2000 represented the pinnacle of five years of ICT progress, this technology 
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has instead experienced slow and steady process across decades rather than leaps and 
bounds in a few, short years.   
The telecommunications revolutions started in the 1970s and will take additional 
decades to coalesce.  I would argue that we are at the very early stages of ICT integration 
into the wider economy and that we have not managed to take this set of technologies and 
diffuse them widely enough across all sectors. 
Key Questions 
The following section discusses the four key questions presented in the 
introduction of this research.  The positions on these four issues are based on the research 
completed for the ICT stages framework, regression model, and case studies. 
What is the proper role of the state in the development, deployment, and usage of 
ICTs? 
There is no single approach that is the state’s proper role in supporting ICT 
adoption.  As discussed in my research, the role of the state is ever-changing and differs 
widely across countries depending on their network infrastructure, market environment, 
geography, and overall economy.  Despite this wide variation, it is still important to note 
that developing countries that have had sustained success in their ICT adoption rates have 
also had a strong role for the government.  In most cases, a developing country’s ICT 
sector needs to be led by the private sector.  However, ICT deployment cannot be done 
without strong government regulation and either direct or indirect financial support.  
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Without this level of government participation in the sector, the challenges of an unstable 
environment can severely limit investment and competition. 
As countries shift their policies away from universal service and toward ICT 
innovation, the role of the state must evolve further.  Public-private collaboration is key 
for innovating and customizing ICTs for domestic use, which is essential to increasing 
adoption within developing countries.  Relying too heavily on international technologies, 
content, and applications will hamper utilization because these ICTs will not be tailored 
to the local environment.  To create clusters of ICT firms capable of competing globally – 
as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have accomplished – developing country 
governments must build strong institutions that can coordinate closely with the private 
sector.  The process of research, development, and commercialization is difficult for any 
country, including developed economies.  Developing country governments must take an 
active role to support the process while allowing the private sector enough flexibility to 
thrive. 
How does the state’s role evolve as a developing country transitions toward a more 
advanced ICT sector and overall economy? 
The government plays a vital role in the deployment of ICT infrastructure and the 
development of ICT-related industries.  As stated above, this role is constantly evolving 
to match the changing demands of the sector and shifts in technology options.  The 
deployment of infrastructure may have a government fill several roles simultaneously, 
from directly running municipal networks to offering indirect subsidies to carriers for 
deploying national ICT infrastructure.  Although these efforts require significant 
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resources and institutional support, they still do not require the same level of effort as 
ICT-sector development. 
As the technological capabilities of local firms and ICT providers become more 
advanced, governments must transition to a secondary role within the sector while 
simultaneously providing a more complex set of policy supports.  This can include a 
range of public-private R&D efforts, the creation of a technology park like Malaysia’s 
MSC, or providing venture capital to technology start-ups.  All of these efforts can 
support the development of clusters of innovative ICT firms.  However, they require 
significant budget and resources, and policymakers must choose from a wide array of 
policy options for effort.   
Those initiatives listed above also necessitate strong institutional structures to 
implement and maintain these efforts, requiring a significantly higher level of 
governmental response than was seen when the government had the primary role as 
monopoly operator in the sector.  As a result, it is a real policy challenge for both 
developing and developed country governments to be nimble enough in adapting to the 
changing domestic ICT sector and global technology market, while giving the private 
sector enough flexibility to pursue many different technology avenues instead of 
following government-led ICT decisions. 
What are the determinants for the successful implementation of a national ICT 
policy within developing countries? 
The development of a national ICT institution within a developing country assists 
in creating a critical mass of expertise and funding capable of implementing complex 
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sector support policies that are necessary for accelerating adoption rates.  As discussed in 
the case study section, there is a great deal of cross-border influence between national 
governments – including Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore – in the design of these 
institutions.  However, although creating an institution or national ICT policy based on 
international best practices is a necessary step, it is not sufficient to ensure successful 
implementation.  In Thailand, the government has experienced difficulties in funding, 
implementing, and evaluating ICT policies due to a weakness in its institutions and 
instability in its political environment. 
Once an ICT institution has been created, the government must set a clear national 
goal for ICT adoption and innovation that incorporates input from the private sector.  
This public-private coordination can assist in designing policy goals that are feasible (a 
problem in Thailand) but also target the most appropriate regions and sectors.  This 
cooperation can also help ensure that the policy or initiative is designed to fill a gap left 
by the market or by other public sector efforts, avoiding policy overlap and competing 
initiatives.  The necessary budgeting and authority must be given to the government 
ministry to ensure that program monitoring and evaluation are completed regularly. 
Only after these national goals and policies have been set should the ICT ministry 
determine the most appropriate technology options to fit the needs of residents and 
domestic firms.  These technology deployments should also offer an attractive 
environment to foreign companies, while avoiding the trap of placing the ICT 
requirements of these MNCs above the needs of domestic users.  Allowing the needs of 
MNCs to influence national ICT goals and policies too heavily can lead to limited ICT 
diffusion in developing countries, particularly to rural or low-income areas. 
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What are the major impediments facing developing countries as they attempt to 
accelerate the adoption and utilization of ICTs? 
One of the largest hurdles facing many developing countries, including Thailand, 
is the creation of a regulatory regime that is politically independent and a privatized 
monopoly operator that does not hamper competition.  The creation of a regulatory 
agency and the privatization process are the foundation for all other ICT policies, 
including universal services programs, competitive market regulation, and ICT cluster 
development.  If these two foundational reforms are not completed or become too heavily 
skewed by the political process, the resulting market conditions will hamper ICT 
adoption dramatically.  This was the case in Thailand, which saw its ICT adoption rates 
stall.  But similar challenges have plagued the US, which has seen its broadband market 
become a global laggard thanks in part to the weaknesses of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996. 
Another significant challenge for developing countries is their lack of ICT 
infrastructure, particularly in low-income countries that do not have the necessary 
networks to support rapid ICT adoption.  This lack of a network infrastructure can 
become self-reinforcing, as the poor infrastructure leads to poor services, and residents 
postpone adoption until utilization reaches a minimum threshold due to network effects.  
This can further dampen demand and starve networks of needed investment for 
improvements and expansion.  Poor infrastructure can also translate into a lack of local 
technological expertise, limiting the ability of operators, firms, and residents to utilize 
ICTs.  With low levels of domestic ICT expertise, developing countries may find it 
difficult to support a domestic ICT industry or the creation of local content.  In turn, this 
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can hamper ICT adoption by limiting the availability of technology, content, and 
applications tailored to the local environment. 
Further Research 
Although this research covers a wide range of topics within the area of ICT 
diffusion, several opportunities still remain for additional study in the area of institutional 
development and ICT adoption in developing countries.  The section below offers some 
initial thoughts on topics and methods that could be utilized for additional study in all 
three of these sections: the stages of ICT adoption, the global model, and the two national 
case studies. 
Stages of ICT Adoption Framework  
The section devoted to exploring the stages of ICT adoption attempted to span the 
range of key issues that determine the success or failure of ICT adoption efforts in 
developing countries.  Although many of these issues were examined in detail, there is 
opportunity for further study of some of these topics within each of the stages.  One of 
these areas includes studying the ICT policies of individual developing countries over 
their five stages of adoption.  Tracking the policies of a single country across the stages 
would help clarify the evolution of the state’s role in the ICT adoption process.  The other 
area of further study includes examining the institutional structures of additional 
developing countries to determine the pattern of structural changes in more granular 
detail.  This would include countries at all five stages and explore the shifting 
institutional structure as the developing country government shifts from centralized to 
decentralized participation in the ICT sector.  
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Regression Model  
Although the fixed effect model is one of the most common approaches to 
estimating the correlation between economic, social, and other factors and ICT adoption, 
there are several other methods that can be explored in additional research.  A number of 
telecommunications diffusion models track the penetration rates both across countries 
and within them, using a generalized Bass model.  This model helps account for the non-
linear take-up rate that exists in technology adoption, including ICTs.  ICT adoption can 
go through several phases in these models, reaching early adopter, mass market, and then 
late adopter penetration – with the total penetration rate for the country shaped as an s-
curve.  Several previous ICT studies used modified Bass models and can be used as a 
foundation for further study. 
Another option for this model that will be assessed is to use 2-Stage Least Squares 
to assess the impact of institutional and market factors on three ICT indicators: internet 
access, mobile subscribers, and fixed lines.  This would allow for the Internet penetration 
equation to include ISP competition, PC penetration, and fixed line penetration in 
addition to the economic and social control variables.  For fixed lines and mobile phones, 
population density and an independent regulatory agency would become key indicators.   
A third option is to adopt the economic development convergence models as a 
foundation for understanding the ability of developing countries to quickly catch up to 
developed country ICT penetration rates.  Based on the economic theory that countries 
will converge over time, this model has been used to study firm-level development within 
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and between countries across time.  Using this approach for cross-country ICT adoption, 
the model would use the institutional and policy factors.  The intervention will begin the 
process of convergence and then use economic and social metrics as structural limitations 
that will determine a country’s new converged state. 
Case Studies  
Although it may certainly be time consuming, additional developing country case 
studies would be beneficial for this research area.  One approach would be to complete 
another round of interviews in Asian countries that have a larger variance in their ICT 
adoption rates, policies, and institutions.  This variance in ICT adoption would offer a 
larger range of economic development levels among the study countries, allowing me to 
study in more depth the influence of economic development on evolving ICT policies and 
institutions.  This would allow for a more detailed framework and description of the 
stages of adoption as well.  In addition, because the study countries would still be in Asia, 
further research could be completed on the policy influence between countries.  This 
would build on the research from this study, which found significant cross-pollination 
among Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in their design of ICT policies and institutions. 
Finally, one of the most interesting results from some of my cross-country models 
was the negative correlation between ICT adoption and FDI as well as with trade.  This 
fits with the theory that FDI and trade can begin to have a detrimental effect on the 
technology choices of a developing country.  However, this area has not been explored 
thoroughly in the literature.  This topic would lend itself to a case study approach, which 
could clarify the influence MNCs and FDI have on the choices made by government 
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agencies, firms, and other technology buyers in developing countries.  This issue also 
could use extensive quantitative study to determine the thresholds where additional FDI 
or trade have a negative relationship with ICT adoption.  The interaction term between 
FDI and GDP per capita also suggests that there are GDP per capita thresholds where 
FDI becomes less of an influence on ICT adoption.  Understanding the contours of these 
relationships between ICTs, trade, FDI, and GDP per capita would be a valuable 
contribution to the literature.   
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Appendix A: Completed Interviews 
Thailand 
Organization Topics Covered 
Competitive fixed line 
carrier 
Broadband deployment plans, national licensing 
reforms, competitive landscape 
Competitive mobile phone 
operator 
Interconnection charges, regulatory structure, market 
structure, international mergers and acquisitions, 3G 
infrastructure, mobile enterprise applications 
Kenan Institute Asia Political trends, telecommunications sector structure 
Ministry of Finance Privatization process, state-owned enterprises, 
regulatory structure, program budgeting and evaluation 
Ministry of ICT E-governance programs, institutional reform process, 
agency budgeting, program monitoring 
Ministry of ICT (MICT) ICT market’s competitive structure, governmental 
supported training programs, design of upcoming ICT 
master plan 
National Electronics and 
Computer Technology 
Center (NECTEC) 
Institutional structure, institutional reforms, international 
investment, ICT master plan 
National 
Telecommunications 
Commission (NTC) 
Regulatory structure, universal service obligation, 
regulatory reform process, broadcast services reform, 
privatization process, market competition, international 
best practices for regulation 
Satellite operator Rural access, broadband data services, international 
connectivity costs, terrestrial fiber, wireless competition 
Software Industry 
Promotion Agency 
ICT master plan design and implementation, training 
programs, international traffic constraints  
Thailand Development 
Research Institute (TDRI) 
Regulatory structure, privatization process, 
interconnection, mobile wireless sector 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID) 
Political structure, telecommunications training, e-
governance programs 
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Malaysia 
Organization Topics Covered 
Competitive mobile carrier 3G licensing and services, market competition, 
international and regional expansion 
Fixed line operator Broadband deployment plans, Internet access demand, 
competitive landscape, metro fiber deployments 
Malaysian Communications 
and Multimedia 
Commission (MCMC) 
Regulatory structure, reform process, universal service 
obligations, market competition, broadband services 
Malaysian Industry-
Government Group for 
High Technology (MIGHT) 
Institutional structure, public-private partnerships, 
technology licensing, program budgeting, global supply 
chain 
Ministry of Energy, Water 
and Communications 
(KTAK) 
Institutional structure, reform process, Singaporean 
model, national broadband deployment goals 
Ministry of Finance Privatization process, program budgeting, ICT program 
monitoring  
Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation 
(MOSTI) 
Program evaluation, key performance indicators for ICT 
initiatives, technology policy reforms, global best 
practices for ICT policy design 
MOSTI (second interview) National ICT deployment plans, institutional structure, 
telecenter deployment and redesign, broadband 
infrastructure for educational facilities 
Multimedia Development 
Corporation (MDeC) 
Technology policy, institutional structure, reform 
process, cross-border cooperation 
MDeC (second and third 
interviews) 
Multimedia Super Corridor, state-level funding for 
additional technology parks, governmental interventions 
to bolster economic spillovers 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID) 
Political structure, telecom market structure, e-
governance programs 
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Appendix B: Question Set 
• What are the goals of the national ICT policies?  Do they include increased 
adoption, innovation, training, or others? 
• What regional area do the national ICT policies cover?  Will this change in the 
foreseeable future? 
• What prompted the development of national ICT policies?  Who was involved?  
• What types of organizations are currently supporting the ICT policies?  How do 
you see that changing? 
• What organization/institution currently leads and coordinates the national ICT 
strategy?  
• Who are the important stakeholders that have supported national ICT policies? 
• What services does the partnership offer to local residents and citizens? 
• What organizational, cultural, or social barriers have been encountered with these 
policies?  
• What have been the most important hurdles faced by the ICT strategy?  How 
have/are they being addressed?  
• What are the major economic, political, and regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of national ICT strategy that have been faced, if any? 
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• Where does the national ICT strategy receive its funding?  What is the current 
budget?  How will that change in the next one to two years? 
• Have there been any issues with low demand for services?  Have there been issues 
of support from the private sector?  How does the national ICT strategy raise 
awareness of its activities? 
• How is the lead institution working to ensure sustainability of the national ICT 
strategy?  
 
 
 
